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This paper is concerned with the estimation of an econometric model designed to test the Modigliani-Miller (henceforth MM) hypothesis. The primary interest is not in the theoretical validity of the hypothesis. The major sources of theoretical disagreement with Modigliani and Miller arise from the key role they impute to the arbitrage process and the effect of leverage on the expected value of the returns to equity through the increased probability of bankruptcy. These issues have occasioned a number of important contributions in recent years (see especially [2] and [23]). The first section of the paper provides a skeletal outline of the MM hypothesis and discusses the problems of formulating an appropriate econometric model. In the second section an econometric model is developed, which, while drawing on the ideas of several
1 This study is part of a continuing program of research into company financial behavior financed by a grant from the Social Science Research Council. I am indebted to Mrs. Eileen Sutcliffe of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of York, and Milton Chen of New York University for assistance with data collection and computer processing, and to the personnel of the SRC Atlas Computer, Chilton, the University of York Computer Center and the New York University School of Commerce Computer Center.
2 References in square brackets are listed on pp. 161-2, below.
3 In terms of the implicit aggregation procedures, the old Liquidity-Preference/ Loanable-Funds controversy has yet to be satisfactorily resolved.
different writers, has certain elements of originality in the way it seeks to incorporate growth and leverage. Finally, in the third section the results of the econometric tests are evaluated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article paper is concerned with the similarity of the growth performance of the British economy during the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties and with the usefulness of the "new-old" industry dichotomy in illuminating the trends of the inter-war period. The inter-war years emerge as a period of growth almost as rapid as any of comparable length in British measured history. The exact rating of the performance naturally varies slightly with the growth criterion adopted and the termini used for the other periods; the simplest way to establish the validity of the conclusion and at the same time leave it open to the reader's judgment is to draw in the inter-war trends on the Matthews graph. The similarity of the growth performance in the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties is largely maintained even when activity is divided into Goods production and Service production. Services get their unity partly from their physical intangibility as final products, partly from supposed differences in income demand elasticities or productivity improvement possibilities, partly, and increasingly, from the statistical difficulties of arriving at satisfactory real output series.

There has been much speculation about the meaning of the residual factor in economic growth. Few economists would defend it as a perfect measure of technical change, preferring to hedge their bets by describing it as part of the growth of output not explained by the growth in the labour force and capital accumulation. Others have been more forceful in their opposition claiming that the residual merely shows the degree of our inability to measure accurately, and the omission of relevant variables, and have demonstrated their views. The view of the present author is that, while the residual when properly measured must theoretically be zero, a detailed examination of the residual as normally measured is useful in providing information on the causes of economic growth and possibly thereby producing policy implications for raising the growth rate. Therefore, this paper seeks to establish how much of the residual can be explained by incorrect measurement and specification, and to see what implications for policy, if any, can be drawn. The analysis is carried out for Great Britain. Manufacturing over the period 1956-65 and provides estimates of the residual at successive stages of purity.

The article discusses the method of control of capital issues adopted by Great Britain. The author states that an increasing number of economists have focused their interest on the problems associated with secular acceleration. These problems include a long-run tendency for planned investment to exceed planned savings, rather than on the main concern of the 1930's, which was secular stagnation. The article also discusses the scope of controls, the argument of the "bonus-issue," and problems with hiring and purchasing.

The article measures the effect of public finance during the period 1793-1815 on the rate and direction of Great Britain's economic development. It explores the country's involvement in war during the period. One aspect of the war which has intermittently attracted economists" attention from the time of the "bullionist" controversy is the effect of the expedients that were adopted in the field of public finance. The article describes the sources of data which economic historian can use to be able to fairly measure the effect of the country's finance on the rate and direction of economic growth. An analysis on the economic indicators during the period is presented.

