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An influential way of distinguishing inferential from non-inferential processes appeals to representational states: an agent infers a conclusion from some premises only if she represents those premises as supporting that conclusion. By contrast, when some premises merely cause an agent to believe the conclusion, there is no relevant representational state. While promising, the appeal to representational states invites a regress problem, first famously articulated by Lewis Carroll. This paper develops a novel account of inference that invokes representational states without succumbing to regress. The key move is to reject the tempting idea that the relevant representational states are causally prior to inferences. I argue, instead, that an inference constitutes the relevant representational state. To infer is thus—in the very drawing of the conclusion—to represent the premises as supporting the conclusion, and thereby to commit to that support relation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Hempel’s (Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays. The Free Press, New York, 1965) influential theory of explanation, explaining why some a is G consists in showing that the truth that a is G follows from a law-like generalization to the effect that all Fs are G together with the initial condition that a is F. While Hempel’s overall account is now widely considered to be deeply flawed, the idea that some generalizations play the explanatory role that the account predicts is still often endorsed by contemporary philosophers of science. This idea, however, conflicts with widely shared views in metaphysics according to which the generalization that all Fs are G is partially explained by the fact that a is G. I discuss two solutions to this conflict that have been proposed recently, argue that they are unsatisfactory, and offer an alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos‐sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de‐combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the combination problem as they are both concerned with subjects being proper parts of other subjects. I then propose two methods for both theorists to avoid the problem of subject‐subject proper parthood relations: a distinction between absolute and relative phenomenal unity, and a modification of the essential nature of subjects. Of these two options, I find the latter option wanting and propose that the first should be adopted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Here, I suggest a hitherto relatively unexplored way beyond the opposed Aristotelian realist and Kantian idealist approaches that divide recent interpretations of the categories or “thought determinations” of Hegel’sLogic, by locating his idealism within the terrain of recent debates in modal metaphysics. In particular, I return to the outlook of the first philosopher to attempt to bring Hegel into the analytic conversation, John Niemeyer Findlay, and consider Hegel’s idealism as instantiating the metaphysical position that, following the work of Findlay’s former student, Arthur Prior, has come to be called “modal actualism”. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses an interpretation of Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity, which manages to avoid many of the concerns that have been raised by analytic interpreters over this doctrine. It is an interpretation put forward by selected C19 and early C20 neo-Kantian writers. The article starts out by offering a neo-Kantian interpretation of the object as something that is constituted by the categories and that serves as a standard of truth within a theory of judgment (I). The second part explicates transcendental subjectivity as the system of categories, which is self-referential and constitutes objects (II), in order to then evaluate this conception by means of a comparison with Hegel's absolute subject (III). Rather than delineating the differences between neo-Kantian writers, the article systematically expounds a shared project, which consists in providing the ultimate foundation for judgments by means of an anti-psychologist and non-metaphysical interpretation of transcendental subjectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A definitive feature of Kant's moral philosophy is its rationalism. Kant insists that moral theory, at least at its foundation, cannot take account of empirical facts about human beings and their circumstances in the world. This is the core of Kant's commitment to 'metaphysics of morals', and it is what he sees as his greatest contribution to moral philosophy. The paper clarifies what it means to be committed to metaphysics of morals, why Kant is committed to it, and where he thinks empirical considerations may enter moral theory. The paper examines recent work of contemporary Kantians ( Barbara Herman, Allen Wood, and Christine Korsgaard) who argue that there is a central role for empirical considerations in Kant's moral theory. Either these theorists interpret Kant himself as permitting empirical considerations to enter, or they propose to extend Kant's theory so as to allow them to enter. With some qualifications, I argue that these interpretive trends are not supported by the texts, and that the proposed extensions are not plausibly Kantian. Kant's insistence on the exclusion of empirical considerations from the foundations of moral theory is not an incidental feature of his thought which might be modified while the rest remains unchanged. Rather, it is the very centre of his endeavours in moral philosophy. If we disagree with it, I argue, we have grounds for moving to a distinctly different theoretical framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Thomas Reid, powers of will and powers of understanding are distinguishable in thought, but conjoined in practice. This paper examines the claim that there is no inert intelligence, the operations of the understanding involving some degree of activity. The question is: whose activity? For it is clear that a great deal of our mental activity is not in our power. We need to distinguish between a weak and a strong sense of ‘power’, and consider our dependence ‘upon God and the laws of nature’ in our mental exertions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Thomas Reid distinguished between natural and artificial language and argued that natural language has a very specific sort of priority over artificial language. This paper critically interprets Reid's discussion, extracts a Reidian explanatory argument for the priority of natural language, and places Reid's thought in the broad tradition of Cartesian linguistics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Mereological principles are sometimes used to support general claims about the structure and arrangement of objects in the world. I focus initially on one such mereological principle, the weak supplementation principle (WSP). It is not obvious that (WSP) is prescribed by ordinary thinking about parthood. Further, (WSP) is not needed for a fairly strong formal characterization of the part-whole relation. For these reasons, some arguments relying on (WSP) might be countered by simply denying (WSP). I argue more generally that there is no reason to assume that one core mereology functions as a common basis for all plausible metaphysical theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the philosophical thinking of Baruch Spinoza. It is stated that Spinoza agreed that the important problems of epistemology and the ontology of the mind could be dissolved by an adequate understanding of the nature of ideas. Spinoza asserted that no one should doubt his ability to know the truth of true ideas who did not mistakenly imagine ideas to be something mute and static. Spinoza noted that through idea he can understand a concept of the mind that the mind forms because it is a thinking thing.

The article focuses on Plato's tinos requirement in the dialogue "Sophist." The author believes that Plato intends the something requirement in the "Sophist" to be a metaphysical conditions of somethings, of beings, the sorts of entities that can serve as objects of discourse and thought. She raises the issue concerning the ontological problem and the semantic problems that exist in the tinos requirement like the mythical discourse. Details related to the arguments against the dialogue "Sophist" are discussed.

The article presents the author's view regarding philosopher Robert Desgabets adoption of the Cartesian philosophy. He says philosopher Emmanuel Faye describes Desgabets' work as original and striking metaphysical thought in which his philosophy is consistent and coherent with that of philosopher Nicolas Malebranche. He discusses some of Desgabets' unusual views about how thought is related to reality and possibility. The author further reveals that Desgabets' acceptance of the orthodox Cartesian view forced him to accept some surprising restrictions on what he could say about God's creative options.

The article presents an analysis concerning the metaphysics of material things. It emphasized the ramifications of the debate between 3-and 4-dimensionalists concerning the presence of material thing throughout a period of time or a region of space. The 3-dimensionalists have thought that a material thing is somehow stretched out through its location at a given time. However, the 4-dimensionalists have thought that a thing is as equally stretched out in time as it is in space.

Commentaries on the article "Freedom from the Inside Out," by Carl Hoefer are presented. Hoefer's article offers an unusual and inspired perspective on the problem of free will. A brief overview of Hoefer's proposal and the metaphysics of time that it involves is offered. Hoefer has argued that determinism in block universes does not privilege any particular time slice as the fundamental determiner of other time slices. Some of Hoefer's theories are modified. It has been suggested that Hoefer should instead claim that one has pervasive macroscopic efficacy toward the past.

At first sight, it may appear that Aquinas's metaphysical theory allows little space for eventuality; but contingency and accidentality have an important place and reach in St. Thomas's ontology, and implies influential consequences in his theory of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]