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The article analyses how population genetics has impacted on nationalist discourses across the Taiwan Straits and affected the relationship between Taiwan and China since the 1990s. In Taiwan this cutting-edge science has helped to construct a native-based and Taiwan-centred national identity through promoting indigenous peoples' rights, rejecting a blood-based, cross-Straits nationalism, and founding a pan-Pacific indigenous peoples' community through genetic links and cultural affinity. In China, after subverting the nationalist myth of Peking Man (a Homo erectus group believed to be the common ancestor of the Chinese) by analysing genetic data, the same group of Chinese genetic scientists have constructed another nationalist myth of a genetically homogenous nationhood. Such a discourse not only valorizes Chinese nationalism through claiming a DNA-based Chineseness across ethnic distinctions but also asserts genetic links between China and Taiwan, therefore providing a 'scientific' basis for China's nationalism in the new century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative studies of nationalism rarely incorporate China as a case in their observations. Despite the rise of nationalism in salience throughout Chinese society, studies of nationalism in China are frequently tagged as insularly focused and unsuitable for comparison. However, a survey of the literature in Chinese nationalism studies reveals that similar blind spots and limitations challenge studies of China with more general comparative research on nationalism. Given this parallelism in development, I argue that looking to observations of China provides scholars of nationalism with vital opportunities to expand and refine theory to include insights from a non-western, non-democratic case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is Chinese nationalism? Is nationalism the most effective framework for understanding how people in China are making sense of the world today? These are among the questions raised by Allen Carlson in his 2009 article 'A flawed perspective: the limitations inherent within the study of Chinese nationalism', which developed a provocative critique of decades of scholarship. Acknowledging the insights of Carlton's questions while disagreeing with his proposed conceptual shift towards national identity construction, I propose a further shift towards national identity deconstruction. In doing so, I combine the political insights of Hong Kong nationalists with the theoretical insights of deconstruction. This shift redirects the study of Chinese nationalism away from an abstract conceptualisation of nationalism to a more precise definition of the phenomena under study, as well as moving the debate on potential impacts away from international relations to consideration of the complex dynamics of China's ethnic politics. New definitions of both nationalism and minzu (of minzu zhuyi) are developed, reconceptualising the phenomena heretofore known as 'Chinese nationalism' as external symptoms of underlying tensions between conflicting identity narratives. In conclusion, the practical implications of this reconceptualisation are considered, exploring potential future paths for the People's Republic of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National identity is the cognition of citizens regarding to which political community they belong, and the tendency to accept the political, cultural and ethnic values of the state. Previous studies have found that national identity is heterogeneous at the subnational levels. Why do people hold different degrees of nationalism and patriotism in the subnational units? In this paper, we offer a political economic explanation of national identity, which links the state capacity with political attitudes. We employ a nationalism-patriotism framework to decompose the concept of national identity, then use the supervised learning approach to measure nationalism and patriotism based on a massive number of Weibo posts dating from 2011 to 2017. Automated text analysis shows that the state capacity plays an important role preventing the national identity from being weakened by globalization and the diversity of social information. Specifically, with the progress of China's globalization, multiculturalism and various information have crossed the national boundaries, which undermines China's national identity. In order to maintain this identity, the Chinese government utilizes its redistribution capacity to reinforce both nationalism and patriotism, and also its information capacity to strengthen nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Finnish national identities because they expressed the shared experiences of newly established Finnish communities, and they were crucial in constructing a new nation. It also explores created images of the Finnish and Finland, as well as community construction in Republican China, especially after Finland gained independence in 1917. Another aim is to examine those Finnish political, cultural and economic activities that supported their identity construction in China. The specific emphasis will be on analysing the largest and sometimes cross‐functioning Finnish groups in China: the governmental officials and the commercial community. By using qualitative methods, namely, discourse analysis and historical analysis, this study shows how the Finnish community created alternative, sometimes imaginative and frequently anti‐imperialist national identities in the new Republican China. Indeed, by signing the Treaty Principles of Reciprocity and Equal Treatment, it was agreed that Finland and China 'shall enjoy same rights, privileges, favours, immunities and exemptions which [might] be accorded to similar foreign agents in accordance with the principles of international law'. This article argues that Finnish aspirations were positively regarded by many Chinese, and they respected this quite unique national connection with Finland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research aims to explore the changes of national identity among Chinese international students in the odd social context of the global pandemic. By conducting semi-structured interviews with 