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This volume explores the importance of constitutivism for legal studies. Constitutivism is the view that the normative force, or authority, of practical reasons is grounded in principles, capacities, aims, or functions that are essential to, and thus constitutive of, agency. While the implications that the constitutivist approach has on the fundamental metaethical disputes and central ethical debates have been extensively explored, the literature on the relations between constitutivism and law remains scarce, unsystematic, and sporadic. This collection brings together world-renowned practical philosophers and legal theorists to fill a noticeable gap in the literature. The authors systematically and innovatively address key dimensions of the relationships between constitutivism and the theoretical study of law, as well as programmatically offering novel insights into the conceptual connections between constitutivist claims, fundamental legal concepts and practices, legal issues, and, ultimately, the law as a distinctive concept. The book will be of interest to academics and researchers working in the areas of Legal Philosophy, Legal Theory, Jurisprudence, Moral Philosophy and Metaethics.Chapter 8 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF at http://www.taylor-francis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.

This thought-provoking book explores the multifaceted phenomenon of objectivity and its relations to various aspects of the law and practical reasoning. Featuring contributions from an international group of researchers from differing legal contexts, it addresses topics relevant not only from a theoretical point of view but also themes directly connected with legal and judicial practice.Beginning with an introduction from the editors proposing a new account of the meaning of objectivity, the book is then divided into three broad themes illuminated by this account. Chapters first address a range of problems linked to the relationship between objectivity and jurisprudence, before turning in the second part to an analysis of the functions of objectivity in legal interpretation. The final part then deals with the function of objectivity in practical reasoning.Offering a spectrum of scholarly insights within a coherent intellectual framework, this book will be a crucial read for scholars and graduate students of legal philosophy and legal theory. Its discussion of objectivity as it relates to legal practice and practical reasoning will also be of interest to practitioners such as judges, arbitrators and lawyers.

Providing a comprehensive account of the often-misunderstood area of legal doctrinal scholarship, this incisive book offers a novel framing for conceptual legal theory and the functions of conceptual theorising in legal studies. It explores the ways in which a doctrinally-oriented legal theory may provide methodological support to legal scholars, arguing that making adequate sense of the rational reconstruction of law is pivotal in delivering such active support.The epistemological key to the central themes of the book is the idea that doctrinal disciplines are anchored in the concept of'doctrinal knowledge', the practice-specific normative knowledge used to navigate institutionalised social practices. The distinctive epistemological and political philosophical grounding for legal doctrinal scholarship demonstrated in this book facilitates a rich analysis of the three core models of interdisciplinary engagement characteristic of legal scholarship.Considering how legal doctrinal scholarship cultivates doctrinal knowledge by way of hermeneutic engagement with positive law, this thought-provoking book will be a key resource for students and scholars of constitutional law, criminal law, private law and international law. It will also be of benefit to legal theorists, philosophers and practitioners.

In this unique book, leading legal scholars and philosophers provide a breadth of perspectives and inspire stimulating debate around the transformations of jurisprudence in a globalized world. Traditionally the central debates surrounding jurisprudence and legal theory are concerned with the elucidation of the particularities of state-law. This innovative book considers that this orthodox picture may no longer be tenable, given the increasing standardization of technologies, systems and information worldwide. Split across four thematic parts, this timely book provides a broad overview of the topic, followed by in depth analyses investigating the modifications to jurisprudence s methodological approaches driven by globalization, the concepts and theoretical tools required to account for putative new forms of legal phenomena, and normative issues relating to the legitimacy and democratic character of these legal orders. Chapters cover legal encounters with alterity in a post-monist mode, normative legal pluralism, relating law and power in a historical global context, cosmopolitan legitimacy and human rights and dignity in a corporate world. Jurisprudence in a Globalized World will be a key resource for students and scholars working in global transnational law, public international law and legal theory and philosophy. Contributors include: M. Del Mar, P. Eleftheriadis, J.L. Fabra-Zamora, K.W. Gray, M. Grellete, K. Günther, M. Jovanovic, C. Lafont, H. Lindahl, H. Muir Watt, G. Pavlakos, W. Twining

