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We present an economics framework appropriate to the exceptionally broad scope of the climate change problem. This considers that economic and social processes, particularly those involved in purposive transitions of energy technologies and systems, involve the interplay between three distinct domains of decision-making and associated actors. The first concerns small-scale and often short-term decision-making, much of which reflects extensive 'satisficing' and habituation as identified in behavioural economics. Calculated economic optimization decisions, especially of companies in the energy and energy-intensive industries, then best reflect the core assumptions of neoclassical and welfare economics, including discrete market failures. Third, at the largest scale are strategic judgements made by big actors (e.g. governments, large multinational companies) relevant to transformation of complex systems over long periods—particularly concerning innovation and structural changes, for which lessons from theories of evolutionary and institutional economics are most relevant. Economically, these can be logically mapped in relation to the technology (or more accurately, 'best practice') frontier. Each has corresponding policy implications: most directly, respectively in terms of (i) standards and engagement to establish norms; (ii) competitive markets with the critical role of prices; and (iii) strategic investment in innovation and infrastructure. Each faces challenges of implementation and government failure, as observed, for example, with wholly inadequate carbon pricing to date, naïve and ineffective approaches to enhancing energy efficiency, or misdirected support to R&D. Based on the domain distinctions, we argue that the corresponding pillars of policy are naturally complementary, and can be mutually supportive: strong standards and norms on energy efficiency, for example, would enhance the political space for carbon pricing by reducing its direct consumer impacts, while carbon pricing has multiple positive two-way interactions with enhanced low-carbon innovation. From this we also posit a 'carbon pricing paradox': that adequate carbon prices, the central recommendation of most economists, are in most jurisdictions only feasible (or even optimal) if equal analytic and policy attention is devoted to the other pillars, and the wider context of macroeconomic and fiscal policies. Only these other aspects can reduce the absolute cost impact of carbon pricing (potentially turning into a gain) and offer consumers and businesses better lower-carbon alternatives, which are critical to establishing climate-compatible pricing structures across our economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The institution of private property forms the basis for ecological disaster. The profit-seeking of the vested interests, in conjunction with their modes of valuing nature through the apparatuses of neoclassical economics and neoliberalism proceed to degrade and destroy life on Earth. I assert that the radical, or original institutional economics (OIE) of Thorstein Veblen, further advanced by William Dugger, have crucial insights to offer the interdisciplinary fields of political ecology and ecological economics which seek to address the underlying causes and emergent complications of the unfolding, interconnected, social, and ecological crises that define our age. This inquiry will attempt to address what appears to be either overlooked or under-explored in these research communities. Namely, that the usurpation of society's surplus production, or, the accumulation of capital, is a parasite that sustains itself not only through the exploitation of human labor, but by exploiting society and nature more broadly, resulting in the deterioration of life itself. I shall argue that the transformation of the obvious predator that pursues power through pecuniary gain into a parasite, undetected by its host, is realized in its most rapacious form in the global hegemonic system of neoliberal capitalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the economic reforms of the 1970s, local Chinese urban authorities have requisitioned rural land near cities. To protect their land from these practices, many urban village collectives have established a cooperative shareholding system, but their motives remain unclear. Neoclassical economics suggests that such enterprises seek to maximize profits. Guided by the original institutional‐economics approach, I investigate this question empirically by interviewing residents of Mengke village in Chaoyang city, Liaoning Province, northeast China. These data reveal four startling findings about the motives behind the shareholding system. First, collective economic organizations do not simply seek the maximization of profit. Second, the shareholding cooperative system adopted by village collectives helps villagers resist external threats such as land loss. Third, the collective economic organization is not merely a firm or a single market; it may work as a firm and a market simultaneously. Finally, managing of common property contributes to maintaining the identity of the collective. These findings suggest that the theories of neoclassical urban economics and new institutional economics fundamentally mischaracterize urban cooperatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Richard Langlois supports the contribution of New Institutional Economics (NIE) to Economics, contrasting the following assertions: (i) Original Institutional Economics (OIE) wanted institutions but without theory; (ii) Neoclassical Economics (NE) wants an