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Reciprocity is a fundamental element in social interactions and implies an adequate response to the previous actions of our interactant. It is thus crucial to detect if a person is cooperating, deceiving, or cheating, to properly respond. However, older adults have been shown to have a lower ability to detect reciprocity compared to younger adults, partially tying this decline to cognitive functions. Another likely association to reciprocity in literature is made with personality dispositions, i.e., agreeableness, altruism, and empathic concern, and Theory of Mind (ToM). Consequently, the present study investigated age-related differences in the detection of the different components of reciprocity, as well as examined the predictors of reciprocity, such as cognitive measures, personality dispositions, and true and false beliefs in young (n = 98; 20–39 years), middle-aged (n = 106; 40–64 years), and older adults (n = 103; 65–96 years). The Mind Picture Story-Theory of Mind Questionnaire was used to measure the reciprocity components and true and false beliefs in each group. This study reported a significant decline in reciprocity detection from adults aged 65 years old and over. Additionally, the ability to detect reciprocity was significantly linked to cognitive functioning and ToM across all age groups, especially in older adults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jokes understanding is an important part of people's social life, especially in aging. However, little is known about older adults' humor understanding and the role of the cognitive skills underpinning social communication, mainly pragmatics and theory of mind (ToM). To fill this gap, we created the Phonological and Mental Jokes (PMJ) task, a fine-grained task distinguishing two types of jokes based on the mentalistic load. The PMJ task was administered, together with the Assessment of Pragmatic Abilities and Cognitive Substrates (APACS) test for pragmatics and the Strange Stories for ToM, to 147 older adults (age-range 60–85). Through structural equation modeling (SEM), we analyzed: i) the latent structure of the PMJ task; ii) the relationships between humor comprehension, pragmatics, and ToM, controlling for other background variables (vocabulary, education, and age). Results revealed a two-latent-factor model for the PMJ task, which separated phonological from mental jokes. Furthermore, pragmatic skills predicted humor comprehension irrespective of the type of joke, whereas the relationship between humor understanding and ToM skills was specific, being significant for mental, but not for phonological, jokes. These results suggest that humor understanding is part of the larger pragmatic competence of older adults and that it may additionally tax ToM skills when reasoning about the mental states of the joke's characters is required. These findings pave the way to a lifespan consideration of humor in social communication and add to the debate over the relationship between pragmatics and ToM, showing the different role of these abilities in humor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing evidence indicates that Theory of Mind (ToM) declines in normal aging. However, the majority of this research has used classic and static verbal tasks that present scenarios, which are very different from real life. The present study was designed to fill this gap by administering the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) to young and older participants. It allows one to analyze not only the accuracy, but also the typology of error in mental states attribution distinguishing between iper-ToM (over-mentalization), ipo-ToM (insufficient mentalization), and no-ToM (lack of mentalization). We recruited 30 young (20-29 years), 39 young-old (65-74 years), and 31 old-old (75-86 years) participants. Along with the MASC, we administered a classic ToM task, the Strange Stories, and several measures of cognitive functioning. Results showed that older adults were less accurate in mental state attribution than young adults in the MASC, but not in the Strange Stories. In addition, compared to young adults, older adults committed more errors of both ipo- and no-ToM, while young adults committed more often iper-ToM errors. Additionally, older adults, but not young adults, did not show a difference between iper-ToM and ipo-ToM errors, which were equally frequent in this age group. Globally, results indicated that older adults' failure in classic ToM tasks may be due to both ipo- and iper-ToM and provide needed evidence for the MASC as a suitable measure of ToM in aging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]