1. Political Career Structures in Democratic Mexico, 1997-2003.
- Author
-
Langston, Joy and Aparicio, Francisco Javier
- Subjects
- *
AMBITION , *FEDERAL government , *PUBLIC officers , *POLITICIANS - Abstract
This paper seeks to understand how political ambition plays out in Mexico's federal system where incumbency does not exist because of the constitutional prohibition against consecutive reelection. Using a unique dataset of the prior career paths and ex- post political positions of almost 1,000 federal deputies, this paper finds that Mexico's federal system is much more like that of Argentina and Brazil, and much less like that of the United States in that political ambition (constrained by the nation's formal rules and informal relations) leads the professional politician to begin her political career in the local and state political arenas, and then return to her state when the single three-year term in the Chamber of Deputies concludes. Our empirical analysis estimates the effect of deputies' personal features, prior positions, district types, party labels, and electoral calendar on two types of career choices: the type of position (elected, bureaucratic, or party post) and the position level (municipal, state or national) with multinomial regression models. Results indicate that younger deputies from plurality seats systematically seek elected offices at local levels of government. Experience in local or national positions correspondingly leads to bureaucratic positions in the same political arenas. Partisan affinity with state governors affects the likelihood of getting a non-elected position but not its level, whereas local election calendars affect the future position levels but not its type. PAN deputies are more likely to get bureaucratic and national level appointments than PRI deputies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2008