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Climate and fiscal policy interact closely. The former imposes explicit prices for carbon emissions, while the latter affects emissions implicitly. We study the correspondence between explicit and implicit carbon pricing of a Ramsey-optimal fiscal policy in a neoclassical growth model of climate change. Our central result is that any arbitrary sequence of explicit carbon prices can be achieved implicitly through a blend of conventional taxes (e.g., consumption, energy, and income taxes), when lump-sum transfers are available. In a Ramsey setting, policy balances these taxes' traditional revenue-raising role with the Pigouvian role of fixing the climate externality. We characterize the Ramsey and Pigouvian components of optimal tax rates. We show that explicit carbon pricing is implicitly implementable through a mix of conventional taxes also in this framework. We extend these findings to scenarios compatible with net-zero emissions, adding carbon capture technologies and a cap on cumulative emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite increasing evidence documenting the role of the outgoing audit of natural resources (OANRA) in environmental governance and enterprise innovation, little is known about its impact on enterprises' total factor productivity (TFP). To address this question, we treat the OANRA policy launched in 2014 in China as a quasi-natural experiment. We adopt a difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) method that exploits three-dimensional variations: city (i.e., OANRA cities versus non-OANRA cities), industry (i.e., more polluting industries versus less polluting ones), and year (i.e., before and after the OANRA policy). Employing a dataset of Chinese industrial listed companies from 2012 to 2019, we reveal that after the OANRA implementation, enterprises' TFP in more polluting industries of OANRA cities decreases by 4.0%. Our mechanism analysis shows that the OANRA restrains the TFP by reducing the financing scale of enterprises and increasing environmental investment of governments. Further, the heterogeneity analysis finds the inhibitory effect of the OANRA is more prominent in large-scale and state-owned enterprises, as well as enterprises located in eastern, low fiscal pressure, and high pollutant emission cities. Our findings provide support for the neoclassical economics hypothesis that the OANRA increases enterprises' compliance costs and decreases their productivity. • We study the relationship between the outgoing audit of natural resources assets (OANRA) and enterprise productivity. • We exploit the difference-in-differences-in-differences analyses and an instrumental variable design. • Evidence suggests enterprises' TFP in more polluting industries of OANRA cities decreases by 4.0%. • Evidence shows the OANRA restrains enterprises' TFP by reducing financing scale and increasing environmental investment. • Our study reveals the possible negative economic impacts of the OANRA and provides recommendations for policy optimization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We prove existence and uniqueness of non-autarkic equilibria in bilateral oligopoly assuming only that preferences are binormal and satisfy a weakened version of gross substitutes. We permit complete heterogeneity of preferences and our analysis exploits the fact that payoffs depend only on own strategy and two universal aggregates. This allows us to define strategic versions of supply and demand curves such that non-autarkic Nash equilibria are in 1–1 correspondence with intersections of these curves. The same approach can be used to establish comparative statics under the assumptions above. As examples, we focus on adding players and changing endowments. This competitive approach also allows us to conclude that much of conventional Marshallian analysis is robust to strategic manipulation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]