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The visual system is remarkably efficient at extracting summary statistics from the environment. Yet at any given time, the environment consists of many groups of objects distributed over space. Thus, the challenge for the visual system is to summarize over multiple groups. The current study investigates the capacity and computational efficiency of ensemble perception, in the context of perceiving mean sizes of multiple spatially intermixed groups of circles. In a series of experiments, participants viewed an array of one to eight sets of circles. Each set contained four circles in the same colors, but with different sizes. Participants estimated the mean size of a probed set. The set that would be probed was either known before onset of the array (pre-cue condition) or afterwards (post-cue condition). By comparing estimation error in the pre-cue and post-cue conditions, we found that participants could reliably estimate mean sizes for approximately two sets (Experiment 1). Importantly, this capacity was robust against attention bias toward individual objects in the sets (Experiment 2). Varying the exposure time to stimulus arrays did not increase the capacity limit, suggesting that ensemble perception could be limited by an internal resource constraint, rather than the speed of information encoding (Experiment 3). Moreover, we found that the visual system could not encode and hold more individual items than ensemble representations (Experiment 4). Taken together, these results suggest that ensemble perception provides an efficient way of information processing but with constraints.

Binary information is prevalent in the environment and contains 2 distinct outcomes. Binary sequences consist of a mixture of alternation and repetition. Understanding how people perceive such sequences would contribute to a general theory of information processing. In this study, we examined how people process alternation and repetition in binary sequences. Across 4 paradigms involving estimation, working memory, change detection, and visual search, we found that the number of alternations is underestimated compared with repetitions (Experiment 1). Moreover, recall for binary sequences deteriorates as the sequence alternates more (Experiment 2). Changes in bits are also harder to detect as the sequence alternates more (Experiment 3). Finally, visual targets superimposed on bits of a binary sequence take longer to process as alternation increases (Experiment 4). Overall, our results indicate that compared with repetition, alternation in a binary sequence is less salient in the sense of requiring more attention for successful encoding. The current study thus reveals the cognitive constraints in the representation of alternation and provides a new explanation for the overalternation bias in randomness perception. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

Visual scenes contain information on both a local scale (e.g., a tree) and a global scale (e.g., a forest). The question of whether the visual system prioritizes local or global elements has been debated for over a century. Given that visual scenes often contain distinct individual objects, here we examine how regularities between individual objects prioritize local or global processing. Participants viewed Navon-like figures consisting of small local objects making up a global object, and were asked to identify either the shape of the local objects or the shape of the global object, as fast and accurately as possible. Unbeknown to the participants, local regularities (i.e., triplets) or global regularities (i.e., quadruples) were embedded among the objects. We found that the identification of the local shape was faster when individual objects reliably co-occurred immediately next to each other as triplets (local regularities, Experiment 1). This result suggested that local regularities draw attention to the local scale. Moreover, the identification of the global shape was faster when objects co-occurred at the global scale as quadruples (global regularities, Experiment 2). This result suggested that global regularities draw attention to the global scale. No participant was explicitly aware of the regularities in the experiments. The results suggest that statistical regularities can determine whether attention is directed to the individual objects or to the entire scene. The findings provide evidence that regularities guide the spatial scale of attention in the absence of explicit awareness.

Numerical information can be perceived at multiple levels (e.g., one bird, or a flock of birds). The level of input has typically been defined by explicit grouping cues, such as contours or connecting lines. Here we examine how regularities of object co-occurrences shape numerosity perception in the absence of explicit grouping cues. Participants estimated the number of colored circles in an array. We found that estimates were lower in arrays containing colors that consistently appeared next to each other across the experiment, even though participants were not explicitly aware of the color pairs (Experiments 1a and 1b). To provide support for grouping, we introduced color duplicates and found that estimates were lower in arrays with two identical colors (Experiment 2). The underestimation could not be explained by increased attention to individual objects (Experiment 3). These results suggest that statistical regularities reduce perceived numerosity consistent with a grouping mechanism., (Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

The environment often is stable, but some aspects may change over time. The challenge for the visual system is to discover and flexibly adapt to the changes. We examined how attention is shifted in the presence of changes in the underlying structure of the environment. In six experiments, observers viewed four simultaneous streams of objects while performing a visual search task. In the first half of each experiment, the stream in the structured location contained regularities, the shapes in the random location were randomized, and gray squares appeared in two neutral locations. In the second half, the stream in the structured or the random location may change. In the first half of all experiments, visual search was facilitated in the structured location, suggesting that attention was consistently biased toward regularities. In the second half, this bias persisted in the structured location when no change occurred (Experiment 1), when the regularities were removed (Experiment 2), or when new regularities embedded in the original or novel stimuli emerged in the previously random location (Experiments 3 and 6). However, visual search was numerically but no longer reliably faster in the structured location when the initial regularities were removed and new regularities were introduced in the previously random location (Experiment 4), or when novel random stimuli appeared in the random location (Experiment 5). This suggests that the attentional bias was weakened. Overall, the results demonstrate that the attentional bias to regularities was persistent but also sensitive to changes in the environment.

