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Recent contributions to the literature on industrialization and development have confirmed that manufacturing continues to play a key role as a driver of economic development. As a corollary, these contributions highlight the importance of premature industrialization as a barrier to economic development and as one of the main sources of the middle-income trap. In this paper, we analyze the factors that may have hindered industrial development in the past four decades. In particular, we focus on the role of (non-Foreign Direct Investment) net capital inflows as a potential source of premature deindustrialization. We consider a sample of 36 developed and developing countries from 1980 to 2017, with major emphasis on the case of emerging and developing economies (EDEs) in the context of increasing financial integration. We show that periods of abundant capital inflows may have caused a significant contraction of manufacturing share to employment and GDP, as well as the decrease of the economic complexity index. We also show that the phenomena of "perverse" structural changes are significantly more relevant in EDE countries than in advanced ones and that they may similarly occur across EDE countries, regardless of structural differences in the way manufacturing contributed to their development. Based on such evidence, we conclude with some policy suggestions highlighting capital controls and external macroprudential measures taming international capital mobility as useful policy tools for promoting long-run productive development on top of strengthening (short-term) financial and macroeconomic stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Industrialization experiences differ substantially across countries. We use a benchmark model of structural change to shed light on the sources of this heterogeneity and, in particular, the phenomenon of premature deindustrialization. Our analysis leads to three key findings. First, benchmark models of structural change robustly generate hump-shaped patterns for the evolution of the industrial sector. Second, heterogeneous patterns of catch-up in sectoral productivities across countries can generate variation in industrialization experiences similar to those found in the data, including premature deindustrialization. Third, differences in the rate of agricultural productivity growth across economies can account for the majority of the variation in peak industrial employment shares. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two concurrent phenomena emerged in rural America in the 1970s: job losses due to deindustrialization and prison proliferation relating to mass incarceration. While supporters of the prison industrial complex promised an economic lifeline for rural America, opponents questioned the economic benefits of prison openings. Using county fixed-effects models and data covering 1960–2000, this study reveals a null association between prison openings and total rural employment. While prison proliferation marginally increased government employment, it simultaneously had a negative impact on private employment. Specifically, prison openings were associated with decreased employment in manufacturing, finance and recreational services; and had no impact on jobs in construction, wholesale, and local retail sales. Thus, the promises of employment growth relating to prisons were, overall, not kept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a model in which distributional conflict and cross-sectoral interactions between demand and supply side forces determine inflation in developing countries. We show that the standard macroeconomic policy recommendations of inflation targeting and balanced budgets (i) increase volatility by amplifying external shocks and (ii) can lead to premature deindustrialization. The recent Brazilian experience is used to illustrate the argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This joint-authored essay concludes the thematic issue 'Marking Race'. Drawing on the authors' individual essays and reviewing the wider literatures in the field of race and immigration, imperialism and decolonization, social democracy and the welfare state, and deindustrialization, the essay makes a series of proposals about what an analytical focus on race adds to our understanding of modern British history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Justice was sorely experienced by Scottish miners in the strike against pit closures and redundancies in 1984–85. In Scotland strikers were arrested by police officers at twice the rate of those in England and Wales and were three times more likely to be dismissed from employment by the National Coal Board. Analysis uses Gramsci as guide: Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government was engaged in an anti-trade union war of position as well as a war of manoeuvre. In Scotland, despite the strike's legality, police officers and NCB officials outmanoeuvred the strikers by criminalising and victimising their local leaders. Arrests and relatively innocuous public-order convictions were followed by punitive sackings which reinforced the government's positional untruths about the strike. This targeted action was strategic: to defeat the strike; and weaken opposition to the closure of some collieries while intensifying production at others. The subsequent acceleration of deindustrialisation was a further injustice. In contributing to further political divergence within the UK, however, it provided a route to restorative justice for former strikers and their supporters in Scotland. In 2022 the Scottish Parliament provided a collective and posthumous pardon for more than 500 people with strike-related convictions in Scottish courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although coalmining and Scotland (and indeed the Scottish coal industry) have long been core case studies utilized by historians of deindustrialization, Ewan Gibbs' I Coal Country: The meaning and memory of deindustrialization in postwar Scotland i pushes our understanding of deindustrialization in a bold new direction making it both an exciting and ambitious contribution to this growing literature. In his exploration of the nature of Scottish nationalism as it developed in the Scottish coalfields over the long-term, Gibbs cautious against interpretating the politics of deindustrialization as exclusively - or necessarily - a '"Rust Belt" rebellion' (p. 226) that takes a right-wing populist form; the Scottish coalfields show that a more progressive manifestation of the politics of deindustrialization is possible. Overall, I Coal Country i persuasively makes the case for deindustrialization as a long-term process that should have important ramifications beyond the confines of its own case study. [Extracted from the article]

