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The European response to COVID-19 has revealed an inconvenient truth. Despite having integrated public health concerns across all its policies – be it agriculture, consumer protection, or security –, the Union cannot directly act to save people’s lives. Only member states can do so. Yet when they adopted unilateral measures to counter the spread of the virus, those proved not only ineffective but also disruptive on vital supply chains, by ultimately preventing the flow of essential goods and people across the Union. These fragmented efforts in tackling cross-border health threats have almost immediately prompted political calls for the urgent creation of a European Health Union. Yet this call raises more questions than answers. With the aim to offer a rigorous and timely blueprint to decision-makers and the public at large, this Special Issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation contextualizes such a new political project within the broader constitutional and institutional framework of EU public health law and policy. By introducing the Special, this paper argues that unless the envisaged Health Union will tackle the root causes of what prevented the Union from effectively responding to COVID-19 – the divergent health capacity across the Union –, it might fall short of its declared objective of strengthening the EU’resilience for cross-border health threats.

Ten years after the introduction of participatory democracy as one of the democratic foundations of the European Union, this introductory chapter to "Citizen Participation in Democratic Europe" provides some theoretical background on the role citizens play, and should play, within the EU democratic system. As such, it offers a contribution about the place of citizen participation in the wider, ongoing debate about how to develop the EU’s democratic system in a post-pandemic Europe. It sets the scene for the subsequent chapters written, again, not only by academic scholars but also civil society advocates and practitioners from across Europe who experience on a daily basis the realities of EU citizen participation. Ultimately, this edited volume argues how Europe’s long-standing democracy challenge can be addressed through the emergence of a new model of EU citizen participation, and a set of democratic innovations emerging bottom-up across the continent. To do so, it offers a re-evaluation and systematisation of EU level citizen participation and its future development, which remains largely underexplored.

Europe has largely been absent from the US-dominated debate surrounding the introduction of nudge-type interventions in policy-making. Yet the European Union and some of its Member States are exploring the possibility of informing their policy action with behavioural insights. While a great deal of academic attention is currently been paid to the philosophical, ethical and other abstract implications of behavioural-informed regulation, such as those concerning autonomy, dignity and moral development, this chapter charts and systematizes the incipient European Nudge discourse. Besides a few isolated initiatives displaying some behavioural considerations (e.g. consumer rights, revised tobacco products directive, sporadic behavioural remedies in competition law), the EU – similarly to its own Member States – has not yet shown a general commitment to systematically integrate behavioural insights into policy-making. Given the potential of this innovative regulatory approach to attain effective, low-cost and choice-preserving policies, such a stance seems surprising, especially when measured against growing citizen mistrust towards EU policy action. At a time in which some EU countries are calling for a repatriation of powers and the European Commission promises to redefine - in the framework of its Better Regulation agenda - the relationships between the Union and its citizens, nudging might provide a promising way forward. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, this promise has not only been shared by the 27 remaining Member State but also represents one of their major priorities . Yet with promises come challenges too. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the scene by discussing the growing appeal of nudging among policymakers within and across Europe. Section 3 introduces the notion of behavioural policymaking and contrasts it with that of nudging. Section 4 describes the early and rather timid attempts at integrating behavioural insights into EU policymaking and identifies some domestic experiences. Section 5 discusses the institutional and methodological efforts undertaken by the EU and some of its member states to embrace behavioural policymaking. In turn, section 6 discusses the major difficulties of integrating behavioural insights into EU policymaking and offers some concluding remarks.

COVID-19 is a matter of common European interest since its very first detection on the continent. Yet this pandemic outbreak has largely been handled as an essentially national matter.This article makes a first attempt at unpacking how such fragmented, uncoordinated national responses to COVID19 came into being under the EU legal order. To do so, it systematizes the European response into separate stages. Phase 1 – the emergency – has been characterized by the adoption of national emergency risk management measures that, albeit country specific, were inspired by a common objective of pandemic suppression, i.e. to reduce disease transmission and thereby diminishing pressure on health services, under the by now well-known ‘flatten the curve’ imperative. Phase 2 – the lifting – is about the attempt at relaxing some of the national risk responses in a coordinated fashion to avoid creating negative spillovers or distortions – be they sanitary and/or financial – across the Union.The article argues that contrary to conventional wisdom the resulting uncoordinated EU response to Covid-19 shouldn’t be seen as the inevitable consequence of the EU’s limited competence in public health. Against this backdrop, it strives to define the regulatory policy framework that might be governing the next phases of the European risk management response to this pandemic as they will emerge from a widely undefined yet unescapable dialectic between the Union and its member states. Ultimately, it predicts that by testing the outer limits of the EU public health competence COVID-19 is set to go down in history as a major catalyst in the advancement of EU health emergency action.

