Search

This paper builds on the paper Disarmament, Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Couterproliferation: In Search of Synergy and Policy Coherence that was presented at the combined International Security Studies Section, ISA, and National Security and Arms Control Section, APSA, meeting at Richmond, VA in October 2002. That initial paper examined the development of the four title policy elements against the emerging international security environment as a foundation from which to examine US Government internal policy, process, and organizational factors for arms control as a policy arena. The follow-on paper proposed here would depart from the same conceptual and process development, but it would examine the external position, emphasis, and priority of the four title elements in US external foreign and security policy and its implementation. The focus here will be on analyzing and critiquing the shift from, for example, nonproliferation to counterproliferation, and from relatively more collective approaches to arms control policy to a more unilateral emphasis. A preliminary outline would be something like the following: Policy Evolution (place, role, and priority in US policy) Disarmament and Arms Control Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation; Bush Administration Policy and Rationale No Place for Disarmament, An end to Arms Control Counterproliferation first, Nonproliferation in a Supporting Role; Policy Relevance and Recommendations; Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterproliferation CBW Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterproliferation Conventional and Emerging Arms Control Arenas; Crafting and Implementing a Coherent and Synergistic Approach to Arms Control [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the demographic representations of threats in the post Cold War security context. Fears of differential fertility between regions, countries and ethnic groups have long been a focus of U.S. national security interests. Today, these fears center on differences in population growth rates between Israeli Jews and Palestinians, Hindus and Muslims in South Asia, and more generally Islamic countries and the West. Youth bulge theories predict that a high proportion of young males within a country predisposes it toward political violence. In the current war on terror defense and intelligence strategists are pointing toward youth bulges as an instigator of violence, especially in the Middle East. The paper also examines the gendered nature of these strategic doctrines as well as their integration into other international and domestic security models, e.g. environmental conflict theory, the superpredator explanation of juvenile crime, and racial profiling. It analyzes their relationship to migration issues and changing demographic realities such as mortality from the AIDS pandemic, slowing of population growth worldwide, and the gray dawn of population aging in the West. Are there subtle differences in the understanding and articulation of these threats among different political interests, e.g. conservative unilateralists and liberal multilateralists? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'National Vision' of the Bush Administration with regard to homeland security aimed to 'prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terror while facilitating the legal flow of people, goods, and services'. International implications of homeland security measures have resulted in the emergence of new class of foreign policy makers: Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, and other units in the Department of Homeland Security whose exposure to international partners increased considerably. This paper challenges a reader to make a certain conceptual shift and look at homeland security as a foreign policy issue as well as the internal security one. The analysis of transatlantic homeland security progresses in two steps. First, it explores the post-September 11th development of homeland security cooperation between the US and the EU in order to identify challenges to the transatlantic governance of homeland security. Then, the attention is paid to internal challenges stemming from domestic politics on each side but also to external ones posed by the international environment and third parties. Issues under discussion in this paper include aviation security and customs cooperation which represent most impressive but at the same time most problematic dimension of the contemporary transatlantic homeland security cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will assess the manifold efforts to securitize global environmental change (GEC) as security dangers and concerns for national and human security that poses a new survival dilemma for those who are highly socially vulnerable due to the impact of natural hydrome¬teo¬¬rological hazards whose number and intensity has increased and is predicted to grow further due to the anthropogenic climate change. In the U.S. nearly as many people died due to the impact of Hurricane Katrina in August 2006 as of the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001. But the perception of these two cases as security concerns has differed not only between many governments within NATO but also among the people in Europe and in North America. The securitization of GEC has fundamentally differed and prevented so far effective global counter measures to adapt to and mitigate against the consequences of this new security threat where the enemy is us: our production and consumption patters as well as ways of life. Climate change as a new human and national security danger and concern poses new global equity problems between those countries and people that have contributed most to GEC and the survival of those poor people â€" especially in the South â€" whose livelihood and survival is directly threatened and who lack the resources for counter measures. The key thesis of this paper is that the turn towards the anthropocene requires a fundamental reconcep¬tua¬lizing of security as a result of