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This paper seeks to highlight a conceptual difficulty in Washington's perspectives toward China, exploring key grounds of the U.S. thinkers in modern history and today. It compares the views with Beijing's current thoughts and approach in initiating what Beijing once called a "peaceful rise" or "peaceful development." This paper then runs a case study of Beijing's multilateral practice in the context of East Asian regionalism in order to assess what Washington may need to refocus on. The central argument maintains that the difficulty of the U.S. to draw a practical policy toward China is attributed to a conceptual difference between Washington and Beijing in thinking of how leadership is obtained and exercised. It points out a limit on the power-oriented nature of Washington to simplify the complexity surrounding Beijing's approach; it especially highlights the insufficient attention of Washington to China's role and impact on neighboring states in the process of regional integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After fifty years of Cold War division, East Asia has gained greater coherence and substance as an emerging economic, even political, entity. This paper examines the role of hegemony in East Asia’s ongoing post-Cold War reorganization. In particular, where the US and Japan once claimed much of East Asia?s economic and political attention, long-term trends suggest an ongoing reorientation on the part of East Asian states around China?s growing economic and political presence and that China will increasingly become the center of gravity for East Asia I focus on the US, Japan, and China as the three powers that have or are most likely to assume the hegemonic organizing role detailed in international relations theory. The paper examines these major powers, with a particular focus on their shifting relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Though a coalition of weaker powers, ASEAN has played an important, if not unusual, role in defining and at times, leading regional processes. This was especially the case for much of the 1990s; however, financial crises, as well as ASEAN?s political and economic limitations, have also forced the organization to look outside itself for additional economic and political leadership. The paper begins with a brief discussion of the 1990-1997 period, a period characterized by much uncertainty about the post-Cold War priorities and policies of major powers. In particular, I describe how the United States as retrenching hegemon, Japan as reluctant hegemon, and China as rising hegemon set the stage for new thinking about intra-East Asian relations. Their shifting relations underscore political and economic interdependencies between Northeast and Southeast Asia that had been less apparent during much of the Cold War. It is during this period that we find ASEAN playing the important role of facilitator in negotiating changing relations. The second part of the paper then turns to a discussion of developments since 1997, addressing the roles played by 1) the 1997-9 financial crisis and 2) the US war on terrorism in shaping East Asia’s reorganization. This period is characterized by notable Chinese activity and Beijing?s intensified engagement of Southeast Asian states, individually and collectively. Taken together, the paper shows that major powers have shaped in critical ways the contours and organization of an evolving East Asia. East Asia has become more organized ? formally and informally, politically and economically ? but thus far, that process has been defined more by market forces and competitive dynamics between the major powers. In other words, if East Asia is becoming more coherent and organized, it is becoming so more by accident than necessarily by hegemonic design. Recent Chinese policies suggest that China may wish to assume a larger leadership role; however, the question remains whether the United States or Japan would accept China in such a role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pending rise of China has been one of the most debated issues in international relations during the last decade. This situation creates problems for surrounding East Asian states, the majority of which are currently allied with the United States. What happens if China becomes a regional or even world leader? Will East Asian states be forced to choose between two competing powers? This paper seeks answers to these questions by examining prominent realist theories in relation to small state behavior in the international system, and applying each to the context of China and its surrounding states in Northeast Asia. First, I begin with an overview of the literature dealing with the rising power of China. Second, I seek to correctly understand the fundamental basis of the small state debate by examining in detail Waltz?s balance of power theory. An analysis reveals a fundamental flaw in interpretation: Waltz?s balancing hypothesis pertains to situations of multipolarity, rather than the current situation of unipolarity in the international arena. Waltz?s theory, when applied, predicts states will automatically align with the rising power against the dominant power. Given this finding I offer some facts on small state behavior in East Asia that show this may not be the case. Next, I turn to Walt(1987)?s balance of threat theory and discover Walt, while often understood as prescribing balancing behavior for the international arena, is actually unable to provide predictions for either bandwagoning or balancing in East Asia. I analyze the limitations of Walt?s theory and conclude the ambiguity of his conditions of state behavior, problems in operationalization of state actions and the lack of recognition of the role played by credibility in threat perception, undermine the ability of his theory to fully explain small state action in the context of our situation. Finally, power transition theory is revealed to provide inadequate, albeit roughly accurate, explanations of events in East Asia because of its overwhelming focus upon major powers. This paper deals briefly with its limitations and offers suggestions for further research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That China has been politically and economically playing an important role in the world has great impact to regions all over the world, especially in East Asia. After the Cold War, Japan has gradually walked out of its past "one nation pacifism," actively participating in the international affairs under frameworks of "U.S.-Japan alliance" and the U.N. It is to fulfill its dream of becoming a "political great power." Therefore, Japan has also been playing an important role in the regional issues. On November 2002, North Korea decided to reactivate its uranium-enriching program. It has raised the tension in the region of East Asia; it has also disturbed international relations in the region. The U.S. expects China and Japan, two great powers in the Northeast Asia, intervene in the North Korea problem, hoping to solve the problem with multi-literal agreement. Can the North Korea nuclear crisis shorten the diplomatic distance between China and Japan, establishing the "military strategic partnership," or showing the radical paradox between the two countries? Examining interactions between China and Japan in the North Korea nuclear crisis can clarify the thinking of two countries' regional strategies and benefits of competition and cooperation in politic, security, and economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent year, there have been significant developments in the peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, which is critical to the international relations in East Asia. In addition, the interaction among mainland China, US, and Taiwan is increasing as they are becoming more active in regional multilateral institutions. This situation raises the puzzle that whether institutions, economic interdependence can facilitate peace and stability among China, Taiwan and the United States. If the answer is yes, what are these causal mechanisms? Liberal theories of international relations emphasize the role of international institutions on fostering cooperation by reducing obstacles. such as uncertainty and transaction costs.. that stand in the way of mutually beneficial agreements between states. In addition, they also hold that interdependence decreases the incentives for conflict and war because states become reluctant to disrupt or jeopardize the welfare benefits of open economic exchange. This paper unifies these theoretical insights to explore the role of economic interdependence, institutions on the stability and cooperation between mainland China, Taiwan, and the U.S. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Russian relations are complex, delicate, businesslike, and multifaceted. This complexity provides stability as the relationship institutionalizes. On the other hand, there is a basic asymmetry in Sino-Russian relations. Chinese follow fixed principles with minor domestic disagreement in their Russia policy while Russians pursue ad hoc, contradictory policies often interrupted by domestic disputes with a gap between their stated China policy and the actual Russian policy implementation. Although Russia is the militarily stronger partner, China is the more cohesive partner. The asymmetric nature of the bilateral relationship impacts East Asian stability as Beijing?s strategies often drive the direction of mil-mil exchanges. This has consequences for U.S. strategic interests in East Asia. Sodruzhestvo-2005 (the first joint military exercise between Chinese and Russian militaries planned for summer 2005) was initiated by Beijing which originally hoped to give the exercise a Taiwan focus. In the end it was slated to take place in China?s Northeast with a Korean focus.This paper assesses the nature of Sino-Russian relations and their impact on East Asia, contrasting this with the bilateral relationship?s impact on Central Asia. Both regions involve U.S. interests. Rather than a narrow focus on the Sino-Russian arms trade and military exercises, analysis of the strategic relationship must be placed in a broader context of the bilateral partnership. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]