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The political and security relationship between India and Southeast Asia (SEA) has developed beyond the traditional domain after the Cold War era. As the Cold War ended, and new geopolitics were redefined, both parties sought a strategic approach through greater engagement with extra-regional partners. Since 2003, both parties have engaged in various political partnerships with SEA states and a few security challenges collectively. The paper answers the following questions: what is the pattern of this relationship? What kind of mechanism has been adopted by both parties in strengthening their relationship? Is the factor of China imperative enough to 'boost' India's efforts in reinforcing political and security relations with SEA states? Using content analysis, emerging themes from relevant literature by selected scholars in the area of India and SEA states' relations are explored. This paper also reviews several governmental documents and official websites. In general, some scholars agree that the development of the relationship between India and SEA states is important in creating a regional balance with other international actors especially China. This paper aims to examine the growing relations between India and SEA states in the political and security terms since 2003. The paper suggests that the strong political and security relationship between India and SEA states creates an "external balancing strategy" to counter-balance the presence of China in the region. Meanwhile, it also shows that SEA states are turning to India as a counterweight to China and the US in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The positive role that external powers can play in the creation and maintenance of security in regions has long been ignored; external interference is generally perceived as detrimental to the ability of a group of states to function as a community. However, this paper argues that in the case of ASEAN, the presence of external actors allows the group to function as a community that also provides and ensures security. This paper furthers the debate regarding ASEAN's security functions. With international attention focused on the Asia-Pacific, there is a need to understand the context in which security is maintained in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to study the factors that caused The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) security regime to be ineffective in saving transnational drug smuggling, including the internalization of non-optimal values and norms of the ASEAN Drug-Free Declaration. Design/methodology/approach: This study uses primary data and secondary data. Data analysis and observation are carried out simultaneously, where data are analyzed directly after it is obtained using descriptive analysis. Interactive data analysis is carried out at the initial step by collecting primary and secondary data. Data are analyzed inductively by drawing conclusions from data obtained from general views to specifics. Findings: The development of ASEAN has led to the idea of "ASEAN Way," namely, the ASEAN security forum to eliminate the use of force in maintaining relations between member countries through the dissemination of agreed values. Multilateral negotiations refer to the establishment of a negotiation regime at the ASEAN level that emphasizes the interests of ASEAN member countries in determining agreements relating to transnational drug crimes. There are several inhibiting factors in the negotiation process, namely, perception differences between ASEAN countries on the threat of drug smuggling in the Southeast Asia region and the differences of ASEAN leaders' priorities and agenda. Originality/value: The originality/authenticity of research is analyzing the factors that affect the ASEAN security system in transnational protection policies by using two models, namely, the international level negotiation model and one at the national level in the form of ratification of ASEAN international relations related to drug smuggling. At present, transnational crimes, especially drug smuggling, appear and pose a threat to national and international security. The object of this research is ASEAN international organizations in cases of transnational drug smuggling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper traces the evolution of Japan-Southeast Asia security relations over the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. It makes two main points. First, Japan's relationship with Southeast Asia is slowly overcoming its traditional aversion of security affairs in defining its relations with Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period. Japan has moved beyond economics to gradually carve out a more proactive role in the security affairs of Southeast Asia in the areas of multilateral security dialogues, peacekeeping missions, disaster relief provision, combating piracy, and others. Second, Southeast Asian states have become more amenable to Japan assuming a security role in the region. Not only have the new security roles contributed to enhanced trust and confidence between Japan and Southeast Asia, but Japan has also achieved the status of being a core security actor in Southeast Asian affairs. This role will continue to flourish in the post-Cold War period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines to what extent the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) has moved beyond