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The assumption that the balance of material costs and benefits of nuclear armament for Japan is sensitive to small changes in the scope and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence supports the current role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and military strategy. This paper scrutinizes this assumption in terms of a constraint that is especially difficult to change: what kind of deterrent strategy can Japan implement against nuclear weapon states? I start with pessimistic assumptions about the need for an independent nuclear deterrent, and optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of building nuclear weapons, both of which are crucial for prediction and advocacy of nuclear armament. The first set of assumptions, in which the United States no longer extends deterrence, and China values victory in nuclear war against Japan, rules out a small force de frappe for Japan. Instead, Japan will need a large retaliatory force, even with an asymmetric counter-recovery strategy against energy resources, transportation, and sea power. This deterrent is not likely to become operational without a decade of investment. In short, a claim that a small nuclear deterrent is necessary and sufficient for Japan contradicts itself. Japan needs either a large nuclear deterrent, or none of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1980’s, the Soviet threat in Asia was publicized and Tokyo’s need to increase contribution to the U.S.-Japan alliance was emphasized. At that time, Japanese universities rushed to establishing International Relations departments. System level had an impact on the focus of teaching and research in Japanese universities. Even tough the field of International Relations holds both “low facilities” and “higher facilities” perspectives, what stands out lately in the study of International Relations in Japan is the one close to “higher facilities.” While 2007 marks 60th anniversary of atomic bombs devastated Horoshima and Nagasaki, “lower facilities” aspect of International Relations has not yet prevailed and been suppressed by “higher facilities” aspect. To make a situation worse, Japanese politics is about to give “higher facilities” aspect of International Relations another big push. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently set up an advisory panel which will study the issue of Japan’s right to collective self-defense. At the same time, he is moving toward revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. The panel gathered by Prime Minister Abe consists of 13 members, mainly of people who support the concepts. It appears to be a rigged race with a foregone conclusion. Majority of the members is university professors. Generally professors believe that being chosen as a member of the government, it gives them prestige outside the universities and in turn gain more respect in the universities. Consciously or unconsciously, these professors are serving to make Abe’s wish come true. However, eventually they might regret what they had done was a political act which delimited political imagination and political transformation. By using Prime Minister Abe’s group as a case study, this paper sheds a light on the crisis of the Japanese universities today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. The role of absolute and relative gains in the making of Japanese foreign and security policy will be examined in light of alternative security issues. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper will examine Japanese security policy in light of Japan's attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines public and elite attitudes toward security policy in Japan. While focusing on the US-Japan security alliance, Japan's relations with East Asian countries, and Japan's role in the United Nations, the paper addresses three questions: (1) How have public and elite views evolved since the 1990s?; (2) what is the relationship between mass and elite opinion?; and (3) how do mass and elite opinion relate to security policy? The paper argues that a particular group within the security elite has shaped national security policy and that the public has generally followed that group’s leadership. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1952 Japan's sole guarantor for national security was the United States-Japan Security Treaty. Against strong public opposition after many compromises with opposition as as well as government coalition parties , the widely popular Japanese prime minister Koizumi was able to deploy about 600 Ground Self Defense Forces for the reconstruction of Iraq. This paper analyzes the way public opinion changed before and after deployment, and what the long term effects for Japanese security and alliance arrangements will be. The paper takes advantage of a opinion survey conducted by the author in Japan and the US, which was innovative because it focued on foreign and defense policy questions, as well as public risk perceptions. The paper will also include context analysis of Japanese mass media and official government statement. This papers argues, that increased threat perception in Japan does have very little effect on support for more activist foreign policies, but that 9/11 and he Iraq War has triggered a public debate about Japan's international role. This indicates that the bi-lateral US-Japan security cooperation might eventually be weakened because of an increase in public support for additional bi-lateral (such as the recent agreement with Australia) and regional security arrangements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A shift from active pursuit of multilateral security framework in East Asia to enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance has characterized Japanese security policy during the last decade. Despite this shift, Japan has continued to diversify its security partners in East Asia. This paper will describe a broad range of Japan’s security cooperation with ASEAN countries and analyze the drivers of such cooperation. In doing so, the paper intends to seek a nuanced and empirically grounded explanation of Japanese security policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the evolution of domestic Taiwanese politics came a corresponding internationalization of the Taiwanese independence movement. The importance of Taiwanese independence not only impinges on the lives of 21 million or so Taiwanese living on the island, but also affects