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This article draws on a study of infant participation in research, and work in philosophical-empirical inquiry, to illuminate some of the inexhaustible entanglements constituting the collective relational landscape of educational research of particular encounters, which have been called moments of wonder. Working with Merleau-Ponty's philosophical notions of wild Being and flesh, I look closely at one such 'moment', as lived as an entanglement of embodied self, worldly things, and other selves that collectively comes into being whilst opening onto time and space. I see this account as demonstrating the value of learning to see the 'collective', wherein individualities are engendered, for developing new understandings of early childhood education (ECE) relational landscapes, specifically in relation to 'participatory' research with very young children – and educational research more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I propose a novel interpretation of the role of the understanding in generating the unity of space and time. On the account I propose, we must distinguish between the unity that belongs to determinate spaces and times - which is a result of category-guided synthesis and which is Kant's primary focus in §26 of the B-Deduction, including the famous B160-1n - and the unity that belongs to space and time themselves as all-encompassing structures. Non-conceptualist readers of Kant have argued that this latter unity cannot be the product of categorial synthesis. While they are correct that this unity is not the product of any particular act of category-guided synthesis, I argue that conceptualists are right to nevertheless attribute this unity to the understanding. I argue that it is a result of what we can think of as the 'original' synthesis of understanding and sensibility themselves - it is a synthesis, moreover, in which the whole is logically prior to the parts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on personal memory of the Iron Curtain and the Cold War to examine the checkpoint as a dispositive constituted by disparate elements, at the crossing of space, time and social representations. Relying on Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy as outlined inWhat is Philosophy?andA Thousand Plateaus, as well as on queer theory – and particularly on Eve K. Sedgwick’s notion of queer reading and on Elizabeth Freeman’s notion of queer temporality – it examines the narratives at work in border crossing. In the same way that spatiality for Deleuze and Guattari escapes the historical narratives produced by the state apparatus, the queer body disrupts the normative temporality controlling individual lives. The Berlin Wall and the checkpoints of the Cold War, anchored in spatiality, remain entangled in a series of narratives illustrating this particular tension between time and space, a tension which Deleuze and Guattari’s cartography and Sedgwick’s queer reading help to unfold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes Robert Musil'sThe Perfecting of a Loveas a literary attempt to create a cubist unification of time and space. Musil's concern with overcoming the Kantian conception of space and time, already crucial to his dissertation and his early poetological notes, finds poetic solutions in his novellas. Temporal and spatial inversion are reflected in the linguistic texture of the novella, and the experiences of the protagonist show how time and space are not a priori forms of intuition independent of our sensual apparatus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seventeenth-century authors frequently infer the attributes of time by analogy from already established features of space. The rationale for this can be traced back to Aristotle's analysis of time as ‘the number of movement’, where movement requires a prior understanding of spatial magnitude. Although these authors are anti-Aristotelian, they were concerned, contra Aristotle, to establish the existence of ‘empty space’, and a notion of absolute space which fit this idea. Although they had no independent rationale for the existence of absolute time, it seemed to go with absolute space, and they drew on a long tradition of space-time parallelism in securing this. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Classic time geography is powerful but rigid, admitting only uniform travel velocities. Computational time geographic methods that resolve the uniform velocity assumption through transportation networks or isochrones only partially address this weakness and do not have a rigorous theoretical foundation. This article develops an analytical time geographic theory for the case where travel velocities vary continuously across space. Using the continuous transportation or “urban fields” tradition in quantitative geography and regional science, this article formulates analytical definitions of the space-time path and prism for the case where unobserved components are characterized by minimum cost curves through an inverse velocity field rather than straight line segments through a uniform velocity plane. This provides a geometrically and visually oriented approach to capturing complex velocities that complements existing methods. Time geographic fields also generalize time geography as the classic and isochrone versions are special cases; these now have a rigorous analytical foundation. It also can extend the network approach by treating links as regions with continuously varying velocities. Time geographic fields are also useful for nonnetwork-constrained phenomena such as movement through terrain, water, and air. This article illustrates the approach using a computational implementation based on a lattice approximation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provocatively, David Armstrong's properties are supposed to be both universals and spatio-temporal. What does this amount to? I consider four of Armstrong's views, in order of ascending plausibility: (1) the exemplification account, on which universals are exemplified by space-times; (2) the location account, on which universals are located at space-times; (3) the first constituent account, on which spatio-temporal relations are elements of what I call the form of time; and, the true