1. Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game.
- Author
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Shinohara, Ryusuke
- Subjects
- *
GAME theory , *QUEUING theory , *DECISION making , *DECISION theory , *MATHEMATICAL models - Abstract
We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in the provision of a (pure) public good. We study which Nash equilibria are achieved through cooperation, and we investigate coalition-proof equilibria under strict and weak domination. We show that under some incentive condition, (i) a profile of strategies is a coalition-proof equilibrium under strict domination if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that is not strictly Pareto-dominated by any other Nash equilibrium and (ii) every strict Nash equilibrium for non-participants is a coalition-proof equilibrium under weak domination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2010
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