The region of Lorraine is often seen as paradigmatic of the social problems arising from deindustrialization in France. Noir novels set in the region offer rich re-imaginings of the landscapes of deindustrialization, both geographical and social. This article examines what noir aesthetics do to these landscapes, studying a corpus of novels from four writers. In the first section, the article looks at how the novels engage with deindustrialization through ruins and natural environments. In the second section, the article examines how Dominique Manotti's Lorraine Connection critiques the policies of reindustrialization implemented in the region since the late 1980s. The article concludes with an analysis of how noir genre conventions allow the novels to critique the cruel optimism of reindustrialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that substantial natural resource wealth leads to more restrictive low-skill immigration policy in advanced democracies. High-value natural resource production often crowds out labor-intensive firms that produce tradable goods. When these proimmigration business interests disappear due to deindustrialization, also known as the Dutch Disease, the proimmigration coalition weakens in domestic politics. Without strong business pressure for increased immigration, policy-makers close their doors to immigrants to accommodate anti-immigrant interests. Using a newly expanded dataset on immigration policy across twenty-four wealthy democracies, I find that oil-rich democracies are more likely to restrict low-skill immigration, especially when their economies are exposed to foreign competition in international trade. The results supplement the voter-based theories of immigration policy and contribute to an emerging literature on the political economy of natural resources and international migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The force and coherency with which Margaret Thatcher and her inner circle outlined their vision for 'enterprise culture', like so many aspects of Thatcherism, have masked the complexity of its origins and the histories of alternative responses. This article provides a history of an alternative vision for enterprise culture by examining the community business movement in Scotland, the largest experiment of its kind in the UK in the 1980s and a forerunner of social enterprise. Working across Scotland, but with a hub of activity in the Strathclyde region, practitioners worked with local people to find ways to develop their neighbourhood economy while improving their environment, creating jobs, and developing services needed in their area. This article outlines the origins of the movement, the shared values of its founding members, and how their training in community development informed the community business model. It analyses how practitioners put their ideas into practice and the reasons behind the fragmentation of the movement in the 1990s. It argues that although at face value the concept of community business may appear to chime with the dominant political rhetoric of Thatcher's 'enterprise culture', the history of the movement provides a signpost to an alternative, if unrealised, vision for Scotland's recovery from social and economic depression. Where previous historical research has focused on the political consequences of Thatcher's policies in Scotland, this research connects this discussion to the transformation of Scotland's civic society in the wake of deindustrialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scotland's political divergence from England is a key theme in late twentieth century British history. Typically seen in terms of the post-1979 Thatcher effect, this in fact developed over a longer timeframe, rooted in industrial changes revealed by analysis of the Linwood car plant in Renfrewshire. Conservatism and Unionism was an eminent political force in Scotland in the 1940s and 1950s. But in all general elections from 1959 onwards the vote share of Conservative and Unionist candidates was lower in Scotland than in England. From the late 1960s onwards there were also ambitions for constitutional change. This article breaks new conceptual and empirical ground by relating these important markers of political divergence to popular understanding among Scottish workers of deindustrialization. A Thompsonian moral economy framework is deployed. Expectations were elevated by industrial restructuring from the 1950s, with workers exchanging jobs in the staples for a better future in assembly goods. Labour governments earned a reputation in Scotland as better managers of this process than Conservative governments. The 1979 general election showed that Labourism was growing in popularity in Scotland just as its appeal faded in England. At Linwood moral economy expectations were compromised, chiefly by intermittent redundancy and recurrent threat of closure, which was averted in 1975 by Labour government intervention. When the plant was shut in 1981 criticisms of UK political-constitutional structures and Conservativism were intensified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues for a view of "actually existing neoliberalism," identifying points of continuity from midcentury social democracy and showing how American neoliberalism developed unevenly across a preexisting landscape. It does so with a case study of labor market transformation in Pittsburgh, showing a causal relationship between the New Deal state's institutional structures and the rise of low-wage employment in health care in the 1970s and 1980s. The low-wage service economy did not only come after the high-wage industrial economy: it grew out of it, sped by the decline of steel