dialogue to practical security co-operation. Focusing on terrorism, maritime security and disaster relief as key areas of ARF activities in the past few years, the paper offers four arguments: first, while the ARF primarily remains a forum for regional security dialogues and confidence building, its participants have slowly become prepared to proceed with practical security co-operation, albeit only in limited ways. To the extent that desktop and field exercises take place under ARF auspices, most have been organized in the area of disaster relief. This implies, second, that for the most part ARF participants are still pursuing capacity building and operational security responses outside the Forum. Third, the ARF's cautious embrace of practical co-operation is not the outcome of ASEAN's exercise of diplomatic centrality but the result of initiatives pursued by a small group of ASEAN and some non-ASEAN states. Fourth, at least in the short term, any expectations that participants might organize significantly more demanding practical activities under ARF auspices are premature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of its 40th anniversary, this article analyses how the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has sought to deal with the problem of drug production, trafficking and consumption in Southeast Asia. Reviewing more than three decades of cooperation, it asks whether an international regime against the illicit trafficking and abuse of drugs has been established in the region under the auspices of ASEAN. In particular, the paper discusses the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD) as an attempt to create a framework of multilateral cooperation. It argues however that it is still premature today to characterise existing regional consultations as a working anti-drug regime. The existing cooperative structure has remained a loose forum for information sharing despite the strong Chinese involvement that has deepened consultations since the late 1990s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia (including the sub regions of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia) has been viewed as ranking among the most dangerous or conflictual regions on the planet, enduring colonial and Cold War legacies and several potential flashpoints. Regional international security governance has focused on nonintervention and conflict management, whereas domestic governance has focused on national security, development, and unity under tight central government control. Laos is a paradigmatic case of East Asian security policy prioritization. Its authoritarian government focuses, primarily, on traditional state-centric conceptualizations of security, and top-down, macroeconomic models and mega-projects to develop the country out of insecurity. This research project uses a qualitative approach consisting of literature review, document analysis, and limited interviews in the field. The conclusions are that, while by some measurements Lao governmental policymaking has been successful in achieving stated security objectives, in terms of nontraditional security (NTS) and human security considerations, these policies may not only be considered insufficient, but could also be counter-productive, storing up challenges for the future. Hence, the final section contains policy prescription for a more sustainable security situation in the Lao PDR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores changes in Japan's conception of and policy toward security multilateralism 1 in the Asia-Pacific region after the end of the Cold War with special reference to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It makes the observation that notwithstanding Japan's active role behind the establishment of the ARF in the early 1990s and continuing public expression of strong support for Asia-Pacific security multilateralism since that time, in actuality, Japan's enthusiasm for it has dwindled from the late 1990s onwards. This article argues that this has been due primarily to Japan's disappointing experiences in the ARF, evinced by its abortive efforts to promote meaningful cooperative security measures and the failings of multilateral security diplomacy in addressing its security concerns. Consequently, Japan's conception of regional security multilateralism has shifted from an optimistic liberal to a more pessimistic realist perspective from which the ARF can, at best, be seen as a venue contributing only to a minimal level of confidence building among regional countries or, to put it more cynically, ‘a talking shop’. This has made Japan's ARF policy more tentative and less energetic. Japan's enthusiasm has also been diluted by a number of internal and external constraints on ARF policy, including US misgivings about Japan's tilt toward regional security multilateralism, its domestic organizational limitations, growing dissent within the Japanese government over the value of security multilateralism, the lack of political support for bureaucratic initiatives and the unexpected frictions between bilateral and multilateral security approaches in Japan's overall security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents Southeast Asian perspectives on the rise of the People's Republic of China in the 21st century. Implications for regional security; Ramifications of strategic issues in the region; Existing territorial disputes of China with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

