Gianmario Verona, Giada Di Stefano, Andrew King, Haldemann, Antoine, Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH), Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Synchrotron SOLEIL (SSOLEIL), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Bocconi University, Bocconi University [Milan, Italy], and HEC Paris Research Paper Series
Subjects
History, 050402 sociology, Polymers and Plastics, Geographic Concentration, Process (engineering), Density, Hospitality Industry, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Knowledge Transfer, Compliance (psychology), Microeconomics, 0504 sociology, 0502 economics and business, Economics, Social Norms, Field Experiment, Business and International Management, 050207 economics, Social science research, Reciprocal inter-insurance exchange, business.industry, 05 social sciences, GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION, DENSITY, KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER, SOCIAL NORMS, FIELD EXPERIMENT, HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY, Public relations, Hospitality industry, Property rights, Private knowledge, [SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration, business, [SHS.GESTION] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration, Knowledge transfer, 050203 business & management
Abstract
A long tradition in social science research emphasizes the potential for knowledge to flow among firms colocated in dense areas. Scholars have suggested numerous modes for these flows, including the voluntary transfer of private knowledge from one firm to another. Why would the holder of valuable private knowledge willingly transfer it to a potential and closely proximate competitor? In this paper, we argue that geographic concentration has an effect on the expected compliance with norms governing the use of transferred knowledge. The increased expected compliance favors trust and initiates a process of reciprocal exchange. To test our theory, we use a scenario-based field experiment in gourmet cuisine, an industry in which property rights do not effectively protect knowledge and geographic concentration is common. Our results confirm our conjecture by showing that the expectation that a potential colocated firm will abide by norms mediates the relationship between geographic concentration and the willingness to transfer private knowledge.