Search

This paper analyzes China's new approaches of education aid to Africa through a case study of Cameroon. China's cooperation has been characterized by different discourses and different historic relationships with recipient countries than those of traditional donors. Sino-African policies have gone through different stages, each connected to wider political and economic realities. Currently, a broadening of China's engagement with Africa can be noticed through increasing aid packages and the inclusion of African countries other than those that had traditionally been close to China. Cameroon has been one of the countries that have had a relatively extended cooperation with China. Four types of Chinese education aid to Africa are illustrated by this paper: (i) Confucius Institutes, which are providing language and culture-related training in host countries; (ii) longer term scholarships and short-term training for Africans in China; (iii) school construction; and (iv) stand-alone education projects. By analyzing how these three different types of aid are taking place in Cameroon, various and apparently contradictory strategies and discourses materialize.

This article reexamines the conventional wisdom that characterizes Sino-Japanese energy relations as predominantly competitive, but views Sino-Japanese environmental relations as essentially cooperative. Using sociological theories of risk, it is argued that Sino-Japanese cooperation is more likely in both the energy and environmental areas when common risks are perceived and relative gains are minimized. Despite their many conflicting strategic, political, and economic interests, as energy importers who are vulnerable to supply interruptions in the Middle East and competitors for global energy supplies, China and Japan share common risks to their energy security. Consequently, there actually may be increasing opportunities for China and Japan to address their common concerns through bilateral and multilateral cooperative practices, such as common positions on pricing or energy conservation initiatives. Although one would expect China and Japan to highlight their mutual interests in tackling environmental problems such as air pollution, in fact relative gains often impede cooperation. Japan increasingly views China as an economic competitor and is reducing environmental aid, while China continues to set a priority on economic growth, which sets limits on the use of costlier Japanese green technologies. By examining a selection of scholarly articles, reports and newspaper articles by Chinese and Japanese analysts, as well as material from interviews in Beijing and Tokyo in May-June 2007, the paper shows how environmental and energy issues in Sino-Japanese relations may be framed as threats, requiring counter-measures, or common risks, which can be addressed through cooperative practices. Lastly, the paper discusses the possibility of the development of an energy security 'risk community' as cooperative practices develop between China and Japan. Nonetheless, conflicting political interests, strategies, and self-images, accentuating relative gains, may provide obstacles to their cooperation in both energy security and environmental protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US-Japan and US-EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US-Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper has three main research objectives. First, we define a country's image through its principal dimensions, channels of communication (including the Public Diplomacy) and impact on the international relations framework. Second, we underline the specific determinants of China's image worldwide. The literature review emphasizes this country's distinctive "assets and liabilities", taking into account the role played by the political system in the Chinese economy, external factors, associated with the generally accepted norms and values, the geographical distance that hinders the direct contact and mutual understanding. Third, on the basis of recent studies, we analyze how China is perceived in different regions/countries and demonstrate that the economic rationale of international relations is stronger than that induced by a partner country's image. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area (FTAAP) has become a topic of focus since the proposal was first raised in 2004. The present paper considers China's policy towards the FTAAP from a political economy perspective by probing the gains, impediments and concerns for China, and makes judgments based on several possible scenarios. The author argues that from an economic perspective, China would benefit from joining the FTAAP both in a static and a dynamic manner because both its main trade partners and trade barriers in export markets are concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region. However, whether the Chinese Government is likely to support the initiative is largely dependent on certain crucial political and diplomatic elements, including the APEC approach, US-Chinese relations, quality of treaty, sensitive sectors, competitive proposal of alternative and membership of Chinese Taipei. Therefore, if the Chinese Government cannot ratify the ideology and terms of the initiative, or issues that are central to China's interests are not addressed, the FTAAP will only remain a proposal possessing economic possibility in the long run, without political feasibility in the near term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the development of China’s economic ties with Southeast Asia over the last two decades, culminating in the inauguration of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) in 2010. Particular reference is made to China’s trade ties with Indonesia. Although two-way trade between China and Indonesia has grown rapidly since 2000, Indonesian exports to China are dominated by primary products, while imports from China are dominated by manufactures. While this pattern might reflect short-term comparative advantage in both economies, it is causing some concern in Indonesia. The paper assesses these concerns, and possible political reactions.