While defence expenditures in South-east Asia are increasing, and a number of countries are acquiring sophisticated weapons systems, the region is not yet involved in a full-blown arms race. Nevertheless, economic growth is funding force modernisation and the military's influence remains evident. South-east Asia requires a different approach to new security challenges. The ASEAN-Post-Ministerial Conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum have forced South-east Asian governments to address regional-defence and security-cooperation issues, but this must go further. It is likely that military spending in the region will continue to increase and South-east Asian governments will need to come to terms with the challenges of promoting cooperative proliferation management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the growing prospect of regional instability and turbulence within Southeast Asia, the political transitions experienced by several states and societies, and the three noteworthy trends that defined the region's new normal in 2014. Topics discussed include the growing rivalry between emerging and established powers in the region, the issues raised in relation to America's pivot or rebalance towards Asia, and Russia's apparent gravitation towards China.

Hameiri, Shahar and Lee Jones. (2012) The Politics and Governance of Non-Traditional Security. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/isqu.12014 © 2012 International Studies Association The international security literature has recently observed the growing 'securitization' of issues outside the traditional concern with interstate military conflict. However, this literature offers only limited explanations of this tendency and largely neglects to explain how the new security issues are actually governed in practice, despite apparent 'securitization' leading to divergent outcomes across time and space. We argue that the rise of non-traditional security should be conceptualized not simply as the discursive identification of new threats but as part of a deep-seated historical transformation in the scale of state institutions and activities, notably the rise of regulatory forms of statehood and the relativization of scales of governance. The most salient feature of the politics of non-traditional security lies in key actors' efforts to rescale the governance of particular issues from the national level to a variety of new spatial and territorial arenas and, in so doing, transform state apparatuses. The governance that actually emerges in practice can be understood as an outcome of conflicts between these actors and those resisting their rescaling attempts. The argument is illustrated with a case study of environmental security governance in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses India's national defense in regards to Southeast Asia and its implications for India-ASEAN relations. The Indian Navy's promotion of maritime security in Southeast Asian waters is addressed, with focus given to the potential for conflict between India and China regarding the territorial waters of Myanmar. India's ability to balance the growth of Chinese power in the region through increased defense cooperation with ASEAN nations is then examined.

The article examines the role of India in the regional security framework of Southeast Asia, with the author arguing that India should embrace increased defense cooperation with ASEAN countries. India's historic relationship with Southeast Asia is discussed first, with focus given to independent India's initial embrace of cooperation. The author then notes the evolution of Indian diplomacy and isolationism in the 1990s, along with the impact of Sino-Indian relations on India-ASEAN relations.

Michael Leifer's passing over a decade ago has done little to diminish the force of his scholarly ideas and their continued relevance to the study of regional order and security of contemporary Southeast Asia. Leifer's intellectual influence is apparent in the way analysts of different theoretical persuasions continue to grapple with and debate over the problem of regional order in Southeast Asia. In so doing, they rely on terms of reference originally defined by Leifer. This article reviews and assesses a number of noteworthy insights from Leifer's oeuvre against the contemporary political-strategic situation of Southeast Asia and its immediate extra-regional context. The insights include the elusiveness of regional order, the primacy of the balance power, and the emphasis on conservation rather than innovation in the management of regional security in Southeast Asia. While Leifer's ideas are by no means timeless, they continue nonetheless to speak in telling ways to the security challenges facing Southeast Asia today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security has undoubtedly been a central and continuous feature of ASEAN since its establishment. While it has modified its basic thinking on security and adapted elements of the attendant principles, aims and ways of operation to meet changed circumstances, the level of consistency is still readily observable. Centrality of a different sort has been evident, too, during the post-Cold War period. ASEAN has consciously sought to position itself at the heart of the developing security architecture in both East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific. The Association has been largely successful at limiting competition and preventing inter-state conflict among its members and at fostering a stable regional order in Southeast Asia (and an incipient one outside of the boundaries of Southeast Asia). Broadly speaking, this stability has been aided and abetted by the policies of the major external powers in whose interests it has been, up until now. The extent to which a stable regional order remains in the interests of the major powers will be one of the great questions for the next phase of ASEAN's life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the shift of ASEAN dialogue from consensus-seeking to strategic means to utilize the Habermas distinction. It notes the role and the nature of the dialogue in the international relations of Southeast Asia, as well as its Habermas' concepts. It also cites the diversity of the ASEAN actions in solving problems including terrorism, and SARS pandemic. Moreover, it mentions the expansion of ASEAN to 10 countries, the emergence of non-traditional threats to security, as well as to democratization.

The responsibility to protect (R2P) comprises each state's responsibility to protect its own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the international community's duty to assist states in this endeavour, and a responsibility for the international community to take timely and decisive action in situations where the host state has manifestly failed. At first glance, the latter two elements of this principle seem to require behaviour that contradicts the principle of non-interference. This raises questions as to why R2P was endorsed by Southeast Asian governments and whether it can be localised in a region whose politics are underpinned by non-interference. This article argues that processes of norm localisation are producing an accommodation between the two principles. This accommodation involves the formal retention of both principles but the subtle realignment of each in order to make them compatible and make support for both coherent. It is this third explanation, we argue, that best explains the relationship between R2P and non-interference in Southeast Asia: R2P has been revised to limit its capacity to legitimise coercive interference, whilst non-interference is in the process of being recalibrated to permit expressions of concern, offers of assistance and even the application of limited diplomatic pressure in response to major humanitarian crises. Thus, whilst the region remains largely hostile to doctrinal revisions to non-interference, subtle changes are evident in practice. This article outlines the evolution of R2P as a challenge to traditional notions of state sovereignty, provides an overview of non-interference and past efforts to revise the principle, and examines two case studies to understand how the two principles are being accommodated in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been pursuing new cooperative security agendas – namely, confidence-building measures (CBMs), preventive diplomacy (PD), conflict resolution and a set of agendas associated with security communities. The ASEAN members' pursuit of these agendas should be seen as a set of instances of their mimetic adoption of external norms for the sake of legitimacy. They have mimetically been adopting a set of norms associated with the collective management of conflicts, which have been practiced by the participant states of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They have been doing so, with the intention of securing their identities as legitimate members of the community of modern states, and of enhancing the status of ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as legitimate cooperative security institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