view, (4) the second constituent account, on which universals are spatio-temporal only ‘derivatively’ by being constituents of states of affairs which are so ‘primarily’. The first two accounts are rejected because they entail that space-times must be substantival. In making plausible the second constituent account, I distinguish primitive and derivative spatio-temporality. Something is primitively spatio-temporal when it is at a space-time, or stands in spatio-temporal relations. Something is derivatively spatio-temporal when it is a constituent of something primitively spatio-temporal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that time‐asymmetric processes in spacetime are enantiomorphs. Subsequently, the Kantian puzzle concerning enantiomorphs in space is reviewed to introduce a number of positions concerning enantiomorphy, and to arrive at a dilemma: one must either reject that orientations of enantiomorphs are determinate, or furnish space or objects with orientation. The discussion on space is then used to derive two problems in the debate on the direction of time. First, it is shown that certain kinds of reductionism about the direction of time are at variance with the claim that orientation of enantiomorphic objects is intrinsic. Second, it is argued that reductive explanations of time‐asymmetric processes presuppose that enantiomorphic processes do not have determinate orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the possibility of constructing a structural realist interpretation of spacetime theories that can resolve the ontological debate between substantivalists and relationists. Drawing on various structuralist approaches in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as on the theoretical complexities of general relativity, our investigation will reveal that a structuralist approach can be beneficial to the spacetime theorist as a means of deflating some of the ontological disputes regarding similarly structured spacetimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work considers a number of properties of space-time covariance functions and how these relate to the spatial-temporal interactions of the process. First, it examines how the smoothness away from the origin of a space-time covariance function affects, for example, temporal correlations of spatial differences. Models that are not smoother away from the origin than they are at the origin, such as separable models, have a kind of discontinuity to certain correlations that one might wish to avoid in some circumstances. Smoothness away from the origin of a covariance function is shown to follow from the corresponding spectral density having derivatives with finite moments. These results are used to obtain a parametric class of spectral densities whose corresponding space-time covariance functions are infinitely differentiable away from the origin and that allows for essentially arbitrary and possibly different degrees of smoothness for the process in space and time. Second, this work considers models that are asymmetric in space-time; the covariance between site x at time t and site y at time s is different than the covariance between site x at time s and site y at time t. A general approach is described for generating asymmetric models from symmetric models by taking derivatives. Finally, the implications of a Markov assumption in time on space-time covariance functions for Gaussian processes are examined, and an explicit characterization of all such continuous covariance functions is given. Several of the new models described in this work are applied to wind data from Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism. Kant's distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves; Distinctions between Kant's humility and idealism; Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of space and time; Ways in which the phenomenalist interpretation conflicts with the genuine empirical realism in Kant's position; Rejection of any interpretation of transcendental idealism that mentalizes appearances.

This paper outlines a new interpretation of an argument of Kant's for the existence of absolute space. The Kant argument, found in a 1768 essay on topology, argues for the existence of Newtonian-Euclidean absolute space on the basis of the existence of incongruous counterparts (such as a left and a right hand, or any asymmetrical object and its mirror-image). The clear, intrinsic difference between a left hand and a right hand, Kant claimed, cannot be understood on a relational view of space - for in terms of the spatial relations of their parts, there is no difference to be found. Kant's argument has been interpreted by, among others, Graham Nerlich (in 1973, Hands, Knees and Absolute Space, The Journal of Philosophy). I briefly discuss Nerlich, and then offer a different reconstruction of the argument, one that appears to be closer to Kant's text. The reconstruction, however, essentially involves ascription of primitive identity to parts of space. Comparing the Kantian absolutist account of incongruous counterparts using primitive identity to the correct relationist account, I conclude that the absolutist account pays a heavy metaphysical price, without buying any genuine explanatory advantage over the relationist. I go on to examine recent suggestions that parity-non-conservation phenomena in quantum physics allow a stronger version of Kant's challenge to relationism. On closer examination, it turns out that here too the absolutist or substantivalist must be appealing to space parts with primitive identity in order to claim an advantage over relationists; and here too, I argue the substantivalist story really has no advantage over the correct relationist account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the philosophy, political and ethical nature of technological innovations. Reduction of time and space brought about by process of technological innovations; Philosophy of Socrates; Interpretation of philosopher Jacques Derrida.

The author responds to Ernâni Magalhães' commentaries on his account of the spatio-temporality of universals. He agrees on the claim that there is a difficulty in identifying the world as a vast collection of states of affairs. He also comments on the objective linking of property and universals.