Although Myanmar is among the world’s oldest oil-producing countries, Chinese oil and gas companies did not start their oil and gas exploration projects there until recently. The most recent and significant China–Myanmar energy cooperation project is the oil and gas pipelines which got started in 2009. This paper will discuss the reasons and driving forces for this pipeline project and its broader objectives, and testify whether pipelines can deepen regional economic integration and strengthen bilateral relations. This paper concludes by saying that China might use the China–Myanmar pipeline construction as an opportunity to play a more constructive role in Myanmar’s domestic reforms, thus improving its image in Southeast Asia and strengthening its relations with Myanmar.

In 2001, China finally joined the WTO. The accession of China was looked forward to by many WTO members and China itself. However, observers had some fears that the Chinese accession would prove to be a Trojan horse, disrupting the working of the WTO. This paper looks into the Chinese accession and its involvement in the WTO Dispute Settlement and argues that these fears seem so far to be unfounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains the continuity of India's globalization policies from a realist strategic perspective, incorporating economics with security studies. It contends that the Indian state is not passively surrendering to an overarching world economy, but opening up strategically, taking into account its competitive position against rival states, particularly China. Changes in tariff and foreign investment policies in India display a consistent pattern of gradual liberalization since the early 1990s and a close correspondence with China's opening-up policies. Afier considering alternarive explanations for such correspondence, the article suggests that the most persuasive explanation centers on strategic rivalry between the two countries. Competition with China in multiple arenas--economic, political military, and technological--induces Indian policymakers to imitate Chinese policies of opening up. The continuation of India's globalization policies is inspired by efforts to strengthen the state relative to its external rivals in order to vie more effectively for regional hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After obtaining its independence in 1948, Burma established a welfare state and a national economic development plan (Pyidawtha), but foreign aid was required to facilitate the implementation of this plan. The United States and the United Kingdom did not provide the required financial assistance to Burma during the post-war years, even though Burma urgently needed assistance to advance the Pyidawtha plan and was unexpectedly facing a drastic decrease in paddy export income. Following the instability and crisis in socioeconomic reform and development, Burma requested additional assistance from China and other sources. Although Burma faced pressure from the left wing, particularly from the Burmese Communist disturbance, Burma became increasingly interested in cooperating with China. China established a policy giving Burma a Chinese diplomatic exit and provided, along with the Soviet Union, timely economic aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the emergence of a rich literature on the rise of China in Latin America (LAC) since 2000, we are still grappling with this phenomenon. In this article we seek to theorize this expanding South-South relationship from two vantage points. First, from the perspective of China, we argue that, by necessity, the PRC has had to internationalize its development strategy in order to compensate for its serious natural resource deficit, feed the world's largest domestic population, and fuel the soon-to-be largest economy in the world. LAC has been just one slice of China's ‘go out’ strategy. Our second perspective probes the effect of China's entry into the region. Through the lens of development economics, we identify three separate political economy scenarios that have been accentuated within those countries that have the strongest economic ties with China. We rely on measures of institutional performance and macro-economic trends to illustrate the variable effects of China on LAC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Professional Geographer is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Under President Xi Jinping's leadership, Chinese foreign relations have moved from keeping a low profile, to a more assertive bid for international leadership that is beginning to take form in the 'belt and road initiative' (BRI). This initiative focuses on connectivity in policy coordination, facilities, trade, finance and people-to-people relations, in order to connect China to key parts of Asia, the south Pacific, east Africa and Europe. Networked capitalism and the national unit, which are often seen as spatial opposites in the global political economy, are both exercised through the BRI in mutually supporting ways. Networked capitalism is not challenging the national spatial unit, nor vice versa. Rather, they conglomerate to reinforce Chinese government narratives which portray China as the new trailblazer of global capitalism—thus illustrating and justifying a new Sinocentric order in east Asia. Likely winners of this constellation, if it