ASEAN has proved an enduring regional architecture, but the Asia-Pacific increasingly faces a series of interrelated political and security challenges for which the organisation may be outmoded. See Seng Tan asks whether ASEAN centrality enhances regionalism or merely rationalises the status quo in which it enjoys pride of place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is growing concern that Southeast Asia is in the midst of a regional arms race. Certainly many nations in the region have been on a veritable "shopping spree" for advanced conventional weaponry, and this has been enabled by a corresponding increase in military spending. However, these acquisitions do not fit the pattern of an "arms race" as laid out in prevailing theory: mutually adversarial relationships, explicit tit-for-tat arms acquisitions, the intention of seeking dominance over one's rivals through arming and intimidation, etc. Additionally, the actual numbers of arms being acquired are, for the most part, relatively small. That said, the regional re-arming process is significant in that the types of arms being acquired go beyond the "mere modernization" of regional armed forces and could greatly change the nature and character of potential regional conflicts. The resulting arms competition, or "arms dynamic", has at least the potential to contribute to a classical "security dilemma", a situation whereby actions taken by a country can actually undermine the security and stability that they were meant to increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a new piece for two of the puzzles of institutionalized cooperation in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). First, with regard to the organization's four decades of existence, there has always been a marked gap between ASEAN's rhetorical goals of cooperation and its actual achievements. What explains these systematic failures of implementation? Second, from the outset, ASEAN was criticized for its light institutionalization, which failed to deliver the substantial cooperation goals. Despite selected institutional reforms, ASEAN's autonomy has not increased remarkably and it has not made any major institutional innovations. Why does ASEAN design institutions it does not use? Why does this transformation gap occur? The author suggests a sociological institutional explanation and argues that major impulses for cooperation have come from outside Southeast Asia, most importantly from Europe. By mimicking the European integration process, ASEAN member states have effectively created an isomorphic organization. The Association's institutional development reflects a concern for international legitimacy and less an objective functional demand arising from the specific interactions of member states. This copying process has led to network governance within the organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the regional security strategies in the Southeast Asia. East Asia remains a security complex in transition. The stability of the interim hierarchy remains in question due to the uncertainties about U.S. commitment, Chinese intentions, and the greater involvement of the other major regional powers and players. Regional leaders will want to pay more attention to the legitimation of U.S. primacy and China's great power status in the region. They will also need to develop strategies of enmeshment and balance of influence specific to binding Japan and India more securely to the hierarchical regional order.

The article reports on the importance in dealing with the danger that terrorism has brought in the U.S. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack alerted the national security of several countries. In the January 2007 summit of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), leaders reiterated the danger posed by terrorism to innocent lives, infrastructure and environment, regional and international peace and stability as well as to economic development. It will gradually interrupt several organizational operations and will eventually put the country at risk. ASEAN leaders strive hard in dealing with the challenges through regional cooperation. However, there are some factors that hinder their plans including the lack of agreement among members on the nature and implications of terrorism.

This article explains the emerging security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific in the context of the project to establish an "Asian Community". Although the model of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been constrained by a post-colonial attachment to sovereignty, new processes of domestic democratisation, taking in new members and dealing with non-traditional security threats have led to an acceptance of the need to deepen its social and political pillars. The real test for this project, however, will be whether it can be extended to Northeast Asia, where relations between states are still characterised by traditional power-balancing and rising nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivist contributions to the study of Southeast Asian security raise much-needed awareness of identity concerns and introduce conceptual and methodological innovations into the study of identity. However, their shared rationalist proclivity to couple subjectivity with sovereignty revives the enduring problem of treating agency as ultimately pre-given. Contrary to their professed aim to restore to security studies an appreciation for history and practice, the contributions of many Southeast Asia constructivists are quite tellingly essentialist, particularly their concessions to state-centrism and ideational/normative determinism, both due partly to an uncritical emulation of rationalist constructivist perspectives in International Relations (IR) theory. In granting ontological priority to states, Southeast Asia constructivists cannot fully transcend reification because their denaturalizing of international anarchy or regions comes at the expense of a reified state. In reifying either the state or ideas/norms, their claim to privilege practice in their analyses of Southeast Asian security becomes suspect. But if process and practice are to be taken seriously, then Southeast Asia constructivists must avoid presuming a preordained subjectivity that invalidates their claim to study social construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