economic theory without institutions; and (iii) NIE wants both institutions and theory. This article uses the approach of Critical Realism with the aim of counteracting the suggestions of Langlois, who considers the advances of institutionalist schools by contrasting the theoretical (scientific) and anti-theoretical (naive empiricism) institutionalism. Instead of sustaining a criterion of scientificity founded on the assumption of a world composed of isolated and atomized events, Critical Realism treats the real unity of human activity and social structure as a condition of knowledge in the social domain. This implies the adoption of a structured ontology that deals with the opening of social systems, the existence of emerging phenomena, and the rejection of the notion of cause as a constant conjunction of events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The challenge of sustainable development can be approached from different angles. In this essay it is argued that one also needs to examine the present close to monopoly position of neoclassical economic theory at university departments of economics in many parts of the world. An open debate is needed about paradigms in economics as well as ideological orientations. An alternative to neoclassical theory is outlined where individuals and organizations are regarded as political actors, each guided by an ideological orientation or mission. Reference is made to the 17 UN sustainable development goals suggesting that impacts need to be seen in multidimensional terms and an alternative definition of economics as "multidimensional management of limited resources in a democratic society" is proposed. It is argued that economics need to move away from its technocracy-oriented tendencies to democracy-oriented approaches. This is exemplified by a move away from neoclassical Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) to Positional Analysis as approach to decision-making and sustainability assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: The gnoseological sense of a new paradigm, apart from the methodological and sociological sense, includes its the deepest essence. It is expressed in a process of forming and popularization of a paradigm. It includes essential factors of a particular paradigm which are reflected by its general sense. Revealing the essence of the gnoseological sense enables to reveal the main factors from the essential ones, which have been applied unintentionally. The same applies to new institutional economics when it is used without scientific reflection. An idea of revealing the essence of its (of the institutional economics) gnoseological sense is to reveal aspects of the individualism and the holism hidden in it. Aim: Goal of this paper is to reveal the essence of the outline of the gnoseological sense of the paradigm of the new institutional economics. Results: Result of the study is presentation of relations between the individualism and the holism in the paradigm of the new institutional economics. The main conclusion is that the paradigm of the economics sui generis is not homogeneous, similarly to the social sciences. The new institutional economics derives a holistic perspective from the sociology, and individualistic one from the neoclassical economics. Consequently the new institutional economics is based on contradictory foundations (it is of dual nature); this becomes clear at a detailed level of considerations concerning its paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: The role of corporations in the modern economy is extremely important, in addition, the widely observed oligopolistic markets gave birth to the need for the formulation of the theoretical concept of undertaking explanatory way of large companies, with particular emphasis on the basic objective of the company and the role they play in the markets. The aim of the work is to present alternatives to the traditional neoclassical concept of enterprises, management theory and their critical assessment, as well as an indication of the application values of managerial recognition proceedings of enterprises with an emphasis on the form of its operation. In this work there were presented mainly the views of O.E. Williamson, on the aggregate concept of operation of the company in the light of the theory of transaction costs. Aim: The aim of the article is the analysis of enterprise under the new institutional economics in respect of management science, and to show the intermingling of economics and management, and an attempt to justify the need of their connection. In the article there has been used the world literature and it has been examined for adequacy and being up-to-date to the theme proposed in the article. Results: Most of the discussion in the mainstream of new institutional economics provides indications on the ways and means of raising the efficiency of the sector by striving to achieve aka the institutional balance. New institutional economics offers a fresh look at the decision-making process in organizations; it shows the complexity of this process and indicates the items that have not been previously included, and whose role in this process can be significant. Institutional analysis applies to phenomena and processes, which occur in organizations and its use can lead to beneficial results for them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, institutionalism was presented by T. Veblen as an alternative to neoclassical economics. On the basis of neoclassical economics, in addition to the explanation how an effectively functioning market leads to maximization of welfare, we also find a market failure analysis. The main