a multi-, inter- and transdiciplinary process where natural and social scientists cooperate contributing to an anticipatory learning to prevent that the business as usual scenarios on climate change become reality with all its impact on global security policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite renewed interest in international security cooperation after 9-11, security coordination between Mexico, Canada and the United States has been limited. Lack of policy coordination between these three countries is no surprise. They all have developed different security doctrines and practices that are not likely to be changed in the near future. Hence, this paper will analyze the security policies of three North American countries from the end of World War II to the September 11 attacks. Post-World War II analysis will allow me to analyze how structural conditions regarding bipolarity interacted with the domestic conditions of each country. The second period to be analyzed, pre-September 11, will illustrate how structural changes are not immediately translated into new security doctrines, at least not in the near future. Policy adaptation tends to be slow and not always progressive. This paper will be structured in five sections. The first three sections will examine each country’s security doctrines during the Cold War period, focusing on the interaction between international and domestic politics. The fourth section will compare and contrast how each country reacted differently vis-à-vis the end of the Cold War. Finally, the last section will evaluate the implications of these findings and its impact on North American security cooperation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States focused American strategic policy around the use, or potential use, of preemptive/preventive strikes, particularly as a counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism tool. While preemption and prevention are not new strategies, they have never been highlighted to such a degree as is currently the case. These activities have been studied in the context of international security, using elements such as spiral models and offense-defense theory. This paper seeks to examine if other elements, specifically international law and normative issues, such as just war tradition, contribute to our understanding of the use, or non-use, of preventive or preemptive actions by states. The results indicate that the limitations on the use of anticipatory military activities found in international law and the just war tradition do not have a significant impact on the likelihood that these actions will be used by states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States focused American strategic policy around the use, or potential use, of preemptive/preventive strikes, particularly as a counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism tool. While preemption and prevention are not new strategies, they have never been highlighted to such a degree as is currently the case. These activities have been studied in the context of international security, using elements such as spiral models and offense-defense theory. This paper seeks to examine if other elements, specifically international law and normative issues, such as just war tradition, contribute to our understanding of the use, or non-use, of preventive or preemptive actions by states. The results indicate that the limitations on the use of anticipatory military activities found in international law and the just war tradition do not have a significant impact on the likelihood that these actions will be used by states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An enduring pressure for U.S. foreign policy makers has been upholding and promoting the values of the United States while often necessarily working with dictators and authoritarian regimes for national security concerns. This paper examines the ways in w ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies Michel Foucault’s work on security dispositifs and liberal governmentality that he has developed in his Collège de France’s lectures Il faut défendre la société (1976), Sécurité, territoire et population (1977) and Naissance de la biopolitique (1978) to US global security strategy and discourse. It focuses more specifically on US global governmentality as it relates to outer space, asking how through the US national security governmental(ized) regime Space is being contingently managed. Hence, on the one hand, it looks at how security as a form of management of contingency is being applied to the logic of managing the access to outer space and the freedom of Space, and, on the other hand, it reflects on the political rationalities and technologies at play in the US reordering of international law and legal regime in outer space. It is understood that the Foucauldian outlook here follows more the management of contingency and the preparation towards a “future to come” (un à-venir) as there is no more identifiable enemies than a disciplinary society system in the likes of Foucault’s 1972 Discipline and Punish, even though long-established disciplinary practices in the US national security governmental regime are still somewhat present. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of WWII, and once again at the end of the Cold War, Europeans created order and thereby enhanced their stability. As the following discussion will make clear, they did so by transcending historical legacies, including former enemies into security structures, tying the US to the European continent and thus, over time, promoting principles, norms and rules that built trust and redefined identities. Or, put differently, Europeans promoted peace and stability by giving rise to what Webber et. al. (2004) and Kirchner (2006) characterize as "security governance." Security provisions in the Asia-Pacific region look very different. History there is still a "neuralgic point" (Berger 2006) and a "hub and spokes network" consisting of five bilateral alliances, along with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (a "security regime" which is gradually moving toward a "security community") and the ASEAN Regional Forum were created over time to stabilize the region. Recognizing that Asia is not Europe, the paper argues that the process of European security provisions, nevertheless, provides useful lessons for the Asia-Pacific region, particularly when it comes to the institutionalization of trust on multiple levels--a development that appears inevitable to assure regional stability in the long-run. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional wisdom suggests that, rather than adopting a one-size-fits all approach to nonproliferation, the strategies employed to dissuade states from obtaining nuclear weapons should vary depending upon the particular reasons why the target country is pursuing a nuclear program. This appears perfectly logical: we need to tailor our strategies to the unique circumstances of each case. States may seek a nuclear capability, after all, for a variety of reasons, including to: (1) enhance national security against a regional or international threat, (2) coerce or blackmail rivals in order to make gains, or (3) shore up domestic support or pursue great-power status by pursuing a high-profile foreign policy goal. Thus, for example, the best strategy to deal with states seeking nuclear weapons for purposes of blackmail might be a policy based on credible deterrence.Embracing this widely accepted view of nonproliferation might be self-defeating, however, due to what I term the proliferation paradox. By adopting a differentiated approach to nonproliferation, there is considerable potential for unintended and pernicious demonstration effects. A strategy to dissuade certain states motivated by X from developing nuclear weapons may subsequently heighten the desire for a nuclear capability among other states motivated by Y. One of the clearest examples of this phenomenon occurs when a threat of preemptive action against an aggressive proliferation exacerbates a security concerns for other states in the region, which respond by proliferating. Indeed, states eager to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons may unwittingly set off a dangerous spiral of proliferation. Although each non-proliferation strategy is tailored to each case, and works quite effectively in local terms, the overall result, paradoxically, is to encourage system wide proliferation.The solution is not to fall back on a one-size-fits all nonproliferation strategy but instead recognize that each proliferator is not an island, apart from the main, but instead forms part of a complex system. The United States needs to consider both the effectiveness of nonproliferation strategies in each individual case and the likely ways in which they will affect system-wide proliferation. This paper explores the extent to which this dynamic operates, by examining through deductive logic how strategies designed to deal with one type of proliferator can backfire with other types of proliferators, followed by detailed case studies of the United States' nonproliferation policy in Asia and the Middle East together with specific recommendations for future U.S. nonproliferation policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of the European Union as an actor of its kind with a global strategy coincides with the transformation of the international order shaped by the hegemonic position of the United States. The EU does not challenge the United States in traditional power and its efficiency suffers from inherent institutional weaknesses. Still, the EU equals the United States in the global scope of its security agenda with interests and objectives. The United States, while adhering to its doctrine of power primacy, subjects the EU to expectations and demands regarding burden sharing. While common interests may make cooperation between the EU and the US over global problems and new security threats an issue of pragmatic and functional character, political cultures shaping European and American views of such fundamental aspects of the international order as sovereignty and multilateralism differ significantly. Moreover, in pursuing interests and objectives that differ from those of the United States, the EU has to evoke structural dimensions of power. The paper looks at the structural, functional and ideational elements of the grand strategies of the European Union and the United States and how their security relations are arranged in the international system. More closely, an empirical analysis is made of the effectiveness of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a strategic asset of the EU in addressing and shaping the relationship with the United States, directly and indirectly through EU-NATO relations. The empirical analysis is focused on the military aspects proper of the development of the ESDP, with the concept and policy of autonomy as the starting point. The evolution of capabilities, missions and doctrines is reviewed as evidence of strategies of bargaining, binding and balancing of the European Union towards the United States. Summary of conclusions in Table 1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