External threat plays a diminishing role in the foreign policies of China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Some version of modernization diplomacy is pursued so that economic interests are accorded priority. It is in this context that they have gradually adopted comprehensive security and similar concepts. At the individual level, aspirations and security are also realized in the context of satisfactory economic development. At the international level, regional economic co-operation associated with market liberalization is perceived as an important means to maintain a peaceful external environment and to promote economic growth. The concept of security is thus both broadened and extended to link up the international, regime and individual levels. The Asian financial crisis exposed the contradictions between the developed countries of the West and the developing economies in the Asia–Pacific region; it also challenged the dominant domestic political coalitions in Southeast Asia based on existing development strategies. New alignments therefore have to be established within the Asia–Pacific region to ensure effective interest articulation within the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework, and the shaking of the foundation of the regional regimes produced varied responses ranging from defensive adjustment to offensive adjustment and fundamental economic restructuring. Values and aspirations on the part of individuals have to be redefined too. The threat of terrorism was first highlighted by the September 11 Incident, but terrorism in the region was largely rooted in domestic ethnic and socio-economic contradictions and exacerbated by economic difficulties in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. The threat of terrorism has in turn alerted the regional governments to the issues of radical Islam, the widening gap between the rich and poor and inter-ethnic relations, as well as to a whole range of non-traditional security issues. In short, comprehensive security must include good governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the major studies of terrorism in Southeast Asia emphasize international terrorist links and religious ideology, while more locally-embedded accounts draw attention to historical and political context. Despite this plurality in terrorism studies, flaws and omissions across four issues are common: the nature of terrorist links and information on them, Islam, the United States and the causes of terrorism. A substantial section of studies of terrorism are based on compromised information and substitute descriptive detail for analysis. They frequently depict Islam and anti-American views as incipiently threatening precursors to terrorism and underplay political grievances, particularly as they relate to the United States. Valuable work has drawn attention to local political contexts and grievances, and has begun to explore the ideas and perceptions of militant groups. However, most of the leading experts on terrorism in the region are engaged in academically unproductive attempts either to reconstruct the trail of terrorist activity on the basis of official information or to explain terrorist violence as the product of individual pathology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates and disagreements about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its status as a security community are longstanding. In offering one of the first systematic, constructivist treatments of the subject, Acharya (2001) has helped catalyze new theoretical interest in Southeast Asia, as well as new debate — as illustrated by Nicholas Khoo's (2004) recent book review, in which he challenged Acharya's conclusion about ASEAN's ‘nascent’ or ‘ascendant’ security community status. This article continues the debate by offering a constructivist reply to Khoo's review. Although Khoo raises some pointed questions about Acharya's thesis, his discussion may be overly broad in its treatment of norms and their effects. Khoo may also miss important constructivist insights into process and constitution — aspects of which could have been more explicity elaborated by Acharya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

2005 marks the tenth year since the ten countries of Southeast Asia declared the region a nuclear weapon-free zone. Under the new and fast evolving strategic environment, is the original purpose of establishing the zone still valid? This article will suggest that SEANWFZ remains strategically relevant because it conveys a message of peace, contributes to the global campaign against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, adds pressure to the Nuclear Weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament, and contributes to building the confidence of Southeast Asian countries in managing their common security and exercising a good measure of control over their destiny. SEANWFZ is also relevant to counter-terrorism efforts by ensuring that WMD material, and technology from which nuclear weapons could be developed, do not fall into the hands of terrorists or be transmitted through the Zone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines lessons learned from the recent Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome crisis in East and Southeast Asia, arguing that the wide-ranging impact of infectious diseases makes it imperative for states to treat these diseases as security concerns. "Securitizing" infectious diseases provides urgency for mobilizing resources and strengthening regional cooperation. Adding infectious diseases to the security agenda allows for better handling of sudden outbreaks that endanger lives and threaten the survival of nation-states; this is also in line with the region's concept of comprehensive security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]