is successful, are megalopolises in Eurasia, and most of all the Chinese Communist Party. Likely losers are countries that are not included in the BRI, most notably the United States. In a context where President Donald Trump is signalling a more protectionist stance and the United States is withdrawing from free trade pacts like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump may ironically enable Xi's dream of making China great again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently China has adopted the Belt and Road Initiative as a core component of its foreign policy. An important goal of the initiative is to connect China to major Eurasian and African nations through infrastructure building, including Internet infrastructure. Drawing on the critical political economy tradition to media policies, this article offers a broad overview of the communication and information segment of the initiative, which has so far been undervalued or even overlooked in the existing literature. Based on a two-level document analysis, I argue that a growing and complex alliance has been formed between the state and its homegrown Internet companies in building a "digital Silk Road," with a multifaceted aim to mitigate industrial overcapacity, facilitate corporate China's global expansion, support the internationalization of the renminbi, construct a China-centered transnational network infrastructure, and promote an Internet-enabled "inclusive globalization." The highly dynamic state-capital interplays, however, continue to create tensions and conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the rationale by which mainland Chinese firms choose their coalition partners in their Malaysian ventures. I explore how, under certain political economic conditions, such cross-border investment and corporate tie-ups can be shaped to meet the Malaysian state’s objectives. I argue that the Malaysian state has enjoyed success in the construction sector by nurturing cooperation between its carefully groomed government-linked companies and mainland Chinese firms. Government-linked companies are useful coalition partners for the mainland Chinese firms because of the crucial role the state plays in creating a largely non-competitive industry that favours government-linked companies. Outside of the construction sector, however, the state has enjoyed markedly less success in fostering cooperation between the mainland Chinese firms and the government-linked companies. Consequently, the mainland Chinese firms possess more bargaining power vis-à -vis the state when they invest in these sectors, enjoying considerable autonomy in the selection of their coalition partners.

Background: Global healthcare innovation networks nowadays have expanded beyond developed countries with many developing countries joining the force and becoming important players. China, in particular, has seen a significant increase in the number of innovative firms and research organizations stepping up to the global network in recent years. Nevertheless, the intense Research and Development input has not brought about the expectable output. While China is ascending at a great speed to a leading position worldwide in terms of Research and Development investment, scientific publications and patents, the innovation capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector remain weak.Discussion: This study discusses the challenges and opportunities for pharmaceutical innovation in China. One hand, academic, industrial, institutional and financial constraints were found to be the major and inevitable barriers hindering the development of drug innovation. On the other hand, unique advantages had been observed which included growing pharmaceutical market, Research and Development funding, distinctive source, and international cooperation. The most important thing for China's pharmaceutical sector to leap forward is to break though innovation barriers and integrate own advantages into global value-chain of healthcare product development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has re-emerged to become a dominant foreign player in Cambodia. Politically, Cambodia is one of China’s oldest and closest allies. Economically, China is Cambodia’s top foreign investor, a major donor, and an increasingly important trading partner. Culturally, Chinese values are deeply embedded in many aspects of Cambodian society. However, China’s dominance is surrounded by renewed controversies. While the government warmly welcomes Chinese aid, saying that it comes with no strings attached, many experts are concerned that China is providing aid for more nefarious reasons. Critics also accuse Chinese investment and aid of having exacerbated corruption, weakened governance and harmed human rights, and of ruining Cambodia’s natural resources and environment. With such controversies, it is relevant and significant to assess the roles that China has played and continues to play in Cambodia’s socio-economic development. Using expert interviews, media analysis and an extensive literature review, this paper uniquely contributes to the existing discussion on China–Cambodia relations by closely examining the controversies of China’s investment and aid, critically analysing China’s interests in Cambodia, and asking if the relationship between the two nations is a positive-sum game.