A dozen of green and sustainable labels have emerged on the financial markets of the Member States of the European Union since the creation of a first label in 1997 in France, allocated to nearly 1,360 financial products, demonstrating a quantitative success, especially in France. This article analyzes the development of such green and socially responsible labels in Europe over the past decades , their construction dynamics, and questions the real benefits of a proliferation of labels in this industry. Does the multiplicity of factors contributing to the development of labels achieve the desired end or does it encumber the market with loud but uncertain signals? While household savings are at their highest and there is a demand for financing the ecological transition, does the proliferation of labels not complicate the readability of the market ? We show that, instead of simplifying the choice of agents, the multiplication of labels tends to increase the noise provided by each of the quality signals and deteriorate confidence. Economic agents have less interest in benefiting from a generic label but are looking for less demanding labeling at a lower cost. The whole system can therefore play in a counterproductive way, each actor minimizing the intrinsic effort provided. As the number of labels grows, the information asymmetry grows and end investors may therefore turn away from labeled products. Only regulator can counter this trend.; Une dizaine de labels verts et durables ont vu le jour sur les marchés financiers des États membres de l'Union européenne depuis la création d'un premier label en 1997 en France, attribués à près de 1360 produits financiers, démontrant un succès quantitatif, notamment en France. Cet article analyse l'évolution de ces labels verts et durables en Europe au cours des dernières décennies, leur dynamique de construction, et s'interroge sur les réels bénéfices d'une prolifération de labels dans ce secteur. La multiplicité des facteurs contribuant au développement des labels atteint-elle le but recherché ou encombre-t-elle le marché de signaux forts mais incertains? Alors que l'épargne des ménages est au plus haut et qu'il existe une demande de financement de la transition écologique, la multiplication des labels ne complique-t-elle pas la lisibilité du marché? Nous montrons que, au lieu de simplifier le choix des agents, la mutliplication des labels tend à accroître le bruit fourni par chacun des signaux de qualité et détériorer la confiance. Les agents économiques ont moins intérêt à bénéficier d’un label générique mais recherchent à moindre coût une labelisation moins exigeante. L’ensemble du système peut donc jouer de façon contreproductive, chaque acteur minimisant l’effort intrinsèque fourni. L’asymmétrie d’information s’accroît à mesure que le nombre de labels grandit et les investisseurs finaux risquent donc de se détourner in fine des produits labelisés. Seul le regulateur peut contrer cet effet.

This article examines what difference – if any – the renewed EU Better Regulation Agenda has made for the EU Commission in terms of its own accountability and policy outcomes. Emboldened by the Spitzenkandidaten process – which established for the first time a link between the outcome of the EU elections and the presidency of the EU Commission –, the Juncker Commission emerged as the most political yet. To shrug off the label of technocratic institution – historically insulated from citizens’ preferences –, the new Commission asked EU citizens to judge its operation by its ability ‘to deliver solutions to the big issues that cannot be addressed by the Member States alone’. By embracing such a panem et circenses approach to EU democracy – as such not too dissimilar from the Santer’s and Barroso’s previous administrations – the Juncker Commission raised new expectations. This is true not only in terms of output legitimacy – which was meant to become the privileged benchmark against which to measure the Commission’s success –, but also in terms of its own democratic and political accountability vis-à-vis EU citizens. Indeed, although unintelligible to the many, the Spitzenkandidaten logic entails that EU citizens contributed for the first time with their vote to shape the political orientation of this Commission and – as a result – could hold it accountable. While the very notion of political accountability is foreign to the EU constitutional setting – as citizens don’t have the possibility to replace the Commission if this does not meet their hopes –, the Juncker Commission has strived to frame its mandate as if such an oversight existed. This article concludes that at the very same time the Juncker Commission has been striving to develop its own, autonomous democratic credentials, its choice to embrace a set of well-defined institutional mechanisms that reward expert judgment over political adjudication appears at odds with its newly-acquired political nature.