10 Chinese undergraduate and postgraduate students in a prestigious university located in London, UK, the study provides evidence of Western neo-racism against Chinese students and the rise of Chinese nationalism. More significantly, it is found that Western neo-racism and Chinese nationalism have a push and pull effect on the national identity enhancement of Chinese international students. The participants revealed that bottom-up popular nationalism is more than a shadow of top-down state nationalism in China, and is more influential on students' national identity formation. The research also discusses the implications of these findings, limitations and future research directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that in order to understand how national identity and political activism are linked, it is necessary to replace the old dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism with a new one that distinguishes between a constructive and a "blind" identity. Hong Kong provides an illustrative case for the problems of having the former while also needing to promote the latter. While the local government seeks to promote active citizenry, it has since 1997 become part of an illiberal nation-state that seeks unconditional support. The 2014 Umbrella Movement was driven by and has shaped the students' constructive Hong Kong identity because it raised the desire to actively participate as members of the local political community while it reduced interest in the Chinese national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rise of the China Model, China's sharp power has infringed upon the exercise of liberal democracy in other nations. A concern for governments of the Taiwan Strait and other democratic countries is whether visits to Mainland China alter the national identity of Taiwanese youth. This research conducted a panel study of 331 Taiwanese youths who had visited Mainland China. Social contact, rational choice, and political socialization theories were introduced to establish hypotheses; a questionnaire was employed to collect panel data, and statistical regression models were utilized to test the hypotheses. Following visits to Mainland China, the number of participants perceiving themselves as only Taiwanese decreased by 4.59%; those perceiving themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese increased by 3.98%, and those perceiving themselves as Chinese increased by 0.61%. According to the mean survey results, the average change to national identity was 0.05, indicating that visiting Mainland China slightly negatively influenced participants' Taiwanese identity. Following visits to Mainland China, participants' impression of China improved, their preference for an independent Taiwan reduced, they seemed less satisfied with Taiwan's democratic government, and their personal sense of being Taiwanese was reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on Hong Kong's history have viewed the 1967 riots as a watershed in the formation of Hong Kong identity in the 1960s and 1970s. However, by considering MacLehose's social policies as the main contribution to Hong Kong identity formation and defining China as 'the Other' in that process, the prevailing view overlooks the multifaceted nature of Hong Kong identity formation and the continuity of Hong Kong's historical development between the mid-1960s and the 1970s. This article questions that view by investigating the Cultural Revolution discourse in three rarely examined yet representative Hong Kong youth and student journals: Undergrad (Xueyuan), Chinese University Student Press (Zhongda xuesheng bao), and Pan Ku (Pangu). Through examining the three publications' interpretations of the Cultural Revolution during nationalist moments and movements in Hong Kong—the 1967 riots, the Chinese Language movement, the Defending the Diaoyu Islands movement, and the 'Learning about China, Caring about Society' campaign—the article discusses the ways in which the Cultural Revolution profoundly affected educated youth and students by contributing to the mutual development of their national and local identities at the intersection of political, ideological, cultural, and geographical perspectives. By documenting the local practices of the Cultural Revolution and the concept of 'serving the people,' the article demonstrates that Chinese nationalism, along with Maoism and the Cultural Revolution, played an important role in the formation of Hong Kong identity in the colonial setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research shows multiple articulations of national identity by Hong Kong's people since the handover in 1997. An issue of contention is whether the dichotomy of China as the "other" vis-à-vis Hong Kong's local identity still prevails in the context of top-down renationalisation and new developments in transborder spatiality. While the existing literature has illustrated Hong Kong people's steady growth of pride and affinity for national symbols, re-examination of three representative surveys (2006, 2008, and 2010) demonstrates that resistance to these cultural icons is also growing. Furthermore, while previous studies have revealed that a "cultural-economic China" is more welcome than a "political China," the three surveys mentioned above indicate that even the former is meeting growing local resistance. The otherness of China hence should be re-visited in light of the ambivalence of Hong Kong identity. The theoretical and social implications of this sense of the otherness of China are also significant. Specifically, this article argues that the ambivalence of Hong Kong people's articulation of national identity is closely connected to the uneasiness generated by encounters between China and Hong Kong in recent years: controversies and contentions arising from national education, the transborder flow of population, and the provision of goods and public services for non-locals. In this paper, I shall look at the development of local and national identities in some states of contested equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 20th century, numerous scholars have proposed theories and models describing, interpreting, and suggesting the development paths countries have