manufacturing and shaped within the distinctive matrix of the postwar public-private welfare. In establishing this historical process, the article also suggests that social history can play a useful conceptual role linking Foucauldian and Marxist accounts of neoliberalism, by showing concretely the role of the production of subjectivity and the governance of population in the establishment of the neoliberal economic regime. Pointing to a homology between the structural role of incarceration in neoliberalism and that of health care, the article suggests the term "biopolitical Keynesianism" for understanding this conceptual synthesis, which uncovers new contradictions within neoliberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural change is a vital element of successful development. Between 1985 and 2015, however, falling barriers to trade and transfer of technology shifted sectoral structures in different directions in different countries by intensifying endowment-related specialization. In skill-abundant developed countries, manufacturing became more skill-intensive and employed fewer workers. In land-scarce developing East Asia, labor-intensive manufacturing expanded, especially and hugely in China. In land-abundant Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, by contrast, manufacturing shares fell, while in land-scarce South Asia labor-intensive manufacturing was constrained by low literacy and inadequate infrastructure. This pattern of structural change contributed to higher average growth rates during this period in land-scarce than in land-abundant developing countries. Future changes in sectoral structures and growth rates will continue to be shaped by differences among countries in land abundance and skill supplies that matter for development policy choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We assemble a large database of countries' manufacturing employment and output shares for 1970–2010. We ask whether increased global competition and labor-displacing technological change have made it more difficult for countries to industrialize in employment, and whether there are alternative routes to prosperity. We find that: (1) All of today's rich non-oil economies enjoyed at least 18% manufacturing employment shares in the past; (2) They often did so before becoming rich; (3) Manufacturing peaks at lower employment shares today (typically below 18%), than in the past (often over 30%); (4) Compared with employment, output shares are weak predictors of prosperity, and are under less pressure; and (5) Late developers' manufacturing employment shares peak at much lower per capita incomes than previous studies have shown. We demonstrate that final result through analysis and simulation of the dynamics implied by our regression model. Becoming rich through industrialization has therefore become much more difficult. We argue that this is in large part because of rapid growth in the manufacturing capabilities of some very populous countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Narratives of deindustrialization, urban decline and failing public housing and the negative outcomes associated with these processes dominate accounts of post-war Scotland, bolstering the interpretation of Scottish exceptionalism in a British context. Within these accounts working people appear as victims of powerful and long-term external forces suffering sustained and ongoing deleterious vulnerabilities in terms of employment, health, and housing. This article challenges this picture by focusing on the first Scottish new town which made space for working people's aspiration and new models of the self manifested in new lifestyles and social relations. Drawing on archival data and oral history interviews, we identify how elective relocation fostered and enabled new forms of identity predicated upon new housing, new social relations, and lifestyle opportunities focused on the family and home and elective social networks no longer determined by traditional class and gender expectations. These findings permit an intervention in the historical debates on post-war housing and social change which go beyond the materialistic experience to deeper and affective dimensions of the new town self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France’s de-industrialization in the mid-1970s was catastrophic for the proletarian communities of the Parisian banlieue. By the 1980s, the effects of prolonged unemployment were apparent, with high rates of voter abstention and growing support for the Front national. In the summer of 1989, writer François Maspero and photographer Anaïk Frantz spend a month wandering through former Communist bastions — the banlieue rouge — to take stock of this political shift. While the chronicle of their journey, Les Passagers du Roissy-Express (1990), has attracted much scholarly interest, its reflections on the legacy and decline of municipal Communism have gone largely undiscussed. As I show, however, Les Passagers presents the social problems of the banlieue primarily in terms of a collapse of political horizons. Having long been involved in anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist activism, Maspero intimately experiences the implosion of the radical left during the Mitterrand years. Les Passagers documents his attempt to work through it. Written against the backdrop of the brutal suppression of pro-democracy protests in China and the first signs of the coming dissolution of the Soviet Union, Les Passagers demonstrates a rare sensitivity to the complex, shifting relationships between state and municipal Communism, and between local party politics and an ethical culture of solidarity. This article examines the contribution that Les Passagers makes to a more nuanced understanding of the history of the French left. