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We consider an economic geography model of a new genre: All firms and workers are mobile and their agglomeration within a city generates costs through competition on a housing market. In the case of two sectors, contrasted patterns arise. When one good is perfectly mobile, the corresponding industry is partially dispersed whereas the other is agglomerated, thus showing regional specialization. When one sector supplies a nontradeable consumption good, this sector is more agglomerated than the other. The corresponding equilibrium involves an urban hierarchy in that a larger array of varieties of the two goods is produced within the same city. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We model the effects of changes in a federal government’s inter-regional transfers within the context of a CGE model of a federal system in which regional governments act to maximise the welfare of the residents of their region subject to the effects of their decision on regional economic outcomes. Regional governments are modelled as players in a non-cooperative game. Simulations are conducted with six versions of a small two-region model, each calibrated for a particular Australian state and the rest of the nation. We show that a change in the level of transfers has little influence on per-capita private consumption, government consumption and welfare, and that its main effect is to induce migration from the donor region to the recipient region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]