taken or should take. None of these, however, can fully explain China's efforts, mainly through education and citizenship education, to modernize itself and foster a modern citizenry since the late 19th century. This article traces and examines these efforts through a reflective and critical analysis of such public texts as official policy documents, curriculum standards, and related commentaries, and reveals three major findings. First, China's leaders have advanced different views of and approaches to development and citizenship in response to changing domestic and global contexts. Second, the Chinese state determines China's development course, defines its national identity and citizenry, and selects its nation-building curricula. Third, the Chinese state's growing desire for national rejuvenation in an increasingly competitive, globalized world in the 21st century mandates an important education mission that its citizenship education be politically and ideologically open and accommodative, and help students develop global, national and local identities and function as active, responsible citizens of a multileveled, multicultural world. This article furthers academic understanding of how China's education responds to economic, political, and social demands and shapes students' multiple identities in a global age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Western representation of the others and the self-representation of the others have received varying degree of scholarly interest, with the former being extensively explored and the latter being largely ignored. Based on the social semiotic interpretation of Chinese visual showcase 'Experience China', this project attempts to contribute to the study of the self-representation of non-Western countries. This dissertation intends to answer the question how China depicts its national identity to both its internal and external audience. The exploration of the video is situated in the cross examination of nationalism and self-Orientalism. As demonstrated throughout this research, nationalism, as the layered meaning of the video, is invoked by the government to cement the national identity of its internal audience and brand itself to the global audience. By stimulating the resonance of the global audience, awakening the national pride and highlighting its soft power, China has depicted its national identity as a powerful and influential nation posing no threat to others. However, the further probe into the representation of Chinese women and Chinese course of modernisation reveals a contrastive expression of Chinese national identity. On one hand, by superimposing various traditional elements appealing to Western sensibility, women in the showcase have been utilised to satisfy the rosy imagination of the West and display a fixed image of China. On the other hand, the video portrays a modern China capable of alleviating poverty and boosting technology. However, the representation of modern China is largely restricted to the material dimension. The reification and reductionistic perception of modernity chiefly result from Chinese immense yearning for achieving modernity and the Chinese Communist Party's concern of Western ideological threats. China, though with certain degree of resistance, slides into self-Orientalism in depicting its national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the theory of social construction of reality deriving from the writings of Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger to explain the origin of national identity and hence the emergence of a nation. It argues that social construction of national reality originates from everyday life experience taken for granted during the process of socialization. Individuals make sense out of the external world. Experiences taken for granted become actor's stock of knowledge. A common scheme of knowledge shared by the community serves to differentiate in-group (nationals) and out-group (foreigners). Collective consciousness thus defines national identity and hence a nation. Unless people (both in-group and out-group) interact with and learn from each other, different stocks of knowledge taken for granted will create political tension. This theory will be applied to understand the tensions in Tibet and along the Taiwan Strait. The paper further argues that Taiwan can hardly separate from mainland China in the future, while strong Tibetan consciousness continues to defy against powerful Chineseness, resulting in endless upheavals in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we examine the emergence of a growing debate in China over the legacy of Beijing's Old Summer Palace (Yuan-mingyuan), burned to the ground by British and French troops in 1860 and looted of its valuable antiques. The debate has arisen in response to an increased official focus on this traumatic incident in China's history, initiated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as part of its ongoing quest for nationalist legitimacy. By reminding the public of the devastation inflicted by the British and French and by linking this directly to the so-called Century of Humiliation, the party has sought to present itself as the true savior of the Chinese nation. But some of China's online critics have responded negatively on the issue. Some reject the official narrative on the Yuanmingyuan incident as biased and fabricated. Others criticize the amounts of time and money that the CCP is expending in keeping the legacy alive, particularly in light of more pressing domestic issues. Most significantly, some people insist that China remains subordinate to foreign powers despite more than sixty years of CCP rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses national identity in Taiwan as of September 2012, focusing on an analysis of the nation's identity politics and democratization process which reportedly began in 1987. The institution of general political elections in Taiwan is addressed, along with an examination of the cross-Strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan. The cultural origins of China are assessed, as well as the evolution of socio-political developments in both Taiwan and China. Former Chinese President Lee Teng-hui is also mentioned.