please see the uploaded paper ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study will attempt to historicize America?s New Imperialism by locating its practices in an emerging post-Cold War security discourse. That is, in an ongoing discussion among American ?intellectuals of statecraft? concerning the official strategic or ?geopolitical? threats or problems that confront America in an era of complex globalization. In this poster, I look at the origins, practices, and ambitions of neoconservative statesmen and develop a genealogical framework for understanding why, despite the obvious constraints of soft power, they have opted to pursue a unilateral agenda. In closing, I look at the ‘counter-scripts’ confronting neoconservative discourse in the aftermath of the failure to capitalize on an initially successful invasion of Iraq. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States Military Academy’s International Security Seminar enables future officers to explore the security environment, constraints, and policies of weak and failing states and non-state actors. An understanding of these actors is vital to US security professionals as we anticipate second and third order effects of US foreign policy; however, the dearth of international relations theory that explains and predicts the behavior of these actors has hindered policy makers from planning for these second and third order effects. What domestic and international policies and actions should we expect from weak and failing states, and from non-state actors, under current and future international conditions? The seminar explores the weaknesses of international relations theory as it applies to weak and failing states and non-state actors and then applies other models that can help to explain observed and expected behaviors. The seminar establishes a conceptual framework to explain how weak and failing states and non-state actors define security and, subsequently, develop security strategies. The conceptual framework accounts for these actors’ domestic, regional, and international security environments and their limited military, diplomatic, information, and economic means. The seminar addresses four central questions: (1) the nature of weak and failing state and non-state actor security (2) the security environment in which these actors operate (3) how these actors plan for their security (4) what factors influence their choices. The first block of the course establishes the conceptual framework and fundamental concepts. The second block assesses the military, diplomatic, information, and economic means available to weak states. The third block allows in-depth analysis from the perspective of a weak or failing state or a non-state actor. Throughout the block, cadets role play both sides of a security diad, enabling students to apply the conceptual framework by transforming domestic and strategic inputs into policy decisions and defense programs. The fourth block questions the applicability of the framework to anticipated changes in the security environment and means available to these actors. Throughout the course, cadets explore non-US perspectives and discover their our own biases with respect to the security of non-US actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalization, far from being a monolithic economic phenomenon, involves a range of complex economic, social, and political trends that are unpacking the Westphalian inter state security system. These trends include, in particular, ! complex economic interdependence, ! ideological fragmentation, multiculturalism, postmodernity, etc., and ! the expansion of diverse, ad hoc processes of global governance. In this context, a growing range of actors, especially non state social and economic actors, find increasing incentives to defect from the state bound international security order. The result is a fragmentation of both threats and responses in a fluid Aneo medieval@ political environment. These new conditions of (un)governability create strong incentives for political entrepreneurs to experiment with untested projects for creating (or re creating) top down control, including attempts to impose unilateral American hegemony, among others. However, these projects themselves become sources of instability and conflict as they in turn reinforce incentives for defection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil or homeland security provides an interesting case for the study of norms transmission. The ‘norm-takers’ in these cases are often officials in cities or arms of government not typically responsible for foreign policy or defence: transportation, civil infrastructure protection, and emergency management. These levels and branches of government are not an obvious site for international relations and security policy, but they have become the focus of policy for preventing and responding to terrorism. However, there is some precedent for civil security norms penetrating arms of government not typical seen to be engaged in international security: the civil defence policies of the cold war. I apply Amitav Acharya’s idea of norm localization, whereby local norms-takers engage in a dynamic process of interaction to adapt local and transnational norms to match each other, to civil security. How do local officials localize regional and global anti-terrorism norms to environments where global security is a new priority, but which already have well-established norms for dealing with natural disasters, crime, and other emergencies? The literature on norms diffusion typically posits a trickle-down effect, with transnational norms-entrepreneurs generating norms to be implemented domestically. But in this situation where local actors possess expertise in emergency response, is there evidence of a trickle-up effect, with local practice influencing regional or international norms? This paper will also contribute to the literature on the life-cycle of norms because it will focus on a case where localization may include re-invigorating the dormant norms of civil defence. Empirically, the paper will examine Canadian civil security policy, with a focus on the all-hazards norm for responding to emergencies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 9/11, members of both foreign policy and academic communities have advanced sweeping claims about the purported connection between states weakness in the developing world and critical global and transnational threats. The underlying assumption, in the words of the 2002 National Security Strategy, is that ?the United States today is threatened less by conquering states than we are by weak and failing ones.? To date, the proposition that weak and failing states serve as incubators and transmission belts for all manner of global ?bads? has relied almost entirely on anecdotal evidence (e.g., al Qaeda?s operations in Afghanistan and Somalia). The paper will begin by documenting the main causal claims about the connection between state fragility and transnational threats (including terrorism, international crime, human trafficking, health epidemics, humanitarian catastrophes, energy insecurity, and environmental degradation). It will outline a research agenda, including quantitative and qualitative methods, designed to test the hypotheses implicit in these causal claims. The paper will then summarize some of the initial research findings and discuss their implications for a more integrated U.S. foreign policy toward weak states and global threats. The paper will be the basis for the first chapter of a longer book manuscript I am writing on Weak States, Global Threats, and U.S. National Security. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decrying the erosion of freedom in the name of security, the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group reports that since the events of September 11th the surveillance and policing of people have been intensified by the use of new mechanisms: "sneak and peak" in the US, "stop and search" in the UK, "preventative detention" in Canada and "indefinite detention without trial" worldwide. Within the frame of the "war on terror," the relationship between civil liberties and security is being transformed. This paper argues, however, that these developments do not merely signal an erosion of civil rights in the name of national and international security, but a reconstitution of the meaning of liberty and freedom. By examining representations of liberty within contemporary security practices in the US, the UK and Canada, this paper will illuminate the conditions under which current security measures have been rationalized and deemed necessary for the continuation of liberal democracy itself. As security is posited as both entwined with the protection of territorialized nation-states while also imperative for the protection of liberty, this paper considers how new practices of security have come to serve as mechanisms for the liberal governance of populations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although threat is central to international security, few works examine how statesmen manipulate external threats to satisfy their own security goals. This paper provides a theory of threat inflation, and investigates cases of American adventurism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Realists currently do not have a lot to say about terrorism.‘New terrorism’ and the asymmetric threats posed by it show the shortcomings of realism as states are being forced to react to non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, in order to defend their own homeland. New threats to international security are posed by non-state actors through their use of global mechanisms as military weapons of destruction. As a result, past national strategies of deterrence and/or intervention have become outdated and inadequate in meeting the challenges from hardly visible threats which cross multiple boundaries. That is why it is necessary to renew realism in a way that is not contrary to its core assumptions and that would allow for it to take into account the role of non-state actors played in the realm of international security. This paper shows how realism fails to explain ‘new terrorism’ as a threat to international security. We examine current theories of asymmetric threats (that ‘new terrorism’ relies on for methods of attack) which currently are not applied to non-state actors. We examine the accuracy of current asymmetric threat theories. It is our contention that existing theories of asymmetric threats alone do not appropriately explain why the weak can defeat the strong. Therefore, we will examine terrorist attacks committed by Al Qaeda, using our theory of asymmetric threats that will stem from the synthesis of two existing theories. Finally, we will offer a modification to realism by suggesting that while states remain the dominant actor on the international arena, the role of the violent non-state actors must be acknowledged, eventually leading to policies effectively counteract and combat the asymmetric threats posed to international security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the events of 9/11/01, there has been much discussion of the pores nature of US boarders and ports of entry. Considering the importance of the issue, there has been little academic debate regarding domestic and international policies to ensure port security, and even less academic research on the cooperation that such policies require and how cooperation is being advanced. We seek to remedy this deficiency.In recent years the US has taken the position as the lead actor in calling for more international cooperation and convergence of policies in how countries review containerized shipments and how they maintain security at ports. This paper asks if the US actions are motivated solely out of concern for securing its own ports, or if there is a genuine interest in cooperation for the sake of global security. Essentially, we will determine if the US' willingness to work with other countries is best represented by a power or interest based theory of cooperation. Additionally, we will determine the ramifications of the US' lead role, asking, if the US' reputation is hindering international cooperation on this important issue. Through the course of our research it will be necessary to review domestic policies and agency interaction, as well as the steps that are being taken on the international front. Finally, we hope to be able to address the implications of an international port security regime and to make some policy prescriptions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been much talk, in recent years, of a ?transatlantic crisis? and a number of scholars have asserted that the structure and politics of transatlantic security relations are undergoing fundamental change. In the context of climate change, there has been a major dispute over the most important institutional characteristics of the Kyoto Protocol. The most divisive issues have been the necessity of binding targets, the kinds of implementation