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Based on research undertaken as part of the EU funded EPPIC project, this paper aims to update and elaborate on the relationship between drug use and offending behaviours by exploring variations within a cross-national sample of drug-experienced young people in touch with criminal justice systems. Adopting a trajectory-based approach, interviews were undertaken with 198 young people aged 15–25 in six European countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Poland, and UK). Data were analysed by applying the Bennett and Holloway categorization of the drugs-crime link, with a focus on the concept of social exclusion as developed by Seddon. Three main types of mechanisms (economic, pharmaceutical, and lifestyles) are used to interpret the data, showing how the relationship between drugs and offending can vary according to type of substances and over time. Furthermore, it can be associated with very different degrees of social exclusion and needs. The results suggest that while economic inequalities still play key roles in explaining drug use and offending, both behaviours can originate from a state of relative deprivation, resulting from the contradictions inherent in 'bulimic societies' that raise aspirations and desires while providing young people scarce opportunities for self-realisation and social recognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the population level, there is limited empirical evidence on the characteristics of individuals who were hospitalized because of Covid-19, the role of hospitalization in mortality risk, and how both evolved over time. Through the analysis of surveillance data for 7 million people in Austria, Germany, and Italy, we investigate: (1) the demographic characteristics and outcomes of individuals hospitalized because of Covid-19; and (2) the role of demographic risk factors and healthcare utilization (as measured by hospitalization) for the individual probability of dying because of Covid-19, in both cases comparing the period February to June 2020 with July 2020 to February 2021. We find that the demographic profile of individuals who were hospitalized or died because of Covid-19 is the same in both periods, except for a younger age profile for hospitalizations in the second period. Mortality differentials across countries result from the interaction of demographic risk factors and hospitalization at the individual level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study examined the relationship between perception of COVID-19, travel risk perception and travel behaviour among travellers in the DACH region (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) – an important tourism market and, after Italy, the second region in Europe that was impacted by COVID-19. Data were collected at two points of time: the sample of the study in Period 1 (n = 1158) was collected at a critical point in time in the beginning of March 2020, when Italy was already massively affected by COVID-19; the sample of the study in Period 2 (n = 212) was collected two weeks later, when Europe has seen immense impacts and COVID-19 was declared a pandemic. Cluster analysis was performed and defined three unique clusters in both periods with distinctive characteristics. In addition, results revealed a significant increase in risk perception of COVID-19, travel risk perception and travel behaviour over a short period of time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

‘If governments allow themselves to be entirely bound to the decisions of their parliament, without protecting their own freedom to act, a break up of Europe would be a more probable outcome than deeper integration.’ The statement of the Italian Prime Minister and head of the so-called ‘governo tecnico words have to be seperated ’ is one remarkable instance for colliding visions of representation in EU member states affected by the financial crisis. It exposes an old problem of representation: that is, representation of the whole versus representation of the parts. National parliaments are called to endorse the European decisions of their governments and simultaneously to sell the sacrifices to their constituencies. This development is conducive to clashes between parliaments and governments. The collision occurs between governments representing the Euro and Europe and national parliaments representing national voters’ interests. Nevertheless in the period of analysis (2010–2012) the governments generally succeeded in commanding the majority needed to pass relevant legislation, whereby most intriguingly majorities were repeatedly formed by government and opposition parties. We are interested in the analysis of how this came about, how MPs argued over and negotiated the outcome. The hypothesis is twofold: First, we expect that despite reservations the majority consents because entrapped in a European discourse, building on arguments of how the rescue mechanisms are in the best European as well as national interests. Second, budget competence being the ‘crown jewel’ of parliaments these are anxious to keep control of decisions taken at the European level and have to be satisfied through side-payments or constitutional concessions strengthening their control function. To test our hypothesis we analysed parliamentary debates and negotiations of national parliaments in three member states: Germany, Italy and Austria. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article traces the foreign relations of 81 European regions by looking first at the constitutional competences which these regions enjoy within their nation-states. We discover that the regions in federal states have expanded their competences in two directions: conducting autonomous foreign activities and influencing national foreign policy. How far the Belgian regions, as well as the German and the Austrian Länder go in both directions depends very much on the scope of their competences in domestic politics. In non-federal states (France, GB, Italy), regionalisation brought rather more leeway to conduct a certain level of autonomous foreign activity than regional influence in national foreign policy. When we - in a second step - trace the strategies or directions of international activities which the regions pursue it becomes obvious that setting up an office in Brussels in order to adapt to political integration is very common among West European regions. In contrast, much more variety can be observed when examining the regions' strategies to adapt to fundamental economic and cultural transformations. Some European regions invest heavily in economic promotion offices and in transnational partnerships while others lack the motivation or ability to invest in these forms of foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]