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Since June 18, 2018, the European Union (EU) and Australia have been negotiating an ambitious and comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA). This paper examines how geographical indications (GIs) are likely to fare in those negotiations, given that Australia and the EU have historically clashed over agricultural policy in international trade and have opposing legal approaches to protecting GIs, apart from wines. Specifically, this paper is concerned with the main challenges facing the EU and Australia on GI‐related matters, as well as the main areas of convergence between both Parties. It begins with an outline of the EU and Australia's current GI legislative frameworks, before exploring both Party's respective interests for including them in the intellectual property chapter of the FTA. Then, it identifies and analyses the main challenges confronting the GI discussions and concludes by determining the main potential points of convergence. This paper is relevant to understand the current relationship between the EU and Australia on GIs, the relative stakes for concluding ambitious GI provisions in the FTA, and the retrospective comparison of GI reform after this agreement has been implemented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper utilises a bilateral bargaining approach as an explanatory framework for understanding how New Zealand and Australia have conducted their trade policy towards the United States and the European Union. Though alternatives like neo realism and liberal institutionalism have some value for explaining bilateral outcomes between the strong and the weak, the bilateral bargaining approach takes us further by showing how and why the negotiation process can potentially adjust outcomes in favour of weaker states. New Zealand and Australia have sought to exploit such opportunities through the application of three important bilateral strategies: informing tactics; coalition-building; and the execution of formal agreements. Differences in their bilateral bargaining approaches are informed by reference to their commercial history and respective interests, as well as cognitive factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the problems and challenges which confronted the Australian government in its response to Britain’s second attempt to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1967. While an adequate body of literature exists on Australia’s policy towards Britain’s first application to the EEC (1961–63), the Australian government’s response to the 1967 bid has been completely ignored by historians. This article, therefore, aims to make a historical contribution to the understanding of Australia’s policy towards Britain’s ‘turn to Europe’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]