mechanisms, and the roles that developing countries should play in the regime, especially in its early stages. The United States has consistently favored non-binding targets, market mechanisms, and the inclusion of developing countries while most European countries, on the other hand, have argued that binding targets are necessary, that there should be regulatory mechanisms set in place, and that developing countries should be excluded. Is this transatlantic gap purely the result of differing economic interests and vulnerabilities? Is there an element of power politics at play? Or is it evidence that the US and the EU have different (and perhaps conflicting) approaches towards institution-building and dealing with global security threats? This paper will explore the development of the transatlantic dispute over Kyoto and it will argue that economic interests, Atlantic politics, and different understandings of security played a role in polarizing the debate at different places and at different times. Ultimately, while there is still consensus across the Atlantic over a number of security and economic issues, the Kyoto dispute is an example of a widening gap between American and European visions of how international institutions should function in maintaining world order. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an era in which the Bush administration?s plea for spreading democracy has been a cornerstone of American security strategy, the security repercussions of democratic consolidation in general and its impact on regional security dynamics in particular have been regrettably understudied. Numerous politicians, including President George W. Bush, have simply touted the East Asian experiences in democracy as a model for a democratic Middle East. Upon closer observation, the story is not only far more complicated but also alarmingly dangerous: Contrary to the ?democratic peace? thesis, democratic consolidation has recently become a source of instability in East Asia. The East Asian case is also interesting because contrary to Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder?s thesis that democratizing countries are prone to instability, it is not the early transition period but the consolidation of democratization that appears to be fodder for regional tension. Based on a comparative analysis of recent developments in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, this paper examines the impact of the deepening of democratization in East Asia on regional security dynamics. More specifically, democratic consolidation in East Asia has opened up a dynamic, interactive process in which foreign policy orientation in each country becomes more conflictual, as manifest in Taiwan?s aggressive push for de jure independence, South Korea?s increasing anti-American and anti-Japanese sentiments, and Japan?s growing assertiveness in its regional diplomacy. As such, instead of unproblematically accepting democratization as a panacea for regional stability, we need to explore the regional context in which democratic processes affect domestic security dynamics in ways that may worsen patterns of regional interaction. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American security umbrella that extends over the GCC is often quickly attributed to a "defense for the free flow of oil" arrangement between the United States and the kingdoms of the Gulf. Such an explanation may accurately describe the current state of affairs, but it does little to explain how or why the GCC has come to rely on the US for defense. The GCC was formed for the very purpose of security and subsequent events of the 1980s and 90s further underscored the need for a regional security alliance. The GCC has also spent exorbitant amounts of money on procuring the most modern and advanced weapon systems available over the last two and a half decades. Given the necessity and apparent will to defend itself, why has the GCC failed to develop an integrated military force or cooperative security policy? This paper will examine some of the factors that have prevented the GCC from doing so. The GCC's ultimate ability to act in concert on defense and security has been hampered by early ambiguity in articulating its actual mission, a poor showing in response to the invasion of Kuwait, diverging interests and threat perceptions and internal distractions among the individual member states. Bilateral security cooperation with the US continues to be the order of the day and a return to GCC-centric cooperation appears unlikely until other nations of the region can be brought into a security relationship and the US resumes an over-the-horizon approach towards the Gulf. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current U.S. security strategy contains several relevant elements, and some of them are new. At the inter-American level, the most important issue is whether security will override indefinitely other important issues of U.S.-Latin American relations. The end of the Cold War radically changed the global panorama and gave rise to the emergence of new actors and issues on the international agenda that are currently challenging the scenario of the world order. Terrorism, drug trafficking, and the fight against organized crime are some of the big problems to be tackled. September 11 produced a rigorous review of U.S. security doctrine, giving rise to preemptive action and homeland security, which demonstrate how the United States concentrated on implementing unilateral policies by adopting a strategy towards guaranteeing security "vis-à-vis everyone and despite everyone." The future of Latin America in U.S. national security plans, at least in the short term, was relegated to a back burner, just as multilateralism became the mechanism par excellence for solving conflicts in the international arena. In the eight years of the George W. Bush presidency, the United States returned to a vertical unilateralism, with extraordinary implications for international security. The U.S. also relatively abandoned some of the regions allegedly of importance, such as Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. Global Security Policy, the UN, and the World: Historical Reflections John Allphin Moore, Jr. California State Polytechnic University Pomona, CA The end of the Cold War and the shocking events of 11 September 2001 have stirred debate in the United States about the country’s security and foreign policies. Commentators and policy-makers have engaged in a search for viable new policies in what are viewed as dangerously altered historical circumstances. Because the United States remains so powerful, both economically and militarily, this internal debate has large ramifications for the rest of the world, including for the United Nations. In the early twenty-first century the American government began to pursue a novel policy that appeared unilateral instead of cooperative, that announced the legitimacy of “preemptive” or “preventive” war, and that seemed more pugnacious than in former times. Even critics of the new posture, however, suggested that earlier American policies must be replaced by ones that more effectively address ominous and unanticipated contemporary challenges. This paper will suggest that – contrary to the proposition that former diplomatic practices are now outdated – three examples from the history of American foreign relations of enduring and rather successful policies may well be worth reconsidering, even in the new circumstances. These include specific injunctions proffered by George Washington in his Farewell Address of 1796, the “Containment” policy heralded by George F. Kennan’s famous “X” article in 1947, and the wide-ranging “internationalist” policy crafted by the Franklin Roosevelt administration in the closing days of World War II. These three approaches to security and diplomatic matters differ from America’s post-9/11 deportment, yet they may offer healthy and practical alternatives. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and international safeguards infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges over the next 25 years. Following a successful 2009, NGSI is positioned to make significant progress toward these goals in 2010 and beyond. NGSI has recently completed a number of policy studies on advanced safeguards concepts and sponsored several workshops, including a second international meeting on Harmonization of International Safeguards Infrastructure Development in Vienna. The program is also continuing multi-year projects to investigate advanced nondestructive assay techniques, enhance recruitment and training efforts, and strengthen international cooperation on safeguards. This paper presents a review of NGSI program activities in 2010 and previews upcoming activities in the near future, including the Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards, scheduled for December 2010. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author argues that despite their different position in the international system, “national identity” is a useful analytical concept when examining the policies of Norway and the U.S. toward international security institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The “war against terrorism” is certainly not an American invention. Indeed the current excesses and failures of antiterrorist policies were already a European concern prior to the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing common perception of a transatlantic rift in the debate on the “necessary sacrifice” of liberties in the name of national and international security. The historical background of contemporary European security concerns might thus allow shedding new light upon current American military Homeland counterinsurgency thinking. Instead of jumping on the bandwagon of easy explanations of the topical focus on the balance between liberty and security, I will suggest delving into the historical roots of the way in which these problems have been expressed in Europe and why. Such a historical perspective indeed raises a crucial question: how much longer shall we be made to believe that fighting terrorism is a proof of democratic values? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Winter 1978 issue of International Security, Raymond L. Garthoff authored a seminal article outlining common fallacies in United States government estimates of enemy intentions during the Cold War. Based on lengthy government service, his insights were at the time quite eye-opening in highlighting the often dysfunctional proclivities surrounding such intelligence analysis. Now after around thirty years it seems appropriate to revisit fallaciesâ€"evaluating old ones and introducing new onesâ€"surrounding intentions estimates in the post-Cold War (and post-9/11) security setting. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores how the representations and practices of petro-terrorism came to be spectacular moments of U.S. and international security discourses. In particular, it discusses how state discourses of security regulate bodies and violence through the language of terrorism, and to what extent this articulation of petroleum violence facilitate or necessitate gender and sexual violence within the international system.

The article focuses on cultural diversity and security after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the U.S. It questions how security paradigms such as national security and human security respond to questions of cultural diversity within states. It states that the international security paradigm aspires towards the condition of peace, order and lawfulness within the society of states. It also notes that problems related to cultural diversity have received renewed interest following the terrorist attacks.

An essay is presented on post cold war foreign and security policy being implemented by Japan. It discusses the changes in international security threat level and the responses of Japan. It mentions that the factor that contribute to the active participation of Japan in security issues is its enhancement of the U.S. and Japan alliance relations after the cold war.