The pluralist turn in jurisprudence has led to a search for new ways of thinking about law. The relationships between state law and other legal orders such as international, customary, transnational or indigenous law are particularly significant in this development. Collecting together new work by leading scholars in the field, this volume considers the basic questions about what would be an appropriate theoretical response to this shift: how precisely is it to be undertaken? Is it called for by developments in legal practice or are these adequately addressed by current legal theory? What normative challenges are raised, and what fresh promises might the pluralist turn hold? What distinctive insights can it offer for theorising about law? This book presents a rich variety of resources drawn from a number of theoretical approaches and demonstrates how they might be brought together to generate an increasingly important pluralist jurisprudence.

The last decade has witnessed a particularly intensive debate over methodological issues in legal theory. The publication of Julie Dickson's Evaluation and Legal Theory (2001) was significant, as were collective returns to H.L.A. Hart's'Postscript'to The Concept of Law. While influential articles have been written in disparate journals, no single collection of the most important papers exists. This volume - the first in a three volume series - aims not only to fill that gap but also propose a systematic agenda for future work. The editors have selected articles written by leading legal theorists, including, among others, Leslie Green, Brian Leiter, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and William Twining, and organized under four broad categories: 1) problems and purposes of legal theory; 2) the role of epistemology and semantics in theorising about the nature of law; 3) the relation between morality and legal theory; and 4) the scope of phenomena a general jurisprudence ought to address.

This book provides a concise and accessible guide to modern jurisprudence, offering an examination of the major theories and systematic discussion of themes such as legality and justice. It gives readers a better understanding of the rival viewpoints by exploring the historical developments which give modern thinking its distinctive shape, and placing law in its political context. A key feature of the book is that readers are not simply presented with opposing theories, but are guided through the rival standpoints on the basis of a coherent line of reflection from which an overall sense of the subject can be gained. Chapters on Hart, Fuller, Rawls, Dworkin and Finnis take the reader systematically through the terrain of modern legal philosophy, tracing the issues back to fundamental questions of philosophy, and indicating lines of criticism that build to a fresh and original perspective on the subject.

In recent years we have witnessed major developments in philosophical inquiry concerning the nature of law and, with the continuing development of international and transnational legal institutions, in the phenomenon of law itself. This volume gathers leading writers in the field to take stock of current debates on the nature of law and the aims and methods of legal philosophy. The volume covers four broad themes. The essays within the first theme address and develop the traditional debates between legal positivism, natural law theory, and Dworkinian interpretivism. Papers within the second theme focus on the power of coercion, often overlooked in contemporary legal philosophy. The third set of papers addresses the aims and methods of legal theory, and the role of conceptual analysis. The final section explores new methods and issues in the subject, and offers fresh starting points for future work in the field. Gathering many leading and up-and-coming writers in the subject, the volume offers a snapshot of the best current work in general jurisprudence.

What is law? This question has preoccupied philosophers from Plato to Thomas Hobbes to H. L. A. Hart. Yet many others find it perplexing. How could we possibly know how to answer such an abstract question? And what would be the point of doing so? In Legality, Scott Shapiro argues that the question is not only meaningful but vitally important. In fact, many of the most pressing puzzles that lawyers confront—including who has legal authority over us and how we should interpret constitutions, statutes, and cases—will remain elusive until this grand philosophical question is resolved.Shapiro draws on recent work in the philosophy of action to develop an original and compelling answer to this age-old question. Breaking with a long tradition in jurisprudence, he argues that the law cannot be understood simply in terms of rules. Legal systems are best understood as highly complex and sophisticated tools for creating and applying plans. Shifting the focus of jurisprudence in this way—from rules to plans—not only resolves many of the most vexing puzzles about the nature of law but has profound implications for legal practice as well.Written in clear, jargon-free language, and presupposing no legal or philosophical background, Legality is both a groundbreaking new theory of law and an excellent introduction to and defense of classical jurisprudence.