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Predator presentation experiments are widely used to investigate animal alarm vocalizations. They usually involve presentations of predator models or playbacks of predator calls, but it remains unclear whether the two paradigms provide similar results, a major limitation when investigating animal syntactic and semantic capacities. Here, we investigate whether visual and acoustic predator cues elicit different vocal reactions in black-fronted titi monkeys (Callicebus nigrifrons). We exposed six groups of wild titi monkeys to visual models or playbacks of vocalizations of raptor or felid. We characterized each group's vocal reactions using sequence parameters known to reliably encode predatory events in this species. We found that titi monkeys' vocal reactions varied with the predator species but also with the experimental paradigm: while vocal reactions to raptor vocalizations and models were similar, felid vocalizations elicited heterogeneous, different reactions from that given to felid models. We argue that subjects are not familiar with felid vocalizations, because of a lack of learning opportunities due to the silent behaviour of felids. We discuss the implication of these findings for the semantic capacities of titi monkeys. We finally recommend that playbacks of predator vocalizations should not be used in isolation but in combination with visual model presentations, to allow fine-grained analyses of the communication system of prey species. Significance statement: It is common to present prey species with predator models or predator calls to study their vocal reactions. The two paradigms are often used independently, but it remains unclear whether they provide similar results. Here, we studied the vocal reactions of titi monkeys to calls and models of raptors and felids. We show that titi monkeys seem to recognize the vocalizations of raptors but not those of felids. The study of the vocal reactions emitted when titi monkeys cannot clearly identify the threat allows us to draw accurate hypotheses about the meaning of titi monkeys' alarm utterances. We argue that playbacks of predator calls should be used in conjunction with model presentations, which can allow us to better investigate the information and the structure of the alarm systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans are able to perform a wide variety of complex actions manipulating a very large number of objects. We can make predictions on the outcome of our actions and on how to use different objects. Hence, we have excellent action and object understanding. Artificial agents, on the other hand, still miserably fail in this respect. It is particularly puzzling how inexperienced, young humans can acquire such knowledge; bootstrapped by exploration and extended by supervision. In this study we have, therefore, addressed the question how to structure the realm of actions and objects into dynamic representations, which allow for the easy learning of different action and object concepts. Performing different manipulation actions on a table top (e.g. the actions of "making a breakfast"), we show with our robots that this will indeed lead to some kind of implicit (un-reflected) understanding of action and object concepts allowing the agent to generalize actions and redefine object uses according to need. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turner (2018) argues that computer programs must have purposes, that implementation is not a kind of semantics, and that computers might need to understand what they do. I respectfully disagree: Computer programs need not have purposes, implementation is a kind of semantic interpretation, and neither human computers nor computing machines need to understand what they do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The binding problem-question of how information between the modules of the linguistic system is integrated during language processing-is as yet unresolved. The remarkable speed of language processing and comprehension (Pulvermüller et al. ) suggests that at least coarse semantic information (e.g. noun animacy) and syntactically-relevant information (e.g. verbal template) are integrated rapidly to allow for coarse comprehension. This EEG study investigated syntax-semantics interface processing during word-by-word sentence reading. As alpha-band neural activity serves as an inhibition mechanism for local networks, we used topographical distribution of alpha power to help identify the timecourse of the binding process. We manipulated the syntactic parameter of verbal event structure, and semantic parameter of noun animacy in reduced relative clauses (RRCs, e.g. 'The witness/mansion seized/protected by the agent was in danger'), to investigate the neural bases of interaction between syntactic and semantic networks during sentence processing. The word-by-word stimulus presentation method in the present experiment required manipulation of both syntactic structure and semantic features in the working memory. The results demonstrated a gradient distribution of early components (biphasic posterior P1-N2 and anterior N1-P2) over function words 'by' and 'the', and the verb, corresponding to facilitation or conflict resulting from the syntactic (telicity) and semantic (animacy) cues in the preceding portion of the sentence. This was followed by assimilation of power distribution in the α band at the second noun. The flattened distribution of α power during the mental manipulation with high demand on working memory-thematic role re-assignment-demonstrates a state of α equilibrium with strong functional coupling between posterior and anterior regions. These results demonstrate that the processing of semantic and syntactic features during sentence comprehension proceeds in highly integrated fashion using gating of attentional resources to facilitate rapid comprehension, with attentional suppression of global alpha