This article outlines and analyses the political character of Taiwan’s relationship with international sport, and in particular with the Olympic movement. In so doing, it seeks to add to the understanding of the links between sport and the formation and reproduction of national identities, with specific reference to the various cultural and ethnic identities of Taiwan, and to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between ethnic and civic nationalism. The idea of the ‘New Taiwanese’ involves an ethnically divided people coming to see themselves as a cohesive group (Wong, 2001). Success in international sport can contribute to this process as it has in other post-colonial settings. Precisely how national identity formation in Taiwan will further develop, however, is difficult, if not impossible, to predict. What is certain, however, is that sport will continue to play a significant role in the unfolding process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both ongoing practice and the theory of interaction ritual chains imply the significance of the contribution that ritual makes to group solidarity, such as national identification. This contribution is in need of empirical examination as in this study, which surveyed 1,788 schoolchildren in Hong Kong, a special administrative region of China. The results show that, controlling for earlier national identification behavior (within the previous year) and other predictors, ritualized interaction in an activity for national cause (within the previous 6 months) manifested both linear and quadratic positive effects on current national identification sentiment. The effect was stronger for children who previously displayed lower national identification behavior. These results favor the use of ritual to promote national identification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the construction of local and national identities among secondary school students in post-colonial Hong Kong. As a Chinese society that has undergone a prolonged period of British colonial rule, the reunification of capitalist Hong Kong with the motherland under socialism in 1997 has set the context for a negotiation of identities. It has been revealed that the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has tried to foster a stronger sense of national identity and a sense of belonging among the younger generations through its education reform measures in the new millennium. Nation-building is part and parcel of the reform, although it is being interpreted and implemented diversely by local officials, school principals and teachers. The intersecting and overlapping nature of students' different identities has set the parameters of their identity formation but allows different latitudes of observance and/or choice of different identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author focuses on how China viewed Taiwan and the people of Taiwan between 1931, the year Japan invaded Manchuria, and 1941, the year the U.S. entered World War II. Some of the subjects considered include nationalism, Chinese identity, Chinese political thought, and the ideology of nation-building and cultural identity. An overview of the historiography of competing Chinese and Taiwanese national identity exemplified in the writings of historians Emma Jinhua Teng, Alan M. Wachman, and Steven E. Phillips, is presented.

This study addresses the Chinese Second World War victims' reparations movement (CWRM) against Japan as a case of contemporary Chinese memory politics. While many studies indicate the Chinese government's use of the war memories for political purposes, ours focuses on how official discourses are translated into citizens' political participation and how the state-society interactions lead to variation in the development of the movement sectors within the case of CWRM. Drawing on textual and ethnographic data and a theoretical "dynamic statism," we argue that the central government's ambivalent attitude towards this ideologically useful yet institutionally troublesome movement created room for local governments and the movement to pursue their own causes. Yet the local and central governments' strong interventions, either facilitation or repression, discouraged civil society's participation and led to the underdevelopment of some movement sectors. In the sectors where the local governments held an attitude of absenteeism or co-operation, the movement was able to mobilize resources from civil society and state institutions and finally developed well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rising nationalism in 2008 has marked the turning point in China's evolving national identity. This most recent wave of nationalism shows that, as China rises as a great power, the Chinese people's perceptions about their national identity are challenged by a number of issues that need to be addressed. The transformation of the Chinese national identity is influenced by both the Chinese government and the public. The Chinese government plays a leading role in constructing a national identity that complements its cultural diplomacy and serves China's core national interests. Meanwhile. the public also contributes to the forging of the national identity through expressing its views and demands in this regard. It is of great importance for people to understand China's emerging new national identity in dealing with this rising power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The populist-oriented Hollywood blockbuster movies that tend to target the lowest common denominator are often accused by Chinese intellectuals of being culturally debilitating. Yet China's nationwide debate revolving around two recent technocratic, spectacle-driven domestic blockbusters by its renowned film director Zhang Yimou, Hero (2002) and House of Flying Daggers (2004), and their flamboyant marketing have demonstrated Hollywood's broader and more systemic impact on China's film style, marketing practice and media culture, which are increasingly in line with the unified global standard set by Hollywood and marked by relentless commercialism. By studying the two movies' reception in China, this article discusses how a national culture receives globalized versions of its own traditions, the role of Hollywood, and the implications for international cultural exchange and national identity in the context of the international cultural economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is nationalism in China on the rise? Is it making China more combative in the international arena? More