The object of this article is to demonstrate that economic analysis used in conjunction with the data employed by researcher R.B. Sheridan yields the conclusion that the possession of the British West Indies actually had the effect of retarding the growth of Great Britain. Sheridan contends that the West Indies in general, and Jamaica in particular, yielded an economic surplus, which contributed in no small way to the growth of the metropolitan economy. In the course of his argument, Sheridan constructs an estimate of the wealth of Jamaica during the 1770's and expands it to include all the British West India sugar colonies. Sheridan's argument contains two types of error that, when corrected, vitiate his conclusion. One type of error, an error of measurement, occurs both in his attempt to measure the wealth of Jamaica and in his acceptance of an estimate of income generated by this wealth. The more serious mistake, however, is an analytical error. Sheridan implicitly considers the extensive growth of the sugar colonies as a measure of their contribution to the economic growth of the mother country.

The article compares the responses of handloom weavers to Chartism in Great Britain. The response of the working classes to the Chartist Movement of the 1830's and 1840's has perhaps too often been seen in the light of revolt against economic distress. It has been assumed that poorly paid and ill-fed workers, struggling under the pressure of the new industrial capitalists or, in the handwork trades, against the competition of machinery, saw in Chartism the opportunity to improve their economic condition and therefore gave it their wholehearted support. To a large extent this is undoubtedly true, since there is considerable correlation, during the relevant period, between economic distress and radical activity. Certainly individual Chartists and neo-Chartists encouraged their listeners at public meetings by suggesting that the attainment of the "People's Charter" would revolutionize the existing society and ensure that the labouring man obtained his due. But this is not the whole story, for many groups in dire economic distress ignored the movement.

This article reviews the economic impact of England on Nigeria during the period in which Nigeria formed part of the British Empire. Observers differ sharply in their evaluation of this impact. A vigorous defense of Great Britain's role in terms of the economic welfare of Nigeria may be found in the writings of various historians, political observers, and economists. On the other hand, critical voices have been raised against the economic consequences of English rule-most significantly from within Great Britain and Nigeria and in recent years from behind the Iron Curtain. Observers who allege Nigeria's economic betterment under British rule tend to stress the commercialization and over-all economic growth, which took place. Their antagonists focus attention instead on alleged allocational injustices in Nigeria's terms of trade. Because the controversy is nourished in part by omissions of pertinent data, an attempt is made in the following pages to facilitate objective evaluation by providing a more complete statement of factual evidence than is usually available.

This article discusses research as a social process in Great Britain. One of the central problems of British society is that of organizing its scientific and technically trained manpower in such a manner that the welfare and security needs are met. The present organization of British science does not contribute much to economic improvement. In the nineteenth century new developments were started because inventors with imagination and energy set about solving practical problems. The aims of contemporary research organization are generally stated in a qualitative fashion. The origins of each new product or process can usually be traced to a few key sources in widely separated areas of fundamental science. The foregoing description of the process by which science is put to use emphasizes the interrelationships which exist at the present stage in the evolution of social organization in research. A complete and balanced managerial set-up for translating fundamental research into new technology and social services can be conveniently sub-divided into a series of essential functions. Each of the functions of research organization requires a special combination of skills and differentiated emphasis in the training of technical workers. The exact relationship and emphasis applied to various functions of research and development varies from industry to industry but.

This article focuses on the social history of Great Britain. The author remarks that the second Boer war was a disaster for Great Britain. She might have recovered from its consequences if Campbell-Bannerman had been spared for a few more years. The last months of the British Queen Victoria's long reign were clouded and dreary. The change, in three or four years, from the rejoicings of 1897 was so startling that shrewd parliamentarians. It was then she realized, at first reluctantly, that her trade in the markets of the world was threatened by the growth of American and German industries. The cross purposes of the U.S., Germany and Great Britain for this period are so patent in the records that a reflective reader might ask if their spokesmen knew from one day to another what new shift would cancel out the aim of yesterday. While Great Britain was smarting under the affliction of the war in South Africa, the work of peaceful penetration was going on apace in Morocco. Both Great Britain and Germany maintained that their interests in Morocco were commercial only and, although English and German individuals were represented upon the directorates of the great concessionaire companies, they were in no way acting in the interests of their governments.