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This paper argues that the Chinese government’s ‘belt and road’ initiative – the Silk Roads vision of land and maritime logistics and communications networks connecting Asia, Europe and Africa – has its roots in sub-national ideas and practices, and that it reflects their elevation to the national level more than the creation of substantially new policy content. Further, the spatial paradigms inherent in the Silk Roads vision reveal the reproduction of capitalist developmental ideas expressed particularly in the form of networks, which themselves have become a feature of contemporary global political economy. In other words, the Silk Roads vision is more of a ‘spatial fix’ than a geopolitical manoeuvre. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A growing body of evidence suggests that China's emergence is having differential effects on Asia's advanced and developing countries. The region's advanced countries are benefiting from the existence of a large and rapidly growing Chinese market for their capital goods, components and technology, whereas its developing countries compete head to head with China in third markets. These facts create additional challenges for late-industrializing Asian countries seeking to catch up with the region's industrial leaders. In turn, the emergence of an Asian core and periphery will not encourage the development of a cohesive Asian economic and political bloc. Asian regionalism will be open regionalism in order to prevent regional initiatives from giving rise to costly trade diversion. Efforts to promote Asian financial development and integration are unlikely to come at the expense of the region's financial links with the rest of the world. An early move toward a common exchange rate regime with the associated common monetary stance will be problematic. And, in the absence of these common policies, pressure for the development of powerful regional institutions to formulate the common monetary stance will be at best modest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY While many developing countries experience a short period of economic boom and then spiral quickly into periods of deficit, currency fluctuation, and indebtedness, China has been able to sustain rapid economic growth and maintain solid fiscal capacity for the past 30 years, even during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and the global recession in the beginning of the 21st century. This article examines three key strategies behind China's fiscal success - its flexibility in adapting tax policies to the changing economic and social conditions, its success in realigning the intergovernmental fiscal relationship in 1994 and forcing subnational governments to become more entrepreneurial in revenue generation, and its pursuit of institutional reforms since the mid-1990s to improve the government's capacity in budgeting and financial management. The article evaluates the implications of the Chinese experience for other developing countries and discusses the future challenges of fiscal reforms in China. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]