the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region as China has declared that it would not hesitate to resort to force should circumstances dictate that it becomes necessary to do so. Taiwan is often cited to be one of the two potential flashpoints in the Asia Pacific, and a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan may more worrying for many countries evolve into one between PRC and the United States. While Taiwan’s role in Sino-US relations have been widely studied, the importance of Taiwan in affecting Chinese bilateral relations beyond its relations with US is a relatively unexplored field. This paper attempts an exploratory study of the evolving role Taiwan plays in Sino-Japanese relations. It attempts to under how the historical role of Taiwan in Sino-Japanese relations affect the island’s contemporary diplomatic dynamics with China and Japan. The role of Taiwan in Chinese and Japanese national security strategy will also be scrutinized to understand the possible divergence or convergence of China and Japan over the Taiwan issue. This is crucial as Japan’s stance is important as Japan is considered one of US allies within region but may not necessarily deem it in its best interests to go along with the US against China. This difficulty presents it with an extremely tricky choice. A slip either way will affect the regional stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In face of the Soviet Union?s military buildup in Northeast Asia in the early 1980?s, Japan?s security debate in International Relations got off the ground. Before then, there existed a debate between the Realists and the Liberals. However, the debate in the early 1980?s marked a turning point since the perspectives other than the Realists and the Liberals have come on the scene of Japan?s security policy debate. Which direction is Japan?s security policy heading for in the 21st century? During Koizumi Administration, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been strengthened. However, Tokyo?s relations with Beijing and Seoul have hit a new low. While the Liberal Democratic Party tries to revise Article 9 and seek a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, understanding the current security policy debate is critical to analyze Japan?s security policy in the 21st century. This paper tries to examine the current Japan?s security policy debate by focusing mainly on three perspectives; Liberal, Realist, and Constructive perspectives. With this comparison, it tries to analyze which perspective would prevail in Japan?s security policy and how the perspective would influence on the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan?s foreign policy in the 21st century. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Gulf War South Korea and Japan had to solve a dilemma that they faced. As important allies of the United Stated in Asia they were expected to assist the US in the War in Iraq. Their dilemma was should they assist the United States and accepts its request to send military troops to Iraq and by doing so they will support their ally. Or should they limit their commitment to the alliance with the US only to Asia and not to support the US in the War in Iraq. By doing so, they might reflect on the alliance with the US and they would undermine the alliance and might even expect some kind of retaliation from the US.The security alliance with the US is an important element in the defense policies of both Japan and South Korea. Without the alliance, both states would have to change their defense policies and they might need to increase their defense budget. In the Japanese case, the modification to its defense policy would be even greater then the one that South Korea would have to do.The alliance with the US carries a ?price tag?. In previous years that included the support of the US against the communist block and financial support as well. The first Gulf War (1990-1991) summand both states with the question if they should assist the US in the war against Iraq. Japan decided not to send any forces to assist the US in the war in Iraq due to constitution limitations on using forces outside the Japanese territory. Later on Japan send few sweeping mines ships to the area after the war ended. Japan was criticized by the US and other states for not participating in the war. Japan paid 13 billion $ for the war and later was accused for trying to buy her part in by using a "checkbook diplomacy". Korea's very limited involvement in the first Gulf war was not criticized, as Japan was.This paper analyzes the decisions of Japan and South Korea to send their forces to Iraq in the second Gulf War. Both allies were asked by the US to support her in the war in Iraq. The US forces are stationed in both states for the purpose of defending them against any attack from hostile states such as North Korea for example. The US expected that both allies will cooperate and supports its mission in Iraq. Both allies had to make the decision if the alliance with the US is limited only to the East Asian region or the alliance includes other areas outside the East Asian parameter. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's North Korea policy throughout the postwar period was dictated by its need to maintain its alliance with the United States to secure its own peace. The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework did not alter Japan's fundamental policy toward North Korea. The current nuclear crisis and the prospect of a nuclear North Korea is forcing Tokyo to review its approach to Pyongyang. Japan supports the six-party talks as a means to solve the nuclear crisis, but it is increasingly aware that the multilateral framework may not be able to produce an outcome acceptable to both North Korea (the source of Japan's security anxiety) and the United States (the most reliable security ally), as well as to the other regional powers. A nuclear North Korea would spell an end to the Pyongyang Declaration, in which Japan and North Korea stated that normalization of their bilateral relations would contribute to the broader regional peace and stability. It would force Japan to reconsider its security policy in a fundamental way, with far reaching implications for Japan's relations with the other neighboring countries. This paper will discuss Japan's current policy toward the North Korean nuclear crisis and the implications of a nuclear North Korea for Japan's relations with the United States and other neighboring countries. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