The EU’s approach to fake news, as epitomised by the European External Action (EEAS) Service East Stratcom Disinformation Review, violates the rights to freedom of expression and due process of those accused of distributing disinformation. The EU Disinformation Review is a publication of the European External Action Service (the European Union’s diplomatic service) to target fake news and online disinformation. Following our request for access to documents, EEAS conceded that the EU Disinformation Review uses an “ad hoc” methodology for conducting its fact-checks, which makes it an outlier in the international fact-checking community led by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Despite being a well-intentioned initiative to respond to the challenges posed by pro-Kremlin disinformation, the EU should ensure the respect of fundamental rights when engaging in fact-checking. The EU Disinformation Review seeks to control the right to freedom of expression by labelling publishers as “disinforming outlets” and their content as “disinformation,” creating a chilling effect on the work of journalists that is central to democracy. The right to freedom of expression is expressed in Article 11.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The labelling of publishers as “disinformation outlets” is contrary to principle of the freedom of press established by the European Court of Human Rights: “[a] general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or damage their reputation is not reconcilable with the press’ role of providing information on current events, opinion and ideas.” In addition, the methodology used by EEAS in the EU Disinformation Review is “ad hoc,” which constitutes a violation of the fundamental right to good administration in Article 41 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Specifically, the ad hoc design and operation of the EU Disinformation Review fails to ensure the review acts “impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time.” First, publications are not provided with the right to be heard or proper notice. The EU Disinformation Review’s homepage offers an opportunity to contact the Task Force report a suspected mistake in a fact-check but the page is only available in English, in violation of the principle of multilingualism, and no notice if given to outlets accused of being “disinforming outlets” before or after fact-checks of their content are published. Second, the EEAS does not fulfil its duty to motivate. EEAS is given a broad margin of discretion to identify disinformation, but fails to do so according to a consistent methodology. Therefore, EEAS cannot justify, on the basis of objective criteria, its choice of which content to review and how to determine its truth or falsehood. To comply with EU law and ensure the respect of fundamental rights, the EEAS should develop and make public (1) a methodology for selecting partnerships and reviewing fact-checks in line with international standards and (2) a notice and response mechanism for journalists, publishers and citizens whose content is being reviewed. If EEAS is unable to comply with the above, the EU Disinformation Review should be shut down.

This paper provides a critical assessment of the realities of EU participatory democracy and offers a set of innovative democratic innovations capable of making the Union more responsive to public input. It argues that today’s limited effectiveness of citizen participation to EU decision-making is due to the design, nature and practice of those instruments more than to the inherent inability of citizens to participate. As such, it concludes, the democratizing potential of the EU participatory tool-box remains not only fundamentally misaligned with societal participatory expectations, but also largely untapped.The paper suggests that the time has come for the EU to create an enabling and collaborative political environment fostering citizen participation beyond elections. Such a space may give birth to alternative, unconventional forms of participation capable of channeling citizens’ pluralistic and increasingly chaotic input into the political conversation to bring citizens closer to our representatives and, moreover, doing so in-between elections and across countries. Thus, for instance, by centralising all public input in a one-stop-shop entailing the participation of all EU institutions, a European Question Time might crystallise and eventually connect the daily realities of Europeans with the day-to-day operation of their institutions. A European Democratic Jury of randomly selected citizens from all over the Union could further contribute to such an objective by ‘humanising’ the EU decision-making.While this participatory framework would not magically fix the European accountability deficit, it may compensate for that by making the system responsive to citizen-driven agenda-setting and monitoring and eventually making it more intelligible and accessible to the many.

