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Disgust is one of the basic emotions and is part of the behavioral immune system, which evolutionarily protects humans from toxic substances as well as from contamination threats by outgroup members. Previous works reveal that disgust not only activates humans' defense against potential individual and collective threats, but also leads to severe moral judgments, negative intergroup attitudes, and even conservative political orientations. As is already known, nationalism is an ideology that features both negative feelings toward outgroups and beliefs about native superiority or privileges. Evidence from previous studies suggests that disgust is related to nationalism's several components but lacks direct research on nationalism and disgust. The current study examines the relationship between disgust and nationalism in China at both individual and regional levels. In study 1, participants temporally induced disgust (vs. control) increasing the adoption of nationalism. In Study 2, we analyzed covariation in disgust expression in the Chinese micro-blog Weibo and the nationalism index as part of an online large-scale political survey http://zuobiao.me/ at the province level across Mainland China. The results show that online expression of disgust positively predicts nationalistic orientation at the regional level. Finally, we discuss how the findings shed light on research concerning online emotion expression and potential future directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the rise of nationalistic activism in the Chinese online sphere has drawn much scholarly attention, few studies have examined how nationalism, usages, and motivations of the Internet affect nationalistic actions among general Internet users in China. Using Sino-Japanese diplomatic disputes as a testing ground, this study investigates the effects of news use from traditional and new media, nationalistic attitudes, and motivations for Internet use on anti-Japanese political behaviors such as boycotting and protest participation. Analyses of online survey data revealed that nationalism is positively correlated with information-seeking and social-interaction motivations for Internet use regarding Sino-Japanese disputes. Results also showed that the stronger the motivation for using the Internet to discuss topics associated with Sino-Japanese disputes, the more likely respondents engaged in anti-Japanese behaviors. This study indicates that nationalistic attitudes and motivations involved in the use of new media technologies have significant effects on mobilizing supporters for anti-Japanese actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of a Chinese popularity function may seem surprising, given its authoritarian nature. However, exploring the possibility of indirect popularity functions in nondemocratic systems, we articulate a model of national government support in China. The model argues that sociodemographics, political attitudes, and performance issues mold central government satisfaction. Drawing on a countrywide 2008 public opinion survey, we conclude that regional differences, national trust, and local policy success are of special importance in shaping national government support. The findings, which exhibit theoretical and statistical appeal, lay the groundwork for further investigation of popularity functions in China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Empirical evidence concerning the demographics and development of Chinese nationalism is sparse but important for scholarship and policy. Its collection entails methodological challenges in access and reliability. We conducted a field experiment to measure nationalism in incentive-compatible choices among a diverse group of 447 Chinese subjects in a field setting. Our results demonstrate greater nationalism in female, older, less affluent and more rural respondents. We also find support for nationalism in professional and educated individuals. Our results provide qualified support for a middle-class nationalism in China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 2005 anti-Japan protests in China inaugurated a new era of Chinese popular nationalism with their pervasive visuality and virtuality. The outpouring of emotions in cityscapes and cyberspaces – anger, outrage, zealousness and even pleasure – requires us to take emotion, passion, hope or sheer delight seriously and to recognize the power of some of the more alarming forms of popular nationalist sentimentality. This chapter analyses one instance of Sino-Japanese relations: the epithet of ‘riben guizi’ or Japanese devils in Chinese popular culture in four historical moments: late-Sinocentric imperium, high imperialism, socialist nationalism and post-socialist globalization. I want to suggest that while this ‘hate word’ performs an affective politics of recognition stemming from an ineluctable trauma of imperialist violence, it ultimately fails in establishing a politics of reconciliation. I argue that anti-Japanism in China is less about Japan than China's own self-image mediated through its asymmetrical power relations with Japan throughout its modern history. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]