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The paper reports the results of registered conceptual replications of the indirect effect of institutional trust in the relationship between precarity and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (CB). The original study of Adam‐Troian et al. (2023; British Journal of Social Psychology, 62(S1), 136‐159) indicated that subjective appraisals of economic hardship are associated with lower trust in governments and institutions, which in turn is associated with stronger endorsement of CB. Our Studies 1 to 3 report a series of replications using Slovak panel data. Study 4 reports a replication of the mediation model using data from the European Social Survey Round 10 collected in 17 countries. To provide a quantitative synthesis of these and previous results, we conducted mini meta‐analysis (N = 50,340). Although the strength of the observed relationships differed across the studies to some degree, the original patterns of relations remained robust, supporting the original model. The study corroborates the view that to curb the spread of CB, it is necessary to address structural issues, such as growing financial insecurity, socioeconomic inequalities, and the deficit of institutional trust. Finally, we discuss the role of cultural and political settings in conditioning the mechanisms through which precarity enhances the endorsement of CB. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Conspiracy beliefs (CBs) can have substantial consequences on health behaviours by influencing both conventional and non‐conventional medicine uptake. They can target powerful groups (i.e. upward CBs) or powerless groups (i.e. downward CBs). Considering their repercussions in oncology, it appears useful to understand how CBs are related to the intentions to use conventional, complementary and alternative medicines (CAM). Design and Methods: This paper includes two pre‐registered online correlational studies on a general French population (Study 1 N = 248, recruited on social media Mage = 40.07, SDage = 14.78; 205 women, 41 men and 2 non‐binaries; Study 2 N = 313, recruited on social media and Prolific, Mage = 28.91, SDage = 9.60; 154 women, 149 men and 10 non‐binaries). We investigated the links between generic and chemotherapy‐related CBs and intentions to use conventional, complementary and alternative medicines. Study 2 consisted of a conceptual replication of Study 1, considering the orientation of CBs. Results: Generic CBs and chemotherapy‐related CBs appear strongly and positively correlated, negatively correlated with intentions to take conventional medicine and positively with intentions to take CAM. The link between generic CBs and medication intention is fully mediated by chemotherapy‐related CBs. When distinguished, upward CBs are a stronger predictor of chemotherapy‐related CBs than downward CBs. Conclusions: The findings suggest that intentions to use medicine are strongly associated with CBs. This has several important implications for further research and practice, notably on the presence and effects of CBs on medication behaviours in cancer patients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy Beliefs (CB) are a key vector of violent extremism, radicalism and unconventional political events. So far, social‐psychological research has extensively documented how cognitive, emotional and intergroup factors can promote CB. Evidence also suggests that adherence to CB moves along social class lines: low‐income and low‐education are among the most robust predictors of CB. Yet, the potential role of precarity—the subjective experience of permanent insecurity stemming from objective material strain—in shaping CB remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose for the first time a socio‐functional model of CB. We test the hypothesis that precarity could foster increased CB because it undermines trust in government and the broader political 'elites'. Data from the World Value Survey (n = 21,650; Study 1, electoral CB) and from representative samples from polls conducted in France (n = 1760, Study 2a, conspiracy mentality) and Italy (n = 2196, Study 2b, COVID‐19 CB), corroborate a mediation model whereby precarity is directly and indirectly associated with lower trust in authorities and higher CB. In addition, these links are robust to adjustment on income, self‐reported SES and education. Considering precarity allows for a truly social‐psychological understanding of CB as the by‐product of structural issues (e.g. growing inequalities). Results from our socio‐functional model suggest that implementing solutions at the socio‐economic level could prove efficient in fighting CB. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism and beliefs in conspiracy theories fuel societal division as both rely on a Manichean us‐versus‐them, good‐versus‐evil narrative. However, whether both constructs have the same dispositional roots is essentially unknown. Across three studies conducted in two different countries and using diverse samples (total N = 1,888), we show that populism and conspiracy mentality have a strong common core as evidenced using bifactor modeling. This common core was uniquely linked to (aversive) personality, namely the Dark Factor of Personality (D), beyond basic personality traits from the HEXACO Model of Personality Structure. The association between D and the common core, in turn, was fully accounted for by distrust‐related beliefs as captured in cynicism, dangerous and competitive social worldviews, sensitivity to befallen injustice, and (low) trust propensity. Taken together, the results show that populism and conspiracy mentality have a shared psychological basis that is well described as a sociopolitically flavored manifestation of generalized dispositional distrust. The findings thus underscore the value of generalized trust for societal functioning and suggest that increasing trust may simultaneously combat both populism and beliefs in conspiracy theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The Immunisation Register of Australia reports that childhood vaccination