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The health gap between the top and the bottom of the income distribution is widening rapidly in the USA, but the lifespan of America's poor depends substantially on where they live. We ask whether two major developments in American society, deindustrialization and incarceration, can explain variation among states in life expectancy of those in the lowest income quartile.Methods: Life expectancy estimates at age 40 of those in the bottom income quartile were used to fit panel data models examining the relationship with deindustrialization and incarceration between 2001 and 2014 for all US states.Results: A one standard deviation (s.d.) increase in deindustrialization (mean = 11.2, s.d. = 3.5) reduces life expectancy for the poor by 0.255 years [95% confidence interval (CI): 0.090-0.419] and each additional prisoner per 1000 residents (mean = 4.0, s.d. = 1.5) is associated with a loss of 0.468 years (95% CI: 0.213-0.723). Our predictors explain over 20% of the state-level variation in life expectancy among the poor and virtually the entire increase in the life expectancy gap between the top and the bottom income quartiles since the turn of the century.Conclusions: In the USA between 2001 and 2014, deindustrialization and incarceration subtracted roughly 2.5 years from the lifespan of the poor, pointing to their role as major health determinants. Future research must remain conscious of the upstream determinants and the political economy of public health. If public policy responses to growing health inequalities are to be effective, they must consider strengthening industrial policy and ending hyper-incarceration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Manufacturing in high-income countries is on the decline and Denmark is no exception. Manufacturing employment and the number of firms have been shrinking as a share of the total and in absolute levels. This paper uses a rich linked employer-employee dataset to examine this decline from 1994 to 2007. We propose a different approach to analyze deindustrialization and generate a series of novel stylized facts about the evolution. While most of the decline can be attributed to firm exit and reduced employment at surviving manufacturers, we document that a non-negligible portion is due to firms switching industries, from manufacturing to services. We focus on this last group of firms before, during, and after their sector switch. Overall this is a group of small, highly productive, import intensive firms that grow rapidly in terms of value-added and sales after they switch. By 2007, employment at these former manufacturers equals 8.7 percent of manufacturing employment, accounting for half the decline in manufacturing employment. We focus on the composition of the workforce as firms make their transition. In addition, we identify two types of switchers: one group resembles traditional wholesalers and another group that retains and expands their R&D and technical capabilities. Our findings emphasize that the focus on employment at manufacturing firms overstates the loss in manufacturingrelated capabilities that are actually retained in many firms that switch industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional studies of the Dutch disease do not account for productivity spillovers between the booming resource sector and other domestic sectors. We put forward a simple theory model that allows for such spillovers. We then identify and quantify these spillovers using a Bayesian dynamic factor model. The model allows for resource movements and spending effects through a large panel of variables, while also identifying disturbances to other shocks. Using Australia and Norway as representative cases studies, we find that a booming resource sector has substantial productivity spillovers on non-resource sectors, effects that have not been captured in previous analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this lecture I have attempted to explain why the proportion of the electorate that supports the two major parties, Labour and Conservative, has steadily declined since the 1950s. I have suggested that historically Britain has had more of a multi-party system than we allow, and that to some extent the supremacy of the Labour and Conservative parties was historically unusual and depended upon a social and economic system that began to decay in the early 1960s. The decline in the total Labour and Conservative vote, which began then, was partly due thus to the enormous change in the country's social structure - a result of steady deindustrialisation - by which Britain became a predominantly 'middle-class' society; though it was a class difficult to define and with little in common. I have also argued that the policies often adopted by Conservative and Labour governments in order to prop up their declining electorates paradoxically hastened that decline by increasing the country's economic and social instability. In this, the enthronement of the financial sector and the political manipulation of private housing for party-political purposes, together with the inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, was particularly important. Furthermore, the Labour and Conservative electorates have decayed in all parts of the United Kingdom, often to the benefit of nationalist parties (most spectacularly in Scotland), and I have suggested reasons why that happened. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Moretti (2013), deindustrialisation has been responsible for a 'great divergence' between cities that have moved to become centres of innovation and ideas, and those that have continued to produce material goods. Other authors however, place more emphasis on trends in specialisation and differences in productive bases as the driving forces behind urban divergence. Somewhat similarly, Storper (2013) argues that recent divergence been fundamentally been driven by the fact that some cities have become more specialised in knowledge intensive sectors. While most of this interest in urban divergence has been based on US cities, recent European research also reports divergent processes. The aim of this article is to examine the degree of divergence across UK cities and to analyse how far this has been driven by differences among cities in industrial structure and specialisation, tradable bases and productivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