theme of the presented study is an attempt to synthesize these concepts, in particular to show how the institutional approach modifies the perception of the market failure. Aim: The aim of the article is to analyze the market failure on the basis of institutional economics. In addition, an attempt was made to determine how institutional solutions can result in limiting certain types of market failure. Results: In the light of the analysis carried out, the analysis of market failure based on Veblen's institutionalism is not justified. However, the relation between the New Institutional Economics and the neoclassical interpretation of market failure can be noticed, mainly, when it comes to explaining the reasons for the existence of markets and the methods used to counteract external effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to offer a theoretical framework for the analysis of labour demand alternative to the neoclassical one, taking as its starting point the conception of the firm that derives from the capabilities or competence-based theories of the organization. After briefly reviewing the essential elements of this approach to the firm, we tackle a range of diverse aspects, such as the link between labour demand decisions and the firm's strategic planning and its determinants, the characterisation of labour demand as a demand for productive competencies, the consequences that these competencies are embedded in human beings or the relative independence between labour demand decision-making and the process of wage-setting. In general terms, this conception of labour demand allows us to incorporate many of the main peculiarities of labour and the demand for it from a number of different areas of heterodox economics (particularly, from institutional and post-Keynesian economics) and it fits in with the conventional literature on internal labour markets and labour market segmentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indeed, the artificial entity 'Homo-Economicus' plays a central role in modern neoclassical economic theory. Maybe an illegitimate child of markets' self-regulation doctrine and the emerging rationalism - professed by the post-modern realms of neoliberalism and the ongoing globalization process - this theoretical abstraction is promoted as a potential prototype of human behavior. It is firmly believed, that this individualistic, self-motivated, and above all, perfectly informed 'entity' could, theoretically, lead the economic system into profound balance between supply and demand, consumption and production, utility maximization, and so on. The present paper consists of a criticism to the mainstream prototype of Homo-Economicus, with further extensions to the neoclassical paradigm. Placing this criticism in the context of ecological economics, the paper argues that the notorious rationality of Homo-Economicus seems to be vanished in the deadlock of a futile race towards non-renewable natural resources depletion and increasing environmental externalities. Finally, a brief review of alternative theoretical frameworks and evidence from institutional and behavioral economics, delineates an emerging pressing request for a paradigm change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article highlights the inadequacy of classical and neoclassical theories for understanding the set of changes experienced by economic systems in their process of development. The institutional dimension concerning the issue of well-defined rules (through the introduction of economic policies) and involving all stakeholders in the regulatory process (starting from the firm), seems to better interpret micro- and macro-economic aspects of the evolving capitalist model. This means questioning the complicated economic governance and society in the transition from the nation-state to a world society (or world state). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conceives of the market as an institution, and contrasts two theoretical approaches: Institutionalism, with an evolutionary and analytical bias, whose theoretical basis comes from "Old/Original" Institutionalism, and New Institutional Economics, with an analytical, contractual approach, linked to mainstream economics. Both approaches have given relevant contributions, as they consider the importance of institutions for economic performance. The limits of New Institutional Economics are particularly relevant, whose analysis of the operation of markets is centered on the logic of transaction cost economics as a determinant of economic performance. Evolutionary Institutionalism, in turn, sees the market within a broader scope, in which cost economies only partially explains economic performance, but it is not necessarily seen as a determining factor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Culture matters for economic development. This postulate has been a main conceptual concern for “old” institutional economics (OIE) and has lately also been tested through neoclassically inspired econometric techniques. This conceptual foundation has been confirmed in several quantitative studies on developed countries, in particular cases from the USA, Germany, and Italy. In less developed regions with a wealth of cultural heritage, particularly in South-East Europe, this postulate is still an underexplored issue from the perspective of advanced econometric approaches. Our goal is to examine the impact of the so-called South-East European cultural corridors on welfare — and especially on total employment — at the local or regional level. Accounting for gross value added and sectoral specialization, we examine the effect of such corridors