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Crime and corruption are ubiquitous worldwide. They have long been both cause and consequence of poverty and various other societal problems around the world, especially in underdeveloped countries. Crime and corruption take different forms, existing at all levels of society and deeply affecting people's lives, from underground exchanges inside or between businesses, to judiciary or police functions and municipal or national government departments. Undermining both political and economic development, crime and corruption can worsen income polarities and harm the poorest most. Currently there are quite many studies focusing on why firms pay for briberies; however, very few studies have considered how firms deal with crime. This paper empirically studies how firms in developing economies cope with both crime and corruption. To be specific, I look into the potential determinants on why and how much worldwide firms spend on protection payments. Using a unique firm-level dataset extracted from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys from 2006 to 2014, this paper focuses on two types of protection payments made by firms operating in developing economies: (1) open security payments, intended to avoid criminal losses exoterically, and (2) underground bribery payments, intended to meet corrupt government officials' needs secretly. Overall data on 120 developing countries were extracted, and 105,282 observations became available. I start with ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the determinants of how much a firm decides to pay for protection. Furthermore, to alleviate the potential simultaneity problem embedded in the OLS method, I also use probit estimation for the firms' decisions to pay. Results obtained through multiple statistical and econometric examinations suggest that firm-level characteristics such as employment size, international business connections, labor quality, and expansion experience exert profound and differentiated influence on firms' payments. Meanwhile, bureaucratic inefficiency and social instability significantly raise firms' incentive to pay. Firms that are smaller with fewer foreign business connections, lower labor quality, and defective infrastructure tend to pay, and pay more, for protection, as do those firms that have grown faster and longer. Besides, fast expansion makes firms more vulnerable to extortion, and more likely to encounter with crime and corruption. Various tests confirmed the robustness of these findings. There are several important policy implications based on these findings. First of all, governments need to enhance the quality of the society's infrastructure. This will effectively decrease firms' extra security expenditures. Also, the government must endeavor to control corruption, especially among those small and less productive firms. Enhanced supervision and auditing procedures must be developed, and create a better growth atmosphere for all firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In developing countries, informal firms account for up to about half of all economic activity. Using data from World Bank firm-level surveys, we find that informal firms are small and extremely unproductive compared with even the small formal firms in the sample, and especially relative to the larger formal firms. Formal firms are run by much better educated managers than informal ones and use more capital, have different customers, market their products, and use more external finance. Few formal firms have ever operated informally. This evidence supports the dual economy ("Wal-Mart") theory of development, in which growth comes about from the creation of highly productive formal firms. Informal firms keep millions of people alive but disappear as the economy develops. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]