De-industrialization has created new economic environments for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. While structural changes in the labour market took place rather rapidly, accompanying institutional changes have been more gradual. While maintaining some core institutional arrangements, each country has adjusted to new labour market challenges and thereby created various labour market risks. In the period of de-industrialization, both South Korea and Japan experienced a sharp increase in the proportion of atypical workers, unlike the case of Taiwan. This study investigates how the institutional legacy of state corporatism matters in explaining how these three economies have differed in two respects: (a) a rapid increase in the proportion of atypical workers, and (b) the gendered characteristic of atypical employment—that is to say, a disproportionate concentration of women in atypical employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Colliery in east Fife was the largest National Coal Board (NCB) unit in Scotland when it closed in 1967, following a disastrous fire which killed nine miners. The NCB, operating within the constraints of the Labour government's policy framework, decided not to invest in Michael's recovery, although this would have secured profitable production within five years and access to thirtyplus years of coal reserves. This outcome, which had major local economic implications, demonstrates that deindustrialization is a willed and highly politicized process. The Labour government ignored workforce entreaties to override the NCB's decision and invest to bring the pit back into production, but made significant localized adjustments to regional policy that within a year attracted a major employer to the area, the Distillers Company Limited. The article relates the closure to moral economy arguments about deindustrialization. It shows that coal closures in the 1960s, while actually more extensive than those of the 1980s, were managed very differently, with attention to the interests of the workers and communities affected, and an emphasis on cultivating alternative industrial employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a new mechanism to explain de-industrialization in response to a price increase of the manufactured good. In our trade model, one sector (agriculture) is perfectly competitive whilst the other (manufacturing) is monopolistically competitive. Both industries use skilled and unskilled labour as inputs. Entry into manufacturing requires a fixed cost in terms of skilled labour only. A rise in the market price for the differentiated goods raises both marginal revenue and the price of skilled labour, which affects the marginal cost of production and the entry cost. When short-run profits increase so that new manufacturing firms enter, fewer skilled workers are available for production purposes. This in turn may then lead to a decline in total manufacturing output. Our theoretical mechanism is jointly consistent with recent empirical observations on premature de-industrialization characterizing several Latin American and Asian countries and productive diversification as observed in various developing economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a Kaldor-Thirlwall theoretical and empirical framework on the basic driving forces of the behaviour of productivity and economic development in the long run. By calculating the so-called Thirlwall equation, the main contribution of our research is to examine whether Brazil has been catching up or falling behind. We show some empirical evidence based on both descriptive statistics and econometric regressions for Brazil between 1970 and 2010. Some important indicators of descriptive statistics reveal that Brazil has entered into a process of early deindustrialisation. In addition, since our econometric estimates also show that there was a dramatic increase in the income elasticity of demand for imports between 1980-98 and 1999-2010 (from 1.97 to 3.36) and a small decrease in the income elasticity for exports during the same periods (from 1.36 to 1.33), we conclude that Brazil not only has already embarked on a trajectory of falling behind relative to the world economy and the international economic frontier, but also that it might show, in the absence of appropriate policies, lower growth rates in the long run. However, if the opposite occurs, it would face major long-term external constraints to growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The seemingly inexorable decline of manufacturing in Australia is typically explained by firm-level competitiveness, especially labour costs, the challenges posed by a peripheral location, and the (Dutch disease) effects of Australia’s mining boom. We argue that such explanations are insufficient, and look instead to the way that processes of financialisation and the policy settings of other countries combine to inflate the value of the Australian currency and render trade exposed industries uncompetitive. We conclude that Australia is locked into a macroeconomic trap through which the global financial crisis is being exported to peripheral economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis of deindustrialisation has been led by heterodox economists, especially those in the structuralist and Kaldorian traditions, based on a conception of sectoral specificity and the role of manufacturing in growth. Sectors are not the units of Marxian economic analysis, but thinking through the meaning of sectors in Marxian terms allows for an analysis of the meaning and implications of a change in sectoral structure. Deindustrialisation is the sectoral shift that has been most prominent in recent decades and which is likely to have significant implications for the future of capitalism. This article develops an original Marxian theorisation of deindustrialisation. This conceptualisation includes a distinction between two forms of deindustrialisation. As well as taking into account changes in sectoral structure, the proposed typology considers whether such changes are associated with a shift between those activities that produce surplus value and those that do not or only a shift in the composition of surplus-value-producing activities. The distinction between different forms of deindustrialisation allows for an arguably richer analysis of this phenomenon than in more narrowly sector-based approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue including deindustrialization, how to foster research and development (R&D) and fiscal policy in the Eurozone.