rates in some regional areas are below herd immunity levels. This is a concern for the health and well‐being of society, as regions with low vaccination rates have an increased risk of disease outbreaks. Objective: This study explored psychological motivators as predictors of anti‐vaccination attitudes amongst parents living on the Sunshine Coast (Queensland), Australia. Methods: A cross‐sectional survey design explored anti‐vaccination attitudes, conspiratorial thinking, psychological reactance, trust in government and magical beliefs about health in 1050 parents (968 mothers). Results: The predictor variables significantly accounted for 42% of the variance in parental anti‐vaccination attitudes. The strongest predictor of anti‐vaccination attitudes was lower levels of trust in government. Conclusion: The findings contribute to understanding of psychological factors motivating anti‐vaccine attitudes in Australian parents. The findings may help inform health communication campaign effectiveness in their alignment with individual underlying motivations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy theory (CT) beliefs have become an important policy‐relevant research area since the events of the COVID‐19 pandemic. Increasing interest has been directed towards strategies that might reduce people's susceptibility to conspiratorial beliefs. In this study, we examined whether encouraging a stronger orientation towards critical scientific appraisal of conspiratorial accounts could reduce CT acceptance. After completing baseline measures of COVID‐19 related beliefs and analytical and scientific reasoning abilities, a total of 700 adults were randomly allocated to a control or scientific reasoning manipulation. People assigned to the scientific reasoning condition were found to display significantly lower CT belief endorsement post‐intervention as compared to the control group. As well as having implications for the design of future intervention studies, the results of this study encourage a greater focus on specific reasoning skills that may be amenable to a psychoeducation approach, in order to further develop methods to prevent CT beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While a great deal is known about the individual difference factors associated with conspiracy beliefs, much less is known about the country‐level factors that shape people's willingness to believe conspiracy theories. In the current article we discuss the possibility that willingness to believe conspiracy theories might be shaped by the perception (and reality) of poor economic performance at the national level. To test this notion, we surveyed 6723 participants from 36 countries. In line with predictions, propensity to believe conspiracy theories was negatively associated with perceptions of current and future national economic vitality. Furthermore, countries with higher GDP per capita tended to have lower belief in conspiracy theories. The data suggest that conspiracy beliefs are not just caused by intrapsychic factors but are also shaped by difficult economic circumstances for which distrust might have a rational basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, it has been argued that conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes go hand in hand. Despite their theoretical and empirical similarities, it remains unclear why these constructs are so closely associated. Across three studies, we examined the processes underlying the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and populist attitudes. Study 1 (Greece, N = 275) and Study 2 (United Kingdom, N = 300) revealed that the relationship between populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs is mediated by political cynicism and zero‐sum thinking. In Study 3 (USA, N = 300, pre‐registered), we use a vignette of a fictitious country to experimentally show that having a newly elected populist party in power (as compared to a well‐established party) reduced participants' tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Moreover, this was due to increased empowerment, decreased political cynicism and decreased zero‐sum thinking. These findings reveal various complementary mediators of the link between populist attitudes and conspiracy thinking and suggest that electing a populist party in power may reduce conspiracy beliefs among the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We experimentally investigate how and when the public responds to government actions during times of crisis. Public reactions are shown to follow different processes, depending on whether government performs in exemplary or unsatisfactory ways to the COVID‐19 pandemic. The 'how' question is addressed by proposing that negative moral emotions mediate public reactions to bad government actions, and positive moral emotions mediate reactions to good government actions. Tests of mediation are conducted while taking into account attitudes and trust in the government as rival hypotheses. The 'when' question is studied by examining self‐regulatory moderators governing the experience of moral emotions and their effects. These include conspiracy beliefs, political ideology, attachment coping styles and collective values. A total of 357 citizens of a representative sample of adult Norwegians were randomly assigned to two experimental groups and a control group, where complaining, putting pressure on the government and compliance to Covid‐19 policies were dependent variables. The findings show that negative moral emotions mediate the effects of government doing badly on complaining and pressuring the government, with conspiracy beliefs moderating the experience of negative moral emotions and attachment coping moderating the effects of negative moral emotions. The results also show that positive moral emotions mediate the effects of government doing well on compliance with COVID‐19 regulations, with political ideology moderating the experience of positive moral emotions and collective values moderating the effects of positive moral emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taxation is one of the most widely