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Smart card-based client-server authentication protocol is well popular for secure data exchange over insecure and hostile networks. Recently, Lee et al. put forward an authentication protocol by utilizing ElGamal cryptosystem and proved that it can withstand known security threats. This article evinces that the protocol of Lee et al. is unwilling to protect various important security vulnerabilities such as forgery attack and off-line password-guessing attack. To vanquish these loopholes, this article presents a robust authentication protocol for client-server communication over any insecure networks. The security explanation of our protocol has done through the formal and informal mechanism and its outcome makes sure that the designed protocol is strong enough to resist the known vulnerabilities. In addition, we have simulated our protocol using ProVerif online software and its results certify that our protocol is safe against private information of the client and server. This paper also has made performance estimation of the presented protocol and others, and the outcome favors the presented protocol. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, based on attribute and password, we introduce a new kind of two-factor authentication protocol that has various applications such as anonymous authentication and privacy protection. Specifically, our proposal is constructed by introducing password authentication into the generic framework of attribute-based authentication. Consequently, it not only achieves two-factor authentication, but also enjoys the advantages of attribute authentication and password authentication simultaneously. Furthermore, to formally evaluate the security of the proposed protocol, we present the corresponding security model, within which the detailed security proof of the proposal is given. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three-party password-based key exchange protocol, a client is allowed to share a human-memorable password with a trusted server such that two clients can negotiate a session key to communicate with each other secretly. Recently, many three-party password-based key exchange protocols have been developed. However, these proposed schemes cannot simultaneously achieve security and efficiency. Based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), this paper will propose a new simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange scheme. The proposed method not only reduces computation cost for remote users and a trusted server but also is more efficient than previously proposed schemes. It is better suited for resource constrained devices, such as smart cards or mobile units. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Recently, many three-party password-based key exchange protocols have been developed. However, these proposed schemes cannot simultaneously achieve security and efficiency. Based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), this paper, will propose a new simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol. The proposed method not only reduces computation cost for remote users and a trusted server but also is more efficient than previously proposed schemes. It is better suited for resource constrained devices, such as smart cards or mobile units. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to secure communications between two clients with a trusted server's help in public network environments, a three-party authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol is used to provide the transaction confidentiality and the efficiency. In 2009, Huang proposed a simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (HS-3PAKE) protocol without any server's public key. By analysis, Huang claimed that the proposed HS-3PAKE protocol is not only secure against various attacks, but also more efficient than previously proposed 3PAKE protocols. However, this paper demonstrates that HS-3PAKE protocol is vulnerable to undetectable online password guessing attacks and off-line password guessing attacks by any other user. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. In 2009, Huang proposed a simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (HS-3PAKE) protocol without any server's public key. By analysis, Huang claimed that the proposed HS-3PAKE protocol is not only secure against various attacks, but also more efficient than previously proposed 3PAKE protocols. However, this paper demonstrates that the HS-3PAKE protocol is vulnerable to undetectable online password guessing attacks and offline password guessing attacks by any other user. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three-party password-based key exchange (3PAKE) protocol, a client is allowed to share a human-memorable password with a trusted server such that two clients can agree on a secret session key for secure connectivity. Recently, many 3PAKE protocols have been developed. However, not all of them can simultaneously achieve security and efficiency. Without any server's public key, this article will propose a simple three-party password-based authenticated key exchange scheme. Compared with the existing schemes, the proposed scheme is not only more efficient, but also is secure. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of multi-server authentication includes multiple numbers of application servers. The registration/control server is the central point in such environment to provide smooth services to a limited number of legitimate users. However, this type of environment is inappropriate to handle unlimited users since the number of users may grow, and thus, the response time may be very high. To eliminate these shortcomings, we have modified the existing multi-server authentication architecture and then designed a new scheme by including multiregistration server technique that can provide a smooth environment to support unlimited number of users. The main aspect of our design is to provide a secure authentication environment for multi-server application using password and smartcard so that the participants can securely communicate with each other. The simulation results are obtained by executing our protocol using AVISPA tool. The results provide concrete evidence about the security safety against active and passive attacks. Furthermore, the justification of correctness of the freshness of the session key negotiation and the mutual authentication between the participants has done been evaluated with the BAN logic model. The comprehensive comparative analysis justifies our argument that our protocol has better applicability in multi-server environments compared to other protocols with similar nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]