Employment rates for black men have declined sharply over the last half century. We use data from the 1962-2009 March Current Population Surveys and linear decomposition techniques to examine the mechanisms generating change in employment rates for white and black men with different levels of education. We find that not only did the overall magnitude of change in employment differ by race and education, but so too did the mechanisms generating change. Black men with less than a college degree experienced sharper declines in employment than did white men and more educated blackmen. Cohort replacement processes played amore prominent role in employment declines for less educated black men than for other men, who were affected more strongly by intracohort change mechanisms. Stronger cohort replacement effects for less educated black men concentrated joblessness to an unparalleled extent among younger black men with the least formal schooling. Declining employment since the 1960s for this group of men was not primarily the result of economic downturns or layoffs later in life, but rather resulted from the inability of more recent cohorts to secure stable employment. Comparisons of the employment experiences of less educated blackmen in the metropolises experiencing the most deindustrialization to those of men in other areas reveal that these men experienced greater employment declines not only because more recent cohorts had greater difficulty securing stable employment in early adulthood but also because, within cohorts, they experienced additional job losses associated with aging and changes in the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the process of deindustrialisation in developing countries, looking at the case of Malaysia. It provides a framework to examine how industrial structure and domestic technological capabilities are affected by the wider challenges of late industrialisation, changes in global accumulation and domestic class formations. It discusses the emerging evidence of Malaysia’s premature deindustrialisation, and how this is the result of broader accumulation strategies that were primarily driven by internal factors related to the emergence of a Malay middle class and supported by changes in global accumulation processes related to the development of global production networks and financialisation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study assesses the possibility that deindustrialization has been contributing to the persistently high unemployment rates experienced by most affluent countries since the mid-1970s. Combining insights from Lilien's (1982) “sectoral shift” thesis and the literature on deindustrialization, the authors assert that the decades-long contraction of the manufacturing sector has been a significant source of high unemployment in affluent countries. This assertion is tested against the literature's existing explanations for unemployment using data from 16 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries over a recent 34-year period. Two-way, fixed-effects regression models suggest that deindustrialization has not only contributed to unemployment in these countries, but that it has been one of the more important causes of this phenomenon. These findings are robust across various model specifications and estimating strategies. The study concludes by suggesting further ways to investigate this important topic. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article explores key issues for a social history of Western European working classes during the last three decades of the twentieth century, starting from a comparative examination of the West German and French cases. The scope of deindustrialization and its social consequences (mass unemployment and growing regional disparities) is the first issue; the transformation of work processes in manufacturing and the effects of this on skills, wages and discretion over tasks at the work place is the second issue. The paper discusses in detail the broadening generational divide among the working classes, the problem of organizing collective interests in times of job insecurity, and the general trend towards market regulation. Finally, changing gender relations among working-class families and households and the changes in intergenerational mobility are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper aims to compare the trajectories of selected newly industrialising countries in terms of structural change. Using an exploratory method of data analysis, the comparative closeness of the economies is studied over time. The results show that industrialisation is a necessary, albeit insufficient, ingredient for catch-up. The successful growth performances of Asian countries are associated with a successful industrialisation process accompanied by high export and investment shares. Latin American country performances are less successful, despite initially high industrial shares. Comparing trajcetories with southern European experiences reveals cases of premature deindustrialisation and tertiarisation processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The diffusion of outsourcing and vertical foreign direct investment (FDI) among manufacturing firms, along with the vertical integration of market services into manufacturing, is questioning the so called ‘Deindustrialisation/Tertiarisation’ (DT) hypothesis. In particular, it has been argued that DT might be an ‘apparent’ phenomenon, in fact amounting to a simple reorganisation of production across national and sectoral boundaries. The empirical studies that try to support this hypothesis, however, cannot be deemed conclusive as they suffer two methodological drawbacks: a non-(sub-)systemic sectoral level of analysis and a not truly global empirical approach. In order to overcome these drawbacks, the paper carries out an investigation of the actual extent to which DT occurred in the OECD area over the 1980s and the 1990s with two modifications: a sector instead of a subsystem perspective, retaining both direct and indirect relations and a ‘pseudo-world’ of seven OECD countries, thus taking into account the ‘global’ dimension of the phenomenon. Our results strongly support the DT hypothesis: although the weight of market services in the manufacturing subsystem increases, providing a counterbalance to manufacturing decline, subsystem shares significantly decrease, thus confirming DT as a more fundamental trend of the investigated period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using growth curve modeling techniques, this research investigates whether military spending improved or worsened the economic well-being of citizens within the American states during the post-Vietnam War period. We empirically test the military Keynesianism claim that military spending improves the economic conditions of citizens through its use by politicians as a countercyclical tool to reduce the negative effects of economic downturns. However, due to deindustrialization and the emergence of the "new military," there are reasons to believe that military spending will not effectively improve economic well-being during the post-Vietnam War era. Using longitudinal data we find that states with high levels of military spending are better equipped to stave off the deleterious effects of economic recession than are states with lower levels of military spending. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Post-industrial decline is frequently cited as one of the major underlying reasons behind the poor health profile of Scotland and, especially, West Central Scotland (WCS). This begs the question: to what extent is poor health a common outcome in other post-industrial regions and how does Scotland's experience compare to these other comparable regions? Methods: Regions were identified by means of an expert-based consultation, backed up by analysis of regional industrial employment loss over the past 30 years. Mortality rates and related statistics were calculated from data obtained from national and regional statistical agencies. Results: Twenty candidate regions (in: Belgium; France; Germany; Netherlands; UK; Poland; Czech Republic) were identified, of which ten were selected for in-depth analyses. WCS mortality rates are generally higher and—crucially—appear to be improving at a slower rate than in the other post-industrial regions. This relatively poor rate of improvement is largely driven by mortality among the younger working age (especially male) and middle-aged female populations. Conclusion: WCS mortality trends compare badly with other, similar, post-industrial regions of Europe, including regions in Eastern Europe which tend to be characterized by higher levels of poverty. This finding challenges any simplistic explanation of WCS's poor health being caused by post-industrial decline alone, and begs the question as to what other factors may be at work. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Deindustrialization has eliminated many traditionally male jobs in Great Britain. Using geographical comparisons based on Census data, this paper estimates that the resulting fall in male employment explains between 38% and 59% of the 1.16m increase in lone parent families over the period 1971–2001. The impact was greatest in the areas which suffered most from industrial decline. Higher male employment would help to contain, and maybe reverse, the growth of lone parenthood, by reducing inflows into lone parenthood and increasing outflows through re-partnering and consequent stepfamily formation. Female employment is found to have no consistent net effect on lone parenthood. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study reexamines the relationship between economic globalization and manufacturing employment in affluent democracies. After reviewing past research, including the well-supported Rowthorn model, we propose a differentiation-saturation model that theorizes that globalization has a curvilinear relationship with manufacturing employment. Using two different techniques, we analyze the most comprehensive sample of 18 affluent democracies from 1960-2001. We examine 12 globalization measures and provide the first analysis of the curvilinear relationship between globalization and manufacturing employment. We find that some aspects of globalization have linear effects on manufacturing employment, most of which are positive. We find more evidence, however, that globalization has a curvilinear, inverted U-shaped relationship with manufacturing employment. The evidence for the Rowthorn model is mixed. GDP per capita and its square do not have robust effects, but agricultural employment is one of the most important causes. Including globalization in the model weakens the evidence for the Rowthorn model. There is some evidence that globalization has different effects across different varieties of capitalism, regions and historical periods. Ultimately, our analyses partially support both the Rowthorn model and our differentiation-saturation model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wilson's deindustrialization thesis has been the focus of much recent research. This study is the first to empirically test his thesis as it relates to suicide among young black males, which has increased dramatically over the past two decades. Using 1998-2001 Mortality Multiple Cause-of-Death Records and 2000 census data, we examine the influence of concentrated disadvantage on suicide among young black males across U.S. cities. After establishing its role in shaping suicide rates, we explore the extent to which industrial composition (the outcome of deindustrialization) affects concentrated disadvantage in urban communities. We perform similar analyses for whites to compare and contrast explanatory processes. Our findings show that while disadvantage is related to suicide for young black and white males, industrial composition only influences the structural covariates of suicide among blacks. These findings demonstrate the ability of Wilson's thesis to help explain a pressing social problem -- rising rates of young black male suicide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, using unbalanced panel data on 16 affluent OECD countries, tests the effects of diverse aspects of globalization and deindustrialization on unionization trends. In contrast to the recent studies focusing on the conditional role of labor market institutions, this study underlines the role of two structural factors in transforming occupational structures and ethnic composition of labor force: deindustrialization and international labor mobility across borders. The results lend substantial credence to my argument that, while deindustrialization has driven dramatic declines in union density by shrinking employment in traditionally highly unionized manufacturing sector, international migration negatively affects unionization by increasing competitions and heterogeneity between low-skilled native and immigrant workers. The empirical findings raise the question of how trade unions can build solidarity between native and immigrant workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines alternative models of producer services development in metro politan communities and