acknowledged strategies to reduce inequality, particularly if based on progressivity. In a high‐powered sample study (N = 2119) we investigated economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs as two key predictors of tax attitude and support for progressive taxation. We found that participants in the high economic inequality condition had lower levels of tax compliance and higher levels of conspiracy beliefs and support for progressive taxation. Furthermore, the effect of the experimental condition on tax compliance was mediated by conspiracy beliefs. Finally, conspiracy belief scores were positively associated with support for progressive taxation. Our results provide evidence that attitudes towards taxation are not monolithic but change considering the aims and targets of specific taxes. Indeed, while the perception of economic inequality prompts the desire for equal redistribution, it also fosters conspiracy narratives that undermine compliance with taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy beliefs have negative effects on decision making in several life areas including health, ethical, political and environmental domains. But their influence on financial decisions is not known. The current study examines the mediational role of social trust in the relationship between non‐financial conspiracy beliefs and stock market participation. First, exploratory findings provide preliminary cross‐country evidence that conspiracy beliefs are associated with lower stock market participation. Next, three studies from close to 53,000 United States respondents show that conspiracy beliefs predict 8%–20% decrease in the odds of investing in stocks even after adjusting for several determinants of stock ownership including income, life satisfaction, cognitive ability and economic attitudes. Mediation analyses shows that conspiracy beliefs predict lower social trust, which in turn predicts lower stock ownership. Overall, the findings imply that endorsing misleading non‐financial beliefs about the causes of socio‐cultural events may potential impede financial decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a high‐risk environment, such as during an epidemic, people are exposed to a large amount of information, both accurate and inaccurate. Following exposure, they typically discuss the information with each other. Here, we assess the effects of such conversations on beliefs. A sample of 126 M‐Turk participants rated the accuracy of a set of COVID‐19 statements, including accurate information, inaccurate information, and conspiracy theories (pre‐test). They were then paired and asked to discuss these statements (low epistemic condition) or to discuss only the statements they thought were accurate (high epistemic condition). Finally, they rated the accuracy of the initial statements again (post‐test). We do not find an effect of the epistemic condition on belief change. However, we find that individuals are sensitive to their conversational partners and change their beliefs according to their partners' conveyed beliefs. In exploratory analyses, we report predictors of believing COVID‐19 conspiracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Health‐related conspiracy beliefs are widespread, cover a variety of health topics, and can impact behavior. As such, understanding exactly how these beliefs impact health behavior is an important step in developing interventions to increase preventative health behaviors and individuals' overall health and well‐being. This review assesses two different widely endorsed health‐related conspiracy beliefs using two key health models, the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB; Ajzen, 1985) and the Health Belief Model (HBM; Rosenstock et al., 1988, https://doi.org/10.1177/109019818801500203), in order to determine how these beliefs may impact health behavior and possible avenues for intervention. Attitudes and subjective norms from the TPB, along with perceived severity, barriers, and benefits from the HBM, were the most salient to conspiracy beliefs. Future research should consider a mixed model approach that utilizes components from both theories in intervention planning and assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent empirical and theoretical developments suggest that endorsement of conspiracy theories can arise from the frustration of social motives. Taking this further, the current review integrates theorising on processes relating to three selves—the individual, relational, and collective self and outlines their associations with conspiracy beliefs. In doing so, we argue that motives pertaining to the individual self (e.g., narcissism, need for uniqueness) are linked to belief in conspiracy theories to deflect blame from personal shortcomings and protect the self‐image. Motives responding to threats to the relational self (e.g., social exclusion) increase endorsement of conspiracy theories to regain a sense of social support through exchanging shared concerns. Finally, collective self motives (e.g., collective narcissism, perceived ingroup victimhood) foster conspiracy beliefs to defend the group image by blaming outgroups for ingroup misfortunes and placing one's group in a morally superior victim role. Taken together, endorsement of conspiracy theories appears to be borne out of attempts to manage these three selves. Potential consequences for each of the selves, future directions, and theoretical implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Four studies (total n = 961) developed and validated the Adolescent Conspiracy Beliefs Questionnaire (ACBQ). Initial items were developed in collaboration with teachers. An exploratory factor analysis (Study 1, n = 208, aged 11–14) and a student focus group (N = 3, aged 11) enabled us to establish the factor structure of a 9‐item scale. This was replicated via confirmatory factor analysis in Study 2 (N = 178, aged 11–17), and the scale displayed good convergent (i.e., relationship with paranoia and mistrust) and discriminant validity (i.e., no relationship with extraversion). Study 3a (N = 257) further tested convergent