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Based on the analysis of data from listed enterprises in China between 2011 and 2022, we investigate the influence of digital transformation on the governance efficiency for minority shareholders. The results show that the extent of digital transformation exert a negative effect on the agency costs incurred from related-party transactions. The mechanism examination elucidates that digital transformation augments the governance efficiency for minority shareholders by boosting attendance at shareholders' meetings and enhancing the exit threat for minority shareholders. Subsequent analysis reveals that non-state-owned enterprises, compared to state-owned enterprises, exhibit a more pronounced effect in diminishing the second type of agency costs through digital transformation. Furthermore, the impact of digital transformation in curtailing agency costs is more significant in the eastern regions than central and western regions. The better the equity checks and balances in listed enterprises, the more effective digital transformation is in reducing agency costs. This study offers valuable insights for bolstering the governance capacity of minority shareholders in the context of digital transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking Chinese non-financial A-share companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) between 2003 and 2018 as a sample, this paper empirically examines whether and how institutional investors' site visits (SVs) affect corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). The results show that institutional investors' SVs can reduce ICFS, and this effect is more obvious for companies with fewer investment opportunities, larger sizes, higher internal cash flows, and higher agency costs, indicating that institutional investors' SVs primarily inhibit ICFS caused by agency conflicts rather than financing constraints. In addition, the inhibitory effect of institutional investors' SVs on ICFS exists mainly in companies with poor internal supervision governance and weak executive compensation incentive mechanisms, indicating that institutional investors' SVs and other forms of corporate governance mechanisms operate as substitutes in reducing ICFS. This paper reveals the important role of institutional investors' SVs in reducing ICFS, with important theoretical and practical implications for regulators to progressively regulate and promote this form of investor activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bilateral Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system is a kind of BRT system in which the stops are located in the middle of the transit lane. By simultaneously serving transit lines in opposite directions, it is particularly designed to save space resources and enhance service quality. To improve the operational efficiency of the bilateral BRT, this paper optimizes the operational performance of bilateral BRT with elastic demand. The objective is to minimize the generalized time cost per passenger of the system by jointly optimizing the headway and number of stops of bilateral BRT. The cost includes the agency operating and user travel. The optimal design model is formulated as a mixed-integer program and solved using a fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) and a genetic algorithm (GA). We conduct a case study and sensitivity analysis to show the effectiveness and reliability of the proposed approach. We conclude that the optimized minimum generalized cost per passenger is lower than the actual case for all demand levels, especially at off-peak hours, by about 22.5%. In addition, we find that the weights of agency and user costs have the most significant impact on headway, whereas the influence of walking, vehicle speed, and route length is minimal. In contrast, the optimal number of BRT stops is mostly influenced by the route length, and walking speed has essentially no effect on the optimal number of stops. Finally, we find that the generalized cost per passenger at peak hours is 10% to 15% smaller than at off-peak hours in various scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a crucial component of internal corporate governance, remuneration controls possess the potential to influence the cash holdings of firms. However, identifying the causal relationship between these controls and such holdings presents a considerable challenge. To address this research gap, this paper leverages the implementation of China's Guidance on Further Regulating the Remuneration Management of Heads of Central Enterprises as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the relationship between executive remuneration controls and firms' cash holdings, utilizing a double-difference approach. Based on an analysis of a sample of listed companies from 2007–2012, the results indicate that firms subject to regulated executive compensation exhibit lower cash holdings. To ensure the robustness of these findings, various statistical techniques such as parallel trend tests, variable replacement, propensity score matching, and placebo tests were employed. Additionally, a mechanism test was conducted, whereby the mediating effect of executive compensation controls on firms' cash holdings was examined, revealing a reduction in internal agency costs. Finally, the analysis of heterogeneity demonstrated that the impact of executive compensation controls on firms' cash holdings was more pronounced in companies with high-quality internal controls, stronger management oversight, and lower information asymmetry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the agency and stakeholder theories, effective boards, acting as an internal governance mechanism, reduce agency costs. This paper asks whether military connected boards represent a good governance tool by exploring how military connected boards affect stock price crash risk. Using instrumental variable analysis, we document that firms with military connected boards have lower risk of stock price crashes. Our findings are unlikely to have endogeneity concerns and shed light on the role of military connected boards as an effective internal governance tool. Consistent with the conservatism hypothesis and stakeholder theory, by being transparent about firm-specific bad news, military connected boards could effectively monitor managers to ensure they act on all stakeholders' interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]