power to facilitate interaction of local networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives an account of the differences between polar and alternative questions, as well as an account of the division of labor between compositional semantics and pragmatics in interpreting these types of questions. Alternative questions involve a strong exhaustivity presupposition for the mentioned alternatives. We derive this compositionally from the meaning of the final falling tone and its interaction with the pragmatics of questioning in discourse. Alternative questions are exhaustive in two ways: they exhaust the space of epistemic possibilities, as well as the space of discourse possibilities (the Question Under Discussion). In contrast, we propose that polar questions are the opposite: they present just one alternative that is necessarily non-exhaustive. The account explains a range of response patterns to alternative and polar questions, as well as differences and similarities between the two types of questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking Chomsky's Syntactic Structures as a starting point, this paper explores the use of recursive techniques in contemporary linguistic theory. Specifically, it is shown that there were profound ambiguities surrounding the notion of recursion in the 1950s, and that this was partly due to the fact that influential texts such as Syntactic Structures neglected to define what exactly constituted a recursive device. As a result, uncertainties concerning the role of recursion in linguistic theory have prevailed until the present day, and some of the most common misunderstandings that have appeared in recent discussions are examined at some length. This article shows that debates about such topics are frequently undermined by fundamental misunderstandings concerning core terminology, and the full extent of the prevailing haziness is revealed. An attempt is made, for instance, to distinguish between such things as iterative constructional devices and self-similar syntactic embedding, despite the fact that these are usually both unhelpfully classified as examples of recursion. Consequently, this article effectively constitutes a plea for much greater accuracy and clarity when such important issues are addressed from a linguistic perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ffectedness-usually construed as a persistent change in or impingement of an event participant-has been implicated in argument realization, lexical aspect, transitivity, and various syntactic operations. However, it is rarely given a precise, independently-motivated definition. Rather, it is often defined intuitively or diacritically, or reduced to the properties it is meant to explain, especially lexical aspect. I propose a semantic analysis of affectedness as a relationship between a theme participant that undergoes a change and a scale participant that measures the change (following Beavers , and Kennedy and Levin ). I justify this analysis by re-examining the empirical diagnostics for affectedness, and argue that affectedness is not reducible to lexical aspect, but is tightly correlated with it in a way that motivates an analysis involving two interdependent participants. This model also provides a precise way of defining the pervasive notion of degrees of affectedness, as a hierarchy of monotonically weakening truth conditions about the result state of the theme on the scale. This hierarchy further captures important subset relations among predicates regarding affectedness diagnostics, and ultimately brings together many of the above phenomena under a single, unified approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that by analysing language as a mechanism for growth of information (Cann et al. in The Dynamics of Language, Elsevier, Oxford, 2005; Kempson et al. in Dynamic Syntax, Blackwell, Oxford, 2001), not only does a unitary basis for ellipsis become possible, otherwise thought to be irredeemably heterogeneous, but also a whole range of sub-types of ellipsis, otherwise thought to be unique to dialogue, emerge as natural consequences of use of language in context. Dialogue fragment types modelled include reformulations, clarification requests, extensions, and acknowledgements. Buttressing this analysis, we show how incremental use of fragments serves to progressively narrow down the otherwise mushrooming interpretational alternatives in language use, and hence is central to fluent conversational interaction. We conclude that, by its ability to reflect dialogue dynamics as a core phenomenon of language use, a grammar with inbuilt parsing dynamics opens up the potential for analysing language as a mechanism for communicative interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This commentary primarily addresses Gärtner’s critique of the “pseudo-cleft” analysis for Malagasy. First, it is shown that this analysis is almost certainly correct for focus constructions in three other Western Malayo-Polynesian languages. Next, it is shown that certain unexpected semantic patterns observed in Malagasy (including the potential for strong quantifiers to occur within the focused predicate phrase, and the non-entailment of exhaustivity) hold in these other languages as well. Thus, the semantic arguments against the pseudo-cleft analysis for Malagasy are not conclusive. Finally, on the basis of comparative evidence from Tagalog, it is suggested that the structure of adjunct-focus in Malagasy may actually be quite different from that of subject-focus, even though both constructions must satisfy the same morphological constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine an argument for the non-context-freeness of English that has received virtually no discussion in the literature. It is based on adjuncts of the form ‘X or no X’, where X is a nominal. The construction has been held to exemplify unbounded syntactic reduplication. We argue that although the