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With the evolution of communication technology and the exponential increase of mobile devices, the ubiquitous networking allows people to use our data and computing resources anytime and everywhere. However, numerous security concerns and complicated requirements arise as these ubiquitous networks are deployed throughout people’s lives. To meet the challenge, the user authentication schemes in ubiquitous networks should ensure the essential security properties for the preservation of the privacy with low computational cost. In 2017, Chaudhry et al. proposed a password-based authentication scheme for the roaming in ubiquitous networks to enhance the security. Unfortunately, we found that their scheme remains insecure in its protection of the user privacy. In this paper, we prove that Chaudhry et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the stolen-mobile device and user impersonation attacks, and its drawbacks comprise the absence of the incorrect login-input detection, the incorrectness of the password change phase, and the absence of the revocation provision. Moreover, we suggest a possible way to fix the security flaw in Chaudhry et al’s scheme by using the biometric-based authentication for which the bio-hash is applied in the implementation of a three-factor authentication. We prove the security of the proposed scheme with the random oracle model and formally verify its security properties using a tool named ProVerif, and analyze it in terms of the computational and communication cost. The analysis result shows that the proposed scheme is suitable for resource-constrained ubiquitous environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) is a network-based mobility management protocol that allows a Mobile Node(MN) connected to the PMIPv6 domain to move from one network to another without changing the assigned IPv6 address. The user authentication procedure in this protocol is not standardized, but many smartcard based authentication schemes have been proposed. Recently, Alizadeh et al. proposed an authentication scheme for the PMIPv6. However, it could allow an attacker to derive an encryption key that must be securely shared between MN and the Mobile Access Gate(MAG). As a result, outsider adversary can derive MN’s identity, password and session key. In this paper, we analyze Alizadeh et al.’s scheme regarding security and propose an enhanced authentication scheme that uses a dynamic identity to satisfy anonymity. Furthermore, we use BAN logic to show that our scheme can successfully generate and communicate with the inter-entity session key. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rapid development of personal information and wireless communication technology, user authentication schemes have been crucial to ensure that wireless communications are secure. As such, various authentication schemes with multi-factor authentication have been proposed to improve the security of electronic communications. Multi-factor authentication involves the use of passwords, smart cards, and various biometrics to provide users with the utmost privacy and data protection. Cao and Ge analyzed various authentication schemes and found that Younghwa An’s scheme was susceptible to a replay attack where an adversary masquerades as a legal server and a user masquerading attack where user anonymity is not provided, allowing an adversary to execute a password change process by intercepting the user’s ID during login. Cao and Ge improved upon Younghwa An’s scheme, but various security problems remained. This study demonstrates that Cao and Ge’s scheme is susceptible to a biometric recognition error, slow wrong password detection, off-line password attack, user impersonation attack, ID guessing attack, a DoS attack, and that their scheme cannot provide session key agreement. Then, to address all weaknesses identified in Cao and Ge’s scheme, this study proposes a security enhanced multi-factor biometric authentication scheme and provides a security analysis and formal analysis using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic. Finally, the efficiency analysis reveals that the proposed scheme can protect against several possible types of attacks with only a slightly high computational cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowadays, many hospitals and medical institutes employ an authentication protocol within electronic patient records (EPR) services in order to provide protected electronic transactions in e-medicine systems. In order to establish efficient and robust health care services, numerous studies have been carried out on authentication protocols. Recently, Li et al. proposed a user authenticated key agreement scheme according to EPR information systems, arguing that their scheme is able to resist various types of attacks and preserve diverse security properties. However, this scheme possesses critical vulnerabilities. First, the scheme cannot prevent off-line password guessing attacks and server spoofing attack, and cannot preserve user identity. Second, there is no password verification process with the failure to identify the correct password at the beginning of the login phase. Third, the mechanism of password change is incompetent, in that it induces inefficient communication in communicating with the server to change a user password. Therefore, we suggest an upgraded version of the user authenticated key agreement scheme that provides enhanced security. Our security and performance analysis shows that compared to other related schemes, our scheme not only improves the security level, but also ensures efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In multi-server environments, user authentication is a very important issue because it provides the authorization that enables users to access their data and services; furthermore, remote user authentication schemes for multi-server environments have solved the problem that has arisen from user’s management of different identities and passwords. For this reason, numerous user authentication schemes that are designed for multi-server environments have been proposed over recent years. In 2015, Lu et al. improved upon Mishra et al.’s scheme, claiming that their remote user authentication scheme is more secure and practical; however, we found that Lu et al.’s scheme is still insecure and incorrect. In this paper, we demonstrate that Lu et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to outsider attack and user impersonation attack, and we propose a new biometrics-based scheme for authentication and key agreement that can be used in multi-server environments; then, we show that our proposed scheme is more secure and supports the required security properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A smart-card-based user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks (hereafter referred to as a SCA-WSN scheme) is designed to ensure that only users who possess both a smart card and the corresponding password are allowed to gain access to sensor data and their transmissions. Despite many research efforts in recent years, it remains a challenging task to design an efficient SCA-WSN scheme that achieves user anonymity. The majority of published SCA-WSN schemes use only lightweight cryptographic techniques (rather than public-key cryptographic techniques) for the sake of efficiency, and have been demonstrated to suffer from the inability to provide user anonymity. Some schemes employ elliptic curve cryptography for better security but require sensors with strict resource constraints to perform computationally expensive scalar-point multiplications; despite the increased computational requirements, these schemes do not provide user anonymity. In this paper, we present a new SCA-WSN scheme that not only achieves user anonymity but also is efficient in terms of the computation loads for sensors. Our scheme employs elliptic curve cryptography but restricts its use only to anonymous user-to-gateway authentication, thereby allowing sensors to perform only lightweight cryptographic operations. Our scheme also enjoys provable security in a formal model extended from the widely accepted Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway (2000) model to capture the user anonymity property and various SCA-WSN specific attacks (e.g., stolen smart card attacks, node capture attacks, privileged insider attacks, and stolen verifier attacks). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]