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Pests and diseases are an existential threat to trees in forests and woodlands. There is, therefore, a pressing need to use ecological and bioeconomic models to inform forest managers on control and mitigation strategies. For example, the incidence of Dothistroma needle blight in the UK has increased rapidly since the 1990s, and it is a significant threat to the productivity of commercial forestry. Climatic changes are expected to exacerbate this problem further. Control of the disease in the UK primarily focuses on good stand management through pre-commercial thinning; similar practices are widely used in commercial forests worldwide. Forest managers would benefit from evidence on the effectiveness of this precautionary strategy (in comparison to its alternatives) to reduce disease impacts and increase the value extracted from timber. In this paper, we develop a bioeconomic model to determine the economically optimal harvesting regime – in terms of thinning and rotation – of an even-aged plantation under the risk of an invading pest. We extend a Schaefer–Faustmann model to include a compartmental epidemiological system that governs timber growth and disease spread. We analyse a set of management regimes, including the timing of the final clear-felling of the forest and the timing and level of earlier thinning. Thus, in our approach, forest managers decide whether and when to thin and must balance (i) harvesting before infection destroys the timber's value and (ii) exploiting the forest's density-dependent growth. We use a sensitivity analysis with respect to the disease spread and impact on the tree dynamics to demonstrate that, in the presence of disease, thinning can significantly improve the net present value of the plantation if applied correctly. Furthermore, if thinning reduces the transmission rate significantly, the priority is to protect the final harvest, and rotations extend while the thinning time shortens. Our study provides a framework to help design appropriate forest management strategies in the presence of disease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1897 British Friends established the first African mission corporately endorsed by Britain Yearly Meeting--a commercial clove plantation employing freed slaves on the island of Pemba, off the coast of Tanzania. Rather than following existing missionary models which focused on conversion, education, and health, Quakers attempted an enterprising approach, developing an ' industrial mission' which could become financially self-sustaining. However, lacking experience on the African continent, with ambivalent support from Friends in Britain, and little engagement with the needs and desires of the freed slaves, meant that Quaker missionaries were not successful in winning converts nor in creating a sustainable plantation. This paper argues that the possibility for Quakers to bring something new and beneficial to the missionary field was mostly unachieved. Further, Friends may even have contributed to the power structures which stopped freed slaves from becoming truly liberated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing principally upon a rich vein of previously unexploited business records, this paper analyses the experience of British firms in Indonesia between the achievement of independence and the beginnings of the Suharto regime. As in The Netherlands East Indies, British enterprises occupied a significant position in post-colonial Indonesia in plantations, oil extraction, shipping, banking, the import-export trade, and manufacturing. After the nationalization of Dutch businesses from the end of 1957, Britain emerged as the leading investing power in the archipelago alongside the United States. However, during Indonesia's Confrontation with British-backed Malaysia (1963–1966), most UK-owned companies in the islands were subject to a series of torrid (albeit temporary) takeovers by the trade unions and subsequently various government authorities. Most of these investments were returned to British ownership under Suharto after 1967. But, in surviving the Sukarno era, British firms had endured 15 years of increasing inconvenience and insecurity trapped in a power struggle within Indonesia's perplexing plural polity (and particularly between the Communist Party and the military). Indeed, the Konfrontasi takeovers themselves, varying in intensity from region to region and from firm to firm, were indicative of deep fissures within Indonesian administration and politics. The unpredictable and unsettled political economy of post-colonial Indonesia meant that the balance of advantage lay not with transnational enterprise but with the host state and society. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]