To resolve conflicts among norms, various nonmonotonic formalisms can be used to perform prioritized normative reasoning. Meanwhile, formal argumentation provides a way to represent nonmonotonic logics. In this paper, we propose a representation of prioritized normative reasoning by argumentation. Using hierarchical abstract normative systems, we define three kinds of prioritized normative reasoning approaches, called Greedy, Reduction, and Optimization. Then, after formulating an argumentation theory for a hierarchical abstract normative system, we show that for a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system, Greedy and Reduction can be represented in argumentation by applying the weakest link and the last link principles respectively, and Optimization can be represented by introducing additional defeats capturing the idea that for each argument that contains a norm not belonging to the maximal obeyable set then this argument should be rejected., Accepted by the Journal of Logic and Computation on November 2nd, 2017

The purpose of this legal memorandum is to provide advice to organisations and individuals interested in submitting a request for public access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/01 (“Regulation 1049/01”) to the European Parliament for documents related to the spending of political groups covered by Budget Item 400 appropriations under Chapter 7. Requests for those documents may face rejection on grounds related to exceptions provided for in Regulation 1049/01, specifically those found in Articles 4(1)b, 4(2), and 4(3) pertaining to privacy and integrity of the individual, commercial interests, and institution’s decision-making process respectively. This legal memorandum addresses the applicability of those exceptions to the documents requested for potential use in a confirmatory request to be submitted to the European Parliament subsequent to the initial rejection in line with Article 7 of Regulation 1049/01. The memo also provides arguments for overcoming these exceptions in light of: 1) recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) relating to the privacy exception; and 2) the strict legal requirements for triggering the commercial interests and institutional decision-making exceptions. The last section of the memo is structured to provide draft responses to the denial of requests for documents and should be tailored to the specific situation in question.

This paper aims to contribute to the longstanding technology-push vs. demand-pull debate and to the literature on renewable energy policy assessment. We argue that in addition to the traditional push–pull dichotomy, the drivers of technological change must be differentiated by whether they are exogenous or endogenous to the economic system and must be assessed with respect to their contribution to both the creation and the diffusion of innovation. We apply this perspective to study innovation in the renewable energy (RE) industry in 15 European Union countries from 1990 to 2012. Using different panel data estimators, we find that public R&D investments, policies supporting RE and per capita income all have a positive effect on either innovation creation or diffusion, whereas the variability of policy support has a negative impact on diffusion. However, impacts are heterogeneous and differ depending on the innovation dimension considered. Most importantly, we find that economic growth is a stronger driver of RE diffusion than technology-push or exogenous demand-pull mechanisms, whereas it is relatively ineffective at stimulating innovation creation. The effect of economic growth on RE diffusion exhibits a nonlinear, U-shaped pattern that resonates with the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis. RE penetration remains negligible at low levels of growth whereas it increases sharply only after income per capita has reached a given threshold. This effect has both a direct cause (with increased affluence demand for environmental quality rises) and an indirect cause (with increased affluence expensive RE policies become more affordable and get implemented more extensively). Our findings have implications for policy making. They suggest that for RE diffusion to increase, innovation policies should be carefully balanced. Government action should be directed not only at shielding renewables from competition with fossil fuel technologies, but also at stimulating aggregated demand and economic growth.

BACKGROUND A feature of the health of men across Europe is their higher rates of premature mortality and shorter life expectancy at birth than women. Following the publication of the first State of Men's Health in Europe report, we sought to explore possible reasons. METHOD We analyzed trends in life expectancy at birth in 19 European Union member states (EU19) between 1999 and 2008 using mortality data obtained from Eurostat. We then used Pollard's decomposition method to identify the contribution of deaths from different causes and at different age groups to differences in life expectancy. RESULTS Between 1999 and 2008, life expectancy at birth in the EU19 increased by 2.74 years for men and by 2.09 years for women. Most of these improvements were due to reductions in mortality at ages >60, with cardiovascular disease accounting for approximately half these improvements for men. In 2008, life expectancy of men in the EU19 was 5.92 years lower than that of women. Deaths from all major groups of causes, and at all ages, contributed to this gap, with external causes contributing 0.96 years, cardiovascular disease 1.80 years and neoplasms 1.61 years. CONCLUSION Improvements in the life expectancy at birth of men and women have mostly occurred at older ages. There has been little improvement in the high rate of premature death in younger men, suggesting a need for interventions to tackle their high death rate.