analyzes factors associated with the development of producer services in two deindustrializing urban communities the primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs) of Cleveland and Akron, Ohio. Sample surveys of producer services in each metropolitan area reveal mat establishments: (1) tend to be primarily dependent upon the revenue generated by local trade within the local metropolitan area; (2) tend to simultaneously engage in nonlocal trade and directly contribute to interurban integration and dominance of large metropolitan centers; and (3) engage most extensively in trade, both locally and nonlocally, with other service-sector industries, rather than manufacturing. These findings suggest that producer services development may be sustained in deindustrializing urban communities and that it is not primarily dependent upon trade with locally based manufacturing industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Third World "development" often is characterized by rapid growth in trade and service jobs, not in manufacturing employment. Prior explanations emphasize materialist conceptions: a widening division of (white-collar) labor is required to match technological complexity. Or the central state pushes investment of capital-intensive industry, and resulting urban immigration outpaces growth in labor demand. This article focuses on how the central state's penetration into rural hinterlands sparks growth in trade and service jobs. The Mexican state not only employed rising numbers of service workers; it also legitimated socially constructed forms of work, urbanlike knowledge and forms of status. We find that variation in state penetration across 299 rural and urban counties, especially the sanctioning of written literacy and mass schooling, is related to growth in white-collar and informal-sector jobs (1900-1940), net the influence of counties' wealth and demographic features. All societies at early stages of their development have viewed industrialization as the main vehicle for improving living standards.., therefore, governments have played an active role in promoting industrialization (World Bank 1987). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines how the leadership of coal company Compagnie des Quatres Mines Reunies de Graissessac turned the 1884 miners' strike in Languedoc, France into an instrument of management. Events leading up to and surrounding the strike; Role of regional deindustrialization in the strike organization; Management strategies to contain the strike and profit in the process; Lessons imparted by the Graissessac case for union militance.

This paper examines the ideology of growth in the context of local economic development activities in Flint, Michigan. The literature on urban political economies, which suggests that local communities can be best understood as `growth machines" directed by a "growth ideology," is examined first. Then, Flint's growth ideology amid deindustrialization is explored through a case study of local economic development that pursued a costly and failed strategy based on tourism and tax abatement/infrastructure improvements. Finally, scrutiny is brought to bear on the most recent suggestion that a centralized planning process will lead to an economic renewal in Flint; the conclusion is drawn that local growth ideology constrains the thinking of economic development decision-makers. This ideological constraint inhibits consideration of progressive economic planning aimed at sustainable economic development strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Great Britain's industrial performance since 1960. It argues that Britain's industrial performance since 1960 has been relatively poor. Despite the views of Crafts and others, the deindustrialisation, which has resulted from this relatively poor industrial performance is a serious problem for the whole economy--not just for the industrial sector itself. Neither the specific problem of deindustrialisation nor the consequent general problem of continued relative economic decline was solved in the 1980s. The key reason behind the poor performance of industries lies in underinvestment in manufacturing. This underinvestment has been allowed to persist by the lack of any strong modernising forces within British society, with the trade union movement having been either too weak or too defensive, and with government policy at best being rather ineffectual and at worst positively harmful. The reasons for this policy failure lie in Britain's economic history and in the resulting distorted nature of both the economy and society. This fundamental problem, of a lack of any strong modernising force, has if anything been exacerbated since 1979.

The article examines the phenomenon of deindustrialization in Great Britain in 1970s. Since 1979 GDP has grown as much in Great Britain as in France and Germany but manufacturing has grown more slowly. This was largely due to a weaker generation of new products in Great Britain. The creation of these was the most significant way in which the world's manufacturers gained sales in the 1980s and the 1990s, but many British companies invested defensively to cut costs and therefore employment to produce a product range which changed relatively little. Hence they failed to gain new markets and British manufacturing employment fell more and output grew less than in other leading economies. This tendency began to be reversed in the later 1980s and the 1990s. The increased wave of foreign companies attracted to Britain in the 1980s owed much of three considerations. Great Britain has the great advantage for companies, which wish to enter the European market that it speaks the same language as the U.S., and therefore the foreign language, which is most commonly taught, in schools throughout the world.

Diminished self-esteem and a sense of uselessness that arise from permanent layoffs created in the process of deindustrialization are symptomatic of an increasingly problematic social class in developed countries. Observations of this enforced inconsequentiality on workers in the United Kingdom's South Wales Coalfield suggest that gerontologists who are knowledgeable in the effects of job detachment and loss might profitably examine this syndrome. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Argues on the enrichment of conventional sector or industry based analysis through institutionalist perspective on an economy. Account of an institutionalist critic of the natural selection analogy; Introduction of path dependencies and multimarket pressures; Discussion of deindustrialization and business organization.