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In this article the author delves beneath the surface of Shiite higher education in Britain to discover whether it constitutes a case for ‘European Islam’. Juxtaposing the theorisation of Islam in Europe with a commonly unrelated body of scholarship on education and citizenship, it examines a paradox of integrative blending and foreign frames. Understanding Western Shiite education requires recognition of both local identity and transnational ties, as well as the relationships between them. The author focuses on the Shiite Al-Mahdi Institute and the Islamic College in Britain, analysing on the one hand their local profiles, defined by efforts to engage with their Western environment, and on the other hand their organic foreign embedding, whether through state ties or links to educational and religious establishments. Dumont’s concept of hierarchy as ‘encompassment of the contrary’ is invoked to account for this paradoxical relationship, from which emerges a scale of differences between the two institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The general autonomy of Central European authors from a Western power agenda as postulated by the mainstream critique of Orientalism is well known. At the same time, scholars have paid much less attention to the attitude of the modern Hungarian, Czech, Polish, and Slovenian corpus vis-à-vis Shi'ism, a narrow branch of the subject of Orientalism. This study argues that a certain bias in this context can be identified on the part of regional academics of the twentieth century, which might be explained by personal preferences for Sunni Orthodoxy. Simultaneously, this paper seeks to explore the reasons for such a tendency within the context of specific historical development at the frontiers. To this end, it presents case studies that juxtapose the relevant experiences with the classic Orientalist criticism of Western intellectual life introduced by scholars such as Edward Said, Talal Asad, Joseph Massad, and Mahmood Mamdani. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the influence of Islam and Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus region (CAC). During the Soviet era, Islamic education continued to make expand its roots in the predominately Turkic republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Despite the efforts of the CAC governments to suppress politically troublesome religious organizations and practices, the populations there became increasingly exposed to international Islamist movements.

It has become standard practice nowadays to begin Morocco's history with the Idrīsids. Today, Idrīs I and Idrīs II can be considered the Moroccan historical figures that are best known to Moroccans. Fez, established by the Idrīsids, remains a central place. The Qarawiyyīn, dating from the Idrīsid era, is the most famous and sacred mosque in the country. Nevertheless, the actual history of the two Idrīses, of the foundation of Fez and of that of the Qarawiyyīn continues to pertain to the realm of traditional collective imagination rather than of the academic discipline of history. This brief study proposes to review again current understandings of the Idrīsids, linking them with some new perspectives that allow for the formulation of new hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the use of Islam as cultural dialect in Syria in 2000 under the nation's leader Bashar al-Asad. It notes that Islamic symbols and vocabulary were used by Ba'thist regime under Bashar in an attempt to gain legitimacy and popularity among pious Sunni Muslims in the nation. It adds that the growing use of Islamic rhetoric by the regime works in tandem with its efforts to ensure the acquiescence of the Sunni religious establishment for its political and social projects. It explores the efforts of Bashar to reshape Aleppo as the capital of Islamic culture. Also mentioned are vernacular religion and the limits of religious policies of Bashar.

What was the internal re-composition process of the Muslim authorities in the north of Mozambique during the late period of colonialism (1961-1974)? The author calls into question the argument whereby there was a conspiracy or a Wahhabite invasion in Mozambique. The term Wahhabism has become a category of diffuse and ambiguous accusation against certain Muslims in Mozambique and is most often used as a synonym of fundamentalism. Being a Wahhabite generally means opposing the – Sufi – brotherhoods that came from Zanzibar and the Comoros in the late 19th century and settled on the island of Moçambique. The global tension between brotherhoods and Wahhabism has to be put into perspective, identifying the ambiguities conveyed by specific agents. In this respect, it has become necessary to understand the "endogenous" conflicts of the Muslim communities in order to understand the type of relationship that each of their spokespeople has attempted to construct with the independent Mozambican state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the structural and institutional basis of the ulama and their authority between 1972 and 1973 in the Garut district of Priangan, West Java, Indonesia. Muslim political culture, in particular the powerful role of the Islamic clergy has attracted much attention from students of Islamic culture and society while it continues to challenge the puzzle the west. Islam owes its centuries of existence as an organized religion to the succession of a body of ulama through which the religious orthodoxy has been transmitted. As religious experts, the Indonesian ulama officiate rites of passage ceremonies, lead mosque prayers, educate the masses and offer counsel to individuals in need of help. Despite these multiple services, majority of Indonesian ulama are not paid officials supported by the state of Islamic agencies. They lack a coherent organization of their own. The institutional framework of the ulama which inhibits the development of a broader basis of sociopolitical and religious cooperation is the parochial nature of each ulama's authority and position in Islamic communities depend on their being the sole holders of esoteric but valued religious knowledge, the ulama are compelled to jealousy guard this position against attempts of outside authorities to impinge upon the ulama's moral and social authority in the community. In the absence of state backing, each ulama family seeks the legitimacy of its authority over the community by offering valued services in the form of religious programs and social services to the community. Offering these services free of charge is not only costly and time-consuming but requires an organizational backing from the family itself.