60 years have passed since the end of World War II. The U.S.-Japan alliance seems to be strengthening ever before under the leadership of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President George W. Bush. At the same time, relations between China and Japan seem to be hitting all time low since the end of World War II. In the meantime, the major shifts in Japanese security policy are about to take place by the initiative of Prime Minister Koizumi; the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution and Japan?s bid to a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. These moves are regarded as the rise of Japan?s nationalism. In this paper, I would like to analyze how the rise of Japan?s nationalism influences Japan?s security policy in the 21st Century. To understand the impact, I would like to analyze it from there levels; system level, state level, and individual level. At the system level, I would like to analyze the dual impact of the rise of Japan?s nationalism on international relations. From Washington?s perspective, it will be welcomed for the time being to promote the joint effort of spreading democracy. From Beijing?s perspective, it might be viewed as the move putting both countries into a collision course in the future. At the state level, I would like to examine how the Japanese view the rise of Japan?s nationalism, and point out the factors behind the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution and Japan?s bid to a permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council. Based on the findings at the system and state levels, finally, at the individual level, I would like to examine how Prime Minister Koizumi needs to maneuver his policy to accomplish his security policy objectives. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the position of Japan with regard to nuclear weapons and its acceptance of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It cites the factors that mold Japan's security identity during the first half of the 21st century. It mentions the continuing effort of the country to acquire a national security identity during the postwar period. It details the implications of the move of Japan to assist the U.S. in the global war on terrorism.

An essay is presented on post cold war foreign and security policy being implemented by Japan. It discusses the changes in international security threat level and the responses of Japan. It mentions that the factor that contribute to the active participation of Japan in security issues is its enhancement of the U.S. and Japan alliance relations after the cold war.

The article focuses on the ongoing Japanese discussion on soft power and its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance is presented. It discusses the concept of soft power which was developed by author Joseph Nye and its potential and limitations as an instrument of national policy. It examines how the Japanese are utilizing the concept in dealing with their nation's security policy.

Policymakers and analysts in many nations have long taken 'energy security' to mean reliable access to affordable oil and gas resources. In recent years, however, the concept of 'energy security' has been explicitly broadened in some policymaking contexts ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers in the US, Japan, and elsewhere have recently taken limited steps toward the realization of a quadrilateral strategic alliance between the US, India, Australia, and Japan. The development of such an 'Asia Democracy Partnership,' supported in ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan’s postwar security policy has been predicated on its alliance with the United States, but the extent to which Japan can assure the U.S. provision of security in emergent situations has not been answered as long as the U.S. government maintains a pol ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to cope with the changing security environment, Japan’s defense policy should be developed in three directions. The first is to modernize defense capability by introducing modern technology as well as joint operation by Japan Self Defense Forces. Currently in order to deal with missiles attacks from neighboring areas, though MD system has currently been introduced, to equip an offense capability against the missile sites would be of pressing priority, Secondly, to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. forces are essential not only to defend Japan itself but also to increase its defense capability. Thirdly, to participate in the international security cooperation Japan need to enhance its readiness in mobilizing its forces abroad. The exclusively self-defense principle which originated from the Article 9 of the constitution has worked as a strong constrain in developing these policy options. PM Abe, recently having passed the referendum bill for the revision of the constitution, set up the council to give the collective defense right to JSDP in order to tackle the coming contingencies. Some argues that North Korea has wakened up the Japanese public opinion. However Japan must make utmost effort to catch up rapidly mutating security environments from East Asia to Middle East as the level of defense setting-up has substantially been lagging behind, ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Though the security situation is improving in the Middle East, the US will not easily withdraw its troops. Meanwhile, security environment has rather deteriorated in East Asia. In view of the growing instability in Asia, Japan has revised Defense Policy Outline last December and it has been strengthening the alliance with the U.S.A as the recent DPRI shows. Furthermore, emergence of North Korea as a nuclear power, liquid political state in South Korea and deteriorating relationships with China are stimulating the Japanese public sentiment toward a more security conscious direction. In 1980, the so-called Ohira report asserted that Japan should not be involved too much into the affaires in the Asian Continent. Japan should, the author argues, take more care of geopolitical identities. Actually Japan has developed as a nation of the Rim Pacific Ocean consolidating the alliance with the USA (possibly with Australia). It also has enjoyed prosperous relationship with ASEAN nations and the countries surrounding Indian Ocean as a sea power. Japan should make more use of these assets when it deals with the continental giant. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]