fundamentally: Is a focus on nationalism the most effective intellectual framework for understanding how those living within the People's Republic of China (PRC) are defining their position in contemporary world politics? This article briefly answers each of these questions. It argues that, despite forwarding some compelling insights, previous work on Chinese nationalism has been undermined by a number of major flaws. It then finds that such shortcomings are in no small part a product of the narrowing gaze that a focus on nationalism alone imposes on the study of identity politics. The article then advocates that in place of the nationalism rubric, a turn to the broader question of national identity formation is merited. Utilising this perspective, it concludes by cautioning that incipient splits within contemporary Chinese national identity may portend a more tumultuous relationship between China and the rest of the world in the years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hong Kong is a paradox in democratization and modernization theory: it has a vibrant civil society and high level of economic development, but very slow democratization. Hong Kong's status as a hybrid regime and its power dependence on China shape the dynamics of civil society in Hong Kong. The ideological orientations and organizational form of its civil society, and its detachment from the political society, prevent civil society in Hong Kong from engineering a formidable territory-wide movement to push for institutional reforms. The high level of civil liberties has reduced the sense of urgency, and the protracted transition has led to transition fatigue, making it difficult to sustain popular mobilization. Years of persistent civil society movements, however, have created a perennial legitimacy problem for the government, and drove Beijing to try to set a timetable for full democracy to solve the legitimacy and governance problems of Hong Kong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on digital archives and technical revisionism related to the search for "Kilometer Zero," the Sino-Vietnamese border which is a prominent symbol of sovereignty in Vietnam. It talks about rumors on a secret agreement between the Communist Parties of China and Vietnam which moved the boundary between their countries in 1999. The emergence of new models of Vietnamese national identity and the inability of the Vietnamese government to control the consideration of Kilometer Zero as a symbol of space, virtual, domestic and diasporic are discussed.

This article explores the historical changes in the national identity of the Korean minority in China from the period of Japanese colonial invasion through to the present. Existing studies have taken an ethno-cultural approach to the Korean minority's dual identity, but they have ignored the importance of political identity-formation which creates, re-creates, and transforms national identity. The Korean minority's national identity has been determined by political and economic factors rather than ethnic and cultural backgrounds. In this regard, the Korean minority's double-minded self-understanding of its own nationhood has shifted from an ethnicity-centred dual identity to a nationality-centred dual identity. This article notes that the Korean minority's national identity has been created and re-created by political identity-formation, and its imagination of ethnicity has been transformed through this political process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the representation of Chinese identity in museums in the People's Republic of China, comparing this briefly with the portrayal of local and national identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In particular, the article looks at the implications for museums of the shift in emphasis within state ideology from socialism to patriotism - a shift that has been particularly marked since the early 1990s. Museums in contemporary China are officially designated as 'bases for patriotic education', but the content of the 'patriotism' that they are meant to promote remains in many respects vague or problematic. One of the key tensions here is that between a deep-rooted assumption of equivalence between 'Chinese' and 'Han' culture and history, and the multicultural reality of the contemporary People's Republic - including as it does a range of non-Han groups such as Tibetans, Uighurs and Mongols. The progressive abandonment of socialism has in some ways exposed these contradictions more starkly in recent years. Meanwhile, the homogenous and totalising official vision of Chinese identity in general, and Han identity in particular, is contested either at the popular or the official level (or both) in the largely Han communities of Hong Kong and Taiwan. In a rapidly commercialising and modernising China, the promotion of a state-centred patriotism has become a key instrument for the regime in its efforts to preserve its legitimacy, and museums represent a key element in this strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese nationalism primarily represents Han nationalism and ignores ethnic minority sub-nationalisms and identities in the larger cause of the state's unity and integrity. The Chinese state calls for submerging of all minority identities within the predominant Han identity, for promoting national cohesion and nationalism, effectively precluding the possibility of the assertion of Tibetan nationalism and autonomy. Because of the suppression of Tibetans in China, a large number of them have fled and settled in India and elsewhere. The Tibetan movement for safeguarding their identity, culture and political space has grievously suffered as a result of Chinese nationalism and China's Tibet policy. The fate of Tibetan nationalism is, to a large extent, tied to the dynamics of the Sino-Indian relations and the course of the internal Tibetan politics and that of its relationship with the community in exile in the post-Dalai Lama era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Chinese diasporic culture and national identity in Singapore. The section reflects on the importance of the Tiger Balm Gardens or Haw Par Villa, built in the 1930s by overseas Chinese pharmaceuticals tycoon Aw Boon Haw, in Singapore's Chinese community area. According to the report, during the colonial era, the garden marked the success not only of Aw Boon Haw but also of the Chinese migrant community in Singapore, which was renovated into an orientalized theme park and then resuscitated as the repository of diasporic Chinese entrepreneurship.