argument can be made in a mathematically valid form, its empirical basis is not claimed unbounded syntactic identity between nominals does not always hold in attested cases, and second, an understanding of the semantics of the construction removes the necessity of making reference to any syntactic reduplication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper is the result of a long struggle to understand how the notion of compositionality can be used to motivate the structure of a sentence. While everyone seems to have intuitions about which proposals are compositional and which ones are not, these intuitions generally have no formal basis. What is needed to make such arguments work is a proper understanding of what meanings are and how they can be manipulated. In particular, we need a definition of meaning that bans all mentioning of syntactic structure; it is not the task of semantics to state in which way things are put together in syntax. The present paper presents such a theory of meaning. This, in tandem with some minimal assumptions on the syntactic process (that there can be no deletion) yield surprisingly deep insights into natural language. First, it rehabilitates a lot of linguistic work as necessary on semantic grounds and defends it against potential claims of redundancy. For example, θ-roles and linking are an integral part of semantics, and not syntax. To assume the latter is to put the cart before the horse. Second, as a particular example we shall show that Dutch is not strongly context free even if weakly context free. To our knowledge, this is the first formal proof of this fact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely attested that university students face considerable difficulties with reasoning in analysis, especially when dealing with statements involving two different quantifiers. We focus in this paper on a specific mistake which appears in proofs where one applies twice or more a statement of the kind "for all X, there exists Y such that R(X, Y)", and forgets that in that case, a priori, "Y depends on X". We analyse this mistake from both a logical and mathematical point of view, and study it through two inquiries, an historical one and a didactic one. We show that mathematics teachers emphasise the importance of the dependence rule in order to avoid this kind of mistake, while natural deduction in predicate calculus provides a logical framework to analyse and control the use of quantifiers. We show that the relevance of this dependence rule depends heavily on the context: nearly without interest in geometry, but fundamental in analysis or linear algebra. As a consequence, mathematical knowledge is a key to correct reasoning, so that there is a large distance between beginners' and experts' abilities regarding control of validity, that, to be shortened, probably requires more than a syntactic rule or informal advice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ordinary semantic compositionality (meaning of whole determined from meanings of parts plus composition) can serve to explain how a hearer manages to assign an appropriate meaning to a new sentence. But it does not serve to explain how the speaker manages to find an appropriate sentence for expressing a new thought. For this we would need a principle of inverse compositionality, by which the expression of a complex content is determined by the expressions of it parts and the mode of composition. But this presupposes that contents have constituent structure, and this cannot be taken for granted. However, it can be proved that if a certain principle of substitutivity is valid for a particular language, then the meanings expressed by its sentences can justifiably be treated as structured. In its simplest form, this principle says that if in a complex expression a constituent is replaced by another constituent with a different meaning, the new complex has a meaning different from the original. This principle is again inversely related to the normal compositional principle of substitutivity. The combination of ordinary and inverse compositionality is here called ‘strong compositionality’. The proof is carried out in the algebraic framework developed by Wilfrid Hodges and Dag Westerståhl. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I advocate a theory of “syntactic semantics” as a way of understanding how computers can think (and how the Chinese-Room-Argument objection to the Turing Test can be overcome): (1) Semantics, considered as the study of relations between symbols and meanings, can be turned into syntax – a study of relations among symbols (including meanings) – and hence syntax (i.e., symbol manipulation) can suffice for the semantical enterprise (contra Searle). (2) Semantics, considered as the process of understanding one domain (by modeling it) in terms of another, can be viewed recursively: The base case of semantic understanding –understanding a domain in terms of itself – is “syntactic understanding.” (3) An internal (or “narrow”), first-person point of view makes an external (or “wide”), third-person point of view otiose for purposes of understanding cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By a focus on three essential elements of language, phonology, semantics, and syntax, a time frame for critical/sensitive periods of language development is presented as a model of central auditory nervous system flexibility. Several studies support the hypothesis that the critical/sensitive period of phonology is from the sixth month of fetal life through the 12th month of infancy. Data indicates that the critical/sensitive periods for syntax runs through the fourth year of life, and for semantics through the 15th or 16th year of life. The data indicate that there is a time dependent series of functions in sequence that is based on responsive adaptations made by the CNS to psychophysical and electrophysiological stimuli. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]