by considering the distance to a cultural corridor: namely, the East Trans-Balkan Road (crossing Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece) as an explanatory factor for regional development, particularly employment. Using the European University Institute (EUI) European Regional Dataset (ERD), as well as the geo-data from the Cultural Corridors of the South-East Europe website, we estimate a regression model using a 2SLS instrumental variable (IV) approach, with a pooled dataset at the NUTS 3 level (Eurostat) from 1980 to 2011. We then triangulate the results by using the distance to the cultural corridor concerned as a treatment effect in a propensity-score-matching and difference-in-differences exploratory analysis. The findings confirm the importance of distance to the cultural corridor under investigation as a strong predictor for local socio-economic development. The results further suggest that the slow evolution of culture over time is likely to lead to the gradual emergence of new geographical cultural centers and a new cultural path-dependence build-up of persistence chains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is considerable discussion on so-called 'mainstream pluralism', that is, on the co-presence of a variety of research programmes in today's mainstream economics that: 1. significantly deviate from the neoclassical core; 2. are pursued by different, often separate communities of researchers; and 3. have their origins outside economics. The literature tends to regard mainstream pluralism as a transitory state towards a new, post-neoclassical, mainstream. This paper advances a new interpretation: it suggests that the changing and fragmented state of mainstream economics is likely to persist over time under the impact of specialization (as a self-reinforcing mechanism) and the creation of new specialties and approaches, also through collaboration with researchers from other disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economics entails a study of institutions regardless of the school of thought, and it is inherently an analysis of institutional transformation with a vision toward creating positive social change through economic arrangements. However, the conceptions of institutions, identity of individuals, human nature as it pertains to economics, identification of the economic sphere, its concerns, and studying its evolution, all vary substantively across schools of thought. We examine the following issues: (i) the differences in the ontological identity of the individual between heterodox approaches, new institutional economics (NIE), and the neoclassical school; (ii) the central point of divergence between original institutional economics (OIE) and NIE, despite both schools being committed to the project of an "institutionally" centered approach to economics; and (iii) the absence of a cohesive project to explore foundational theoretical congruencies among those heterodox approaches that have a shared vision, values, and a common ontological identity of socially embedded people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last four decades there is a renewed interest within the economic theory for the institutional structures. Numerous, multiple and often unpredictable effects of institutions on economic process are differently reflected among the leading schools of economic analysis. Certainly, in this sense, the greatest attention should be given to the stream of economic thought known as institutional economics. This heterogeneous research orientation today is already clearly differentiated on Veblenian and the new institutional economics. The paper will make, in the light of its recorded achievements and the subjects of interest of its main protagonists, a general insight into the new institutional economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Over the past three decades, a limited range of market like mechanisms have been introduced into the hierarchically structured English National Health Service ('NHS'), which is a nationally tax funded, budget limited healthcare system, with access to care for all, producing structures known as a quasi market. Recently, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 ('HSCA') has been enacted, introducing further market elements. The paper examines the theory and effects of these market mechanisms. Methods: Using neo-classical economics as a primary theoretical framework, as well as new institutional economics and socio-legal theory, the paper first examines the fundamental elements of markets, comparing these with the operation of authority and resource allocation employed in hierarchical structures. Second, the paper examines the application of market concepts to the delivery of healthcare, drawing out the problems which economic and sociolegal theories predict are likely to be encountered. Third, the paper discusses the research evidence concerning the operation of the quasi market in the English NHS. This evidence is provided by research conducted in the UK which uses economic and socio-legal logic to investigate the operation of the economic aspects of the NHS quasi market. Fourth, the paper provides an analysis of the salient elements of the quasi market regime amended by the HSCA 2012. Results: It is not possible to construct a market conforming to classical economic principles in respect of healthcare. Moreover, it is not desirable to do so, as goals which markets cannot deliver (such as fairness of access) are crucial in England. Most of the evidence shows that the quasi market mechanisms used in the English NHS do not appear to be effective either. This finding should be seen