The article examines China's successful bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics in terms of Chinese socio-politics and the politics of identity. The Beijing Olympics mark a turning point in China's drive to become a unified, modernized nation within the global community. The Olympics have brought to the fore some considerations of identity politics in the process of modernization, particularly in regards to China's attitudes towards Taiwan. China will have to unify its populace without overtly resorting to the authoritarian structures it has clung to in the past.

This paper points out the limitations of culturalist approaches to the PRC and the ROK and deals with factors that contribute to the legal definition of citizenship in those two counties. The understanding of political and economic interests, rather than cultural aspects, is important in explaining the changes of the definition of citizenship there. China institutionalized a state-centered national identity, while Korea constructed an ethnic-centered national identity as they became integrated into the international order as nation-states. However, both the PRC and ROK made important changes in their legal definitions of citizenship regardless of their distinct national identities in China and Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term guomin is found in Chinese texts from an early period. However, as commonly used today – as a modern political concept of special value and significance – guomin belongs to a political vocabulary adopted by Chinese intellectuals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from Japan’s new usages. The goal of this essay is to explain how this important concept was formed and what it signified. The term guomin has basically conveyed two levels of meaning since the late Qing. In essence, the term is similar to the English word ‘citizenship’, and it reveals a kind of awakening of a new political consciousness on the part of Chinese intellectuals since the late Qing. Through the discourse of guomin, they began to emphasize the subjectivity of each individual in the national political process, along with all of their rights and duties. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the criticisms and reflections of Chinese intellectuals about traditional politics, society and culture, and thought have basically developed along the lines of the logic of ‘turning subjects into citizens’. However, the pursuit of a strong nation-state under a civil crisis sparked by foreign pressure marked the historical conditions that generated the modern Chinese guomin discourse. Limited by this kind of ‘national identity,’ the discourse and construction of guomin since the late Qing have never been able to escape the shadow of the state. Under these ideological conditions, guomin could only become a means of the nationalist project for survival; it could never become an autonomous and universal category. Guomin, as it turns out, has been, and still remains, ‘the people of the state’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses both Manchu and Han sources to interrogate the relationship between Qing and China. After toppling the Ming reign, the Qing rulers identified their state with China as their eighteenth-century campaigns in Inner Asia redefined what China was. By the early twentieth century, educational institutions had Facilitated the Manchu efforts to gain the hearts and minds of the Han intellectual elite, who embraced the idea that China was a multiethnic state. Although Manchu rule ended in 191 I, the Chinese people never returned to the position that "China" was the property of the Han people: China's modem identity would be that of a unified multiethnic state. In other words, the Qing legacies to modem China include not just the country's vast territory but also a new concept of China that laid the solid foundation for the rise of its national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional understandings of Chinese nationalism often portray it as anti-Western, focusing on Chinese nationalists' obsession with a powerful state and on their ambition to recover the glory of China's historical empire. Such understandings clearly underlie the fear and hostility toward rising Chinese nationalism today. But this view relies too heavily on China's conflictive relations with the West and overemphasizes the impact of China's unique history, culture, and politics, making it hard, if not impossible, to draw on the concept of nationalism in understanding China's relations with its non-Western neighbors. Such a perspective neglects the importance of ideas and ideals from the international system that animate Chinese nationalism. In this article, the author characterizes Chinese nationalism as fusing realpolitik ideas and ideals and a fervent quest for national identity and power. A realpolitik nationalist, as defined here, is someone who frames an external threat to China in terms not of the country's unique culture or history but of a breach of the prevailing norms of the nation-state system, whose key dimensions include sovereignty, territoriality, and international legitimacy. Finally, the author applies this notion in examining China's conflicts with India in 1962 and with the Southeast Asian countries involved in the dispute over the Spratly Islands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Argues that an analysis of the current popularity of Hong Kong's low cuisine, which includes traditional village food and homestyle eating venues, contributes to understanding how local residents have reacted to cultural, economic and political change and how they have refashioned identities in the post-handover society. Examination of two different kinds of low cuisine, puhn choi or basin food and si fohng choi or private kitchen food; Discussion of changing foodways in Asia and in Hong Kong society; Significance of the life histories and changing situations of these southern Chinese low cuisines.