validity with a sample of 18‐year‐olds (i.e., relationship with adult‐validated measures of conspiracy beliefs) and demonstrated strong test–retest reliability. Study 3b (N = 318) replicated these findings with a mixed‐age adult sample. The ACBQ will allow researchers to explore the psychological antecedents and consequences of conspiracy thinking in young populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Summary: This study examined whether thinking style mediated relationships between belief in conspiracy and schizotypy facets. A UK‐based sample of 421 respondents completed the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS), Oxford‐Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences Short (O‐Life), and measures indexing preferential thinking style (proneness to reality testing deficits and Need for Cognition). Path analysis revealed direct and indirect relationships between Conspiracy Beliefs and schizotypy facets. Unusual Experiences had a direct effect on Conspiracy Beliefs and predicted Reality Testing and Need for Cognition. Preferential thinking style mediated the schizotypy‐belief in conspiracy relationship. This pattern of results (higher experiential‐based processing and lower Need for Cognition) was consistent with intuitive thinking. Introverted Anhedonia and Impulsive Nonconformity predicted Reality Testing and had indirect effects on Conspiracy Beliefs. Finally, Reality Testing predicted Conspiracy Beliefs, whereas Need for Cognition did not. These results confirm that cognitive processes related to thinking style mediate the schizotypy‐conspiracist beliefs relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present research, we examined a discrepancy between people's beliefs about, versus punitive reactions towards, offenders. Particularly, appraisals of offenders along the dimension of communion (i.e., being friendly or trustworthy) should primarily affect people's beliefs about them, as reflected in demonizing and conspiracy theories, and to a lesser extent observers' punitive reactions. However, actual evidence of transgression should (more strongly than beliefs) influence observers' punitive reactions. In two studies, we manipulated communion and transgression ambiguity in the context of financial offences. The transgression was presented as either an observable and clear‐cut immoral case (non‐ambiguous transgression) or as a case that involves a grey area between what is legal or illegal (ambiguous transgression). Study 1 revealed that viewing an offender as low (as opposed to high) in communion predominantly influenced demonization and conspiracy beliefs involving the offender. The transgression manipulation, however, mostly influenced observers' punitive reactions and their underlying punitive motives. Similar findings were obtained in Study 2. We conclude that although beliefs about offenders and punitive reactions are often strongly related, they are actually grounded in different psychological processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined the interrelation between religiosity, anti‐intellectualism, and political mistrust in predicting belief in conspiracy theories. Improving on previous psychological research on the link between religiosity and societal and political attitudes, we assessed the predictive power of religious self‐categorization and the importance attached to one's own (non)religious worldview predicting belief in conspiracy theories separately. Applying quota sampling in a study in Australia (N = 515), the sample consisted of 48.9% believers (i.e., those who self‐categorized as religious persons) and 51.1% non‐believers (i.e., those who self‐categorized as non‐religious persons). The results showed that believers and non‐believers did not differ in the belief in conspiracy theories. Unpacking this further though, we did find that the extent to which religious worldviews were endorsed predicted belief in conspiracy theories. Among believers, the importance attached to their religious worldview was directly associated with higher belief in conspiracy theories and this link was partly mediated by higher anti‐intellectualism. Political trust, in turn, served as an inhibitor of the link between religiosity and conspiracy beliefs. Among non‐believers, there was no direct association between the importance of non‐religious worldview and belief in conspiracy theories. However, we found that higher trust in political institutions accounted for the negative association between non‐religious worldview and lower belief in conspiracy theories. The results underline the importance of distinguishing religiosity as a self‐categorization and religiosity as a worldview. We find that it is not the self‐categorization as religious, but the extent to which religious worldviews are endorsed that could predict people's beliefs in conspiracy theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examined the role of different forms of positive regard for the ingroup in predicting beliefs in intergroup conspiracies. Collective narcissism reflects a belief in ingroup greatness contingent on others' recognition. We hypothesized that collective narcissism should be especially likely to foster outgroup conspiracy beliefs. Non-narcissistic ingroup positivity, on the other hand, should predict a weaker tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. In Study 1, the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations of outgroup actions was positively predicted by collective narcissism but negatively by non-narcissistic ingroup positivity. Study 2 showed that the opposite effects of collective narcissism and non-narcissistic ingroup positivity on conspiracy beliefs were mediated via differential perceptions of threat. Study 3 manipulated whether conspiracy theories implicated ingroup or outgroup members. Collective narcissism predicted belief in outgroup conspiracies but not in ingroup conspiracies, while non-narcissistic ingroup positivity predicted lower conspiracy beliefs, regardless of them being ascribed to the ingroup or the outgroup. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]