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The idea of American exceptionalism in guiding US national security concerns has often come under scrutiny in the past from security analysts and policy makers alike. The US is not alone in projecting its exceptional values in its foreign policy articulations. Indian foreign policy assertions also stress India's unique civilizational qualities that make it capable of pursuing a "peaceful" modernity as opposed to the "violent" modernity of the West. The aim of this paper is to analyze how the idea of exceptionalism impacts the national security cultures of the two biggest democracies of the world. What are US and Indian exceptionalism in the context of international relations? How do they translate into the national security cultures of a superpower and a rising power? Is their national security culture driven by fear or hope, trust or mistrust, flexible or rigid strategies? These are some of the issues that this paper seeks to address. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rising convergence between India and the United States, as well as their strategic interests, have been evident since the end of the Cold War. Over the last decade, the Indo-US strategic partnership has strengthened not only in the areas of defence, arms cooperation, counter-terrorism collaboration, ballistic missile defence, drones, nuclear technologies, space, and cyber technology, but India has also emerged as a prominent strategic partner of the United States in the areas of cyber and homeland security. India is becoming a pompous regional player who wants to be the regional hegemon as the Indo-US Strategic Partnership grows. As a result of the Indo-US strategic cooperation, the discrepancy in conventional and nuclear weapons between India and Pakistan could exacerbate the South Asian arms race and destabilise Pakistan's security environment. Pakistan must implement a proactive foreign policy in order to gain from the changing global and strategic environment. For Pakistan's economic and security, an alliance policy with regional and extra regional nations would be more prudent. Under the shadow of the US-India cooperation, this paper briefly emphasises the potential security threats to Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the authors conduct a comparative review of the strategic imperatives driving Sino-Indian policy on Afghanistan in the post-2014 scenario. The article argues that divergent strategic imperatives make cooperation difficult and/or unlikely. This analysis is based on a broader consideration of both contemporary history and geopolitical dynamics shaping the foreign policy considerations of these two countries, and an assessment of the impact of ongoing bi-lateral and regional aspirations. The authors begin by highlighting the salient dynamics that have historically characterized and driven Indian and Chinese foreign policy in general and on Afghanistan. They find that Afghanistan, although not a primary focus of either state’s foreign or security policy, historically, is increasing in importance for both; India and China compete on a range of economic and security issues. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article analyzes the latest trends in India-Pakistan relations. It begins by justifying the assumption of one coherent Indian strategy towards Pakistan and, while focusing on the debate in India, argues that this strategy can best be described as one of "hedging." It then analyzes three sources of cooperation and six sources of competition—including one in Afghanistan. Next it argues that India should preferably follow an engagement strategy instead of its current hedging or the alternative containment strategies. At the same time, it acknowledges that an engagement strategy is unlikely, while there are recurrent terrorist attacks in India, especially those that have their roots in Pakistan. In the penultimate section, it examines the sort of political decisions that are needed in following this engagement strategy that should, ideally, lead toward a normalization of relations. However it concludes with the assessment that, despite the erratic composite dialogue, "ugly stability" continues to characterize the bilateral relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The tenth anniversary of India's and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests enables scholars to revisit the issue of South Asian proliferation with a decade of hindsight. What lessons do the intervening years hold regarding nuclear weapons' impact on South Asian security? Some scholars claim that nuclear weapons had a beneficial effect during this period, helping to stabilize historically volatile Indo-Pakistani relations. Such optimistic analyses of proliferation's regional security impact are mistaken, however. Nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nuclear weapons' ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan's dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This, in turn, provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war. Although the resulting Indo-Pakistani crises did not lead to nuclear or full-scale conventional conflict, such fortunate outcomes were not guaranteed and did not result primarily from nuclear deterrence. Second, these Indo-Pakistani crises led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture toward Pakistan. This development could exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics and increase the likelihood of Indo-Pakistani conflict in years to come. Thus nuclear weapons not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade after the nuclear tests; they may damage the regional security environment well into the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]