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The lines of siege, 1886–89 The outlook from the savanna Although in retrospect the flurry of European diplomacy which attended the Berlin Conference of 1884–5 seems clearly designed to prepare for the European invasion of West Africa, economic and political uncertainties in Europe and indications of stiff resistance in Africa inhibited the formation of aggressive policies. In the immediate aftermath the European siege lines were strengthened, but the scale of the impending threat to African independence was still not generally predictable. Even if in retrospect it appears that external and internal pressures were producing a general crisis of authority, its local manifestations varied greatly in nature and in intensity, and it is not easy to trace this crisis to common causes. Obviously, the impact of the European economy and European power was strongest in coastal regions. Many inland kingdoms of the savanna and Sahel still knew Europeans only as isolated and powerless travellers, and they retained the preoccupations and priorities which their historical experience suggested. Bornu, for example, though affected by fluctuations in European demand for ivory and ostrich-feathers, had more urgent problems at home; the challenge which eventually in 1893 overthrew the al-Kānamī dynasty came from Rabah al-Zubayr, a well-armed state-builder from the Nilotic Sudan, who proved capable of mobilising support among over-mighty subjects of Kukawa. 'Umar b. 'Alī, Caliph of Sokoto, 1881–91, also faced difficulties in maintaining administrative control over the empire founded by Usuman dan Fodio and in enforcing the theocratic standards which justified its existence; but these were largely inherent in the attempt to hold together territories which it took four months to traverse from east to west, once the capital of charisma accumulated by the founders had become attenuated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]