Knowledge about regularities in the environment can be used to facilitate perception, memory, and language acquisition. Given this usefulness, we hypothesized that statistically structured sources of information receive attentional priority over noisier sources, independent of their intrinsic salience or goal relevance. We report three experiments that support this hypothesis. Experiment 1 shows that regularities bias spatial attention: Visual search was facilitated at a location containing temporal regularities, even though these regularities did not predict target location, timing, or identity. Experiments 2 and 3 show that regularities bias feature attention: Attentional capture doubled in magnitude when singletons appeared, respectively, in a color or dimension with temporal regularities among task-irrelevant stimuli. Prioritization of the locations and features of regularities is not easily accounted for in the conventional dichotomy between stimulus-driven and goal-directed attention. This prioritization may in turn promote further statistical learning, helping the mind to acquire knowledge about stable aspects of the environment.

When two jointly presented cues predict different outcomes, people respond faster to the conjunction/overlap of outcomes. Two explanations exist. In the joint account, people prioritize conjunction. In the serial account, people process cues serially and incidentally respond faster to conjunction. We tested these accounts in three experiments using novel web based attention-tracking tools. Participants learned colour-location associations where colorus predicted target locations (Experiment 1). Afterward, two cues appeared jointly and targets followed randomly. Exploratory data showed participants initially prioritized locations consistent with the conjunction, shifting later. Experiment 2 presented complex color-category associations during exposure. Upon seeing joint cues, participants' responses indicated both serial and joint processing. Experiment 3, with imperfect cue-outcome associations during exposure, surprisingly showed robust conjunctive predictions, likely because people expected exceptions to their predictions. Overall, strong learning led to spontaneous conjunctive predictions, but there were quick shifts to alternatives like serial processing when people were not expecting exceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has studied how resource scarcity draws attention and creates cognitive load. As a result, scarcity improves some dimensions of cognitive function, while worsening others. Still, there remains a fundamental question: how does scarcity influence the content of cognition? In this article, we find that poor individuals (i.e., those facing monetary scarcity) see many everyday experiences through a different lens. Specifically, thoughts about cost and money are triggered by mundane circumstances, they are difficult to suppress, they change mental associations, and they interfere with other experiences. We suggest that the poor see an economic dimension to many everyday experiences that to others may not appear economic at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most real-world judgments and decisions require the consideration of multiple types of evidence. For example, judging the severity of environmental damage, medical illness, or negative economic trends often involves tracking and integrating evidence from multiple sources (i.e. different natural disasters, physical symptoms, or financial indicators). We hypothesized that the requirement to track and integrate across distinct types of evidence would affect severity judgments of multifaceted problems, compared to simpler problems. To test this, we used scenarios depicting crop damage. Each scenario involved either two event types (i.e. mold damage and insect damage), or one event type. Participants judged the quality of the crop following each scenario. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjective judgments were attenuated if the scenario depicted multiple event types, relative to scenarios depicting single event types. This was evident as a shallower slope of subjective severity ratings, as a function of objectively quantifiable severity, for scenarios with multiple event types. In Experiment 3, we asked whether alternation between event types might contribute to this attenuation. Each scenario contained two event types, and the sequence of events either alternated frequently between types or was organized into two sequential groups. Subjective judgments were attenuated for scenarios with frequently alternating sequences. The results demonstrate that alternation between distinct event types attenuates subjective judgments of severity. This suggests that a requirement to integrate evidence across multiple sources places extra demands on the cognitive system, which reduces the perceived evidence strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This contradicts Orlandi’s version of the non-cognitivist hypothesis, but does so while vindicating her methodological position. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this study we aim to examine how the implicit learning of statistical regularities of successive stimuli affects the ability to exert cognitive control. In three experiments, sequences of flanker stimuli were segregated into pairs, with the second stimulus contingent on the first. Response times were reliably faster for the second stimulus if its congruence tended to match the congruence of the preceding stimulus, even though most participants were not explicitly aware of the statistical regularities (Experiment 1). In contrast, performance was not enhanced if the congruence of the second stimuli tended to mismatch the congruence of the first stimulus (Experiment 2). The lack of improvement appears to result from a failure of learning mismatch contingencies (Experiment 3). The results suggest that implicit learning of inter-stimulus relationships can facilitate cognitive control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]