The rise of China in Africa is often described as a major challenge to the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) democracy promotion policies. China is accused of providing important volumes of loans, development aid, trade and investments without “political strings” attached, thereby undermining the US and the EU's possibilities to set material incentives for reforms. This article investigates Ethiopia and Angola as two cases where one would expect that the growing presence of China has made it more difficult for the EU and US to support reforms. Empirical findings presented in this article go against this argument. In both countries, the EU and the US face substantial difficulties to make the respective government address governance issues. However, the presence of China has not made it more difficult for the US and the EU to implement their strategies. Instead the empirical analysis suggests that domestic factors in Ethiopia and Angola, notably the level of challenge to regime survival both governments face, influence both governments’ willingness to engage with the EU and US. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Institutions are frequently thought of as ‘socialising’ member states into pre-established norms. However, this influence is not necessarily a one-way street; members can also affect institutions, whether individually or collectively. This article analyses the behaviour of two emerging powers – Brazil and China – within the field of international development. What roles have these two states played in shaping global development norms? The article examines the key motivations, positions, and initiatives taken by Brazil and China, with special reference to the UN development system (unds). Whereas Brazil and China’s early behaviour within theundsdiverged significantly, in the post-cold war period both have become increasingly interested in – and capable of – influencing UN norms. However, despite greater involvement in UN development negotiations, these countries’ leverage in normative debates originates outside of theunds, through their South–South cooperation programmes. The current diversification of platforms through which the norms of international development are negotiated may enhance the influence of emerging powers, although their ability to channel this influence effectively will depend on their capacity for norm entrepreneurship, rather than mere norm blocking. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Beijing's contemporary political and economic inroads into Africa have generated much interest in the current literature, with media, policymakers and scholars endeavoring to assess the merits and risks implicit in this renewed engagement. This article fills this void by examining the current China-Africa relations. However, no substantial empirical underpinning is found to back up sinister prophesies of coming catastrophe from critics of the direction of China--Africa relations. The relationship from an economic perspective is promising and encouraging but more needs to be done regarding multilateral relations, improvement of institutions, and sustainability of resources management. A number of positive signs suggest that Beijing is heading towards the right direction which would provide openings for a multi-polar dialog. While benefiting in the short run, African leaders have the capacity to tailor this partnership and address some socio-economic and political matters arising that may negatively affect the nexus in the long term. Policy implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since China agreed to join the international counter-piracy coalition in late 2008, a watershed development in Chinese strategic policy, Beijing's engagement in Somalia is now following two separate streams. First, China is seeking to engage Somalia as part of its expanding number of African diplomatic partners via its participation in the coalition. Second, China is attempting to demonstrate, on the international level, its growing commitment to developing its naval capabilities, and protecting its maritime trade interests, by engaging in multilateral and coalition-based operations, namely to combat piracy off the Somali coast, in order to deflect criticism from the United States and its allies of China's overall military expansion and modernization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Colombia Internacional is the property of Universidad de los Andes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In recent years the People's Republic of China (China) has expanded its economic relations with CARICOM (the member states of CARICOM are Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago). This is evident in the increase in trade and development assistance. The objective of this article is to explain the expanded and intensified economic presence of China in the CARICOM region. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to identify the motives for China's conduct in the region and the factors that account for the receptivity of CARICOM to economic relations with China. Although the focus is primarily on the economic relationship between China and the CARICOM countries, this aspect of China's involvement in the region cannot be separated from the political dimension. China's motives for a growing presence in the region are both economic and political and have to be examined in the wider context of China's overall foreign policy, its shifting world view, its superpower status and the geo-politics of the current global conjuncture. Similarly, CARICOM's conduct has to be located in the wider context of its overall foreign policy. The first section outlines the history and current status of China-CARICOM relations. This is followed by an exposition of the extent and increase in economic interaction between China and CARICOM. The third section provides an examination of China's motives for the conduct of its foreign policy in the CARICOM countries. These motives are partly influenced by economics and partly by politics and hence have to be understood in the global geo-political context. A fourth section is devoted to explaining CARICOM's receptivity to increased economic relations with China. The final section provides a brief outlook for China-CARICOM economic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]