Analysis of the distinctive trajectory of national consciousness of Taiwan and China. Examination of the variations and forms of nationalism; Legacy of the Kuomintang on Taiwanese politics, nationalism, and cross-strait relations; Political dynamics on the impact of the Cold War and Taiwan-China relations.

Looks at the apparent contradiction between Chinese teenagers' nationalism and their identification with a global imagined community that deemed China inferior. Attempts of teenagers in Dalian City to resolve the contradiction through the idiom of filial devotion, which they found more convincing than state-sponsored discourses of nationalism that emphasized China's admirability.

Taiwan is a mildly divided society--divided essentially along the lines of national identity. Indeed, there is no doubt that national identity is the dominant factor affecting Taiwan's mainland China policy. Other factors such as business interests and security concerns may enter the picture from time to time, but they often get bogged down in the national identity controversies. As a matter of fact, there is high correlation between people's attitudes toward business and security concerns and their positions on the national identity issue. The key to understanding Taiwan's mainland China policy is thus the distribution of voters on the national identity issue and how it is translated into the political fortunes of various political parties in the electoral game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the People's Republic of China used Hong Kong's reversion in 1997, a reluctant project at first, as an opportunity to articulate its national aspirations in the post-Mao era. Of special interest is the shift of the Chinese view of Hong Kong from one of ideological degradation to one of kinder, gentler and more contextualized appreciation. Chinese attempts to refashion Hong Kong's image in the 1980s and 1990s attested to two salient features of Deng Xiaoping's reform regime: the decline of Marxist ideology and the resurgence of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China now faces a national identity problem, sections of the national population do not identify with Chinese nation-state in which they live. It appears that Chinese leadership is reluctant to initiate large-scale democratization at the national level. Indeed, Chinese state nationalists oppose democratization, which they see as threatening national unity and control of its territories. The impact of China's national identity question on Chinese democratization is analyzed, and why China has difficulty in establishing democracy is explored in this article.

The central question of this article is: why is peripheral nationalism virtually non-existent in Guangdong but has long been a problem in Xinjiang? Existing theories are inadequate for answering this question. They are tailored to either wealthy or poor regions, but not both. They also fail to explain the absence of nationalism in Guangdong and its presence in Xinjiang. In this article, I propose a model that can explain peripheral nationalism in both wealthy and poor regions. The model incorporates two key variables, elite status and national identity. Specifically, I argue that if the elites from the peripheral region can hold important positions in the central government and if the peripheral residents identify themselves with the core nation, the probability of nationalist movements will be low. On the other hand, if their elites are excluded from high office in the central government and if their people do not identity themselves with the core nation, the probability of nationalist movements will be high. The model succeeds in explaining the cases of Xinjiang and Guangdong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the focus is on various embodied and embedded narratives shaping Tibetan identity today, especially among the diasporic Tibetans living in South Asia. It is argued that it is not only Westerners who have exoticised Tibet and the Tibetans; the Tibetan diaspora too have invested heavily in such (neo)orientalist representation strategies for their own tactical purposes. The first part of the article is devoted to the conceptual issues involved, including the question of identity, nationalism and diaspora. The second part deals with various dynamics and factors shaping the discourse of 'Tibetanness' in the diaspora community. The third part concludes with observations that challenge assumptions about a single discourse of Tibetanness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mandatory use of mother tongue education in Hong Kong after 1997 met strong objections from the local community. While the government put forward a comprehensive educational agenda to justify the implementation of the policy, this paper raises the question of whether the change in language policy was mainly driven by an educational agenda, or whether there were other underlying agendas. To address the question, the history of the medium of instruction in Hong Kong is reviewed, and the experience of three decolonised Asian countries, Malaysia, Singapore and India, is discussed. The paper suggests that the political agenda has always played an important role in language policy formulation and implementation. In view of the important role that language plays in nation building and social reconstruction, it is inevitable that Chinese medium instruction will become more and more important. How the government will balance the need to strengthen the national identity of Hong Kong people and the need to maintain the international outlook and economic development of Hong Kong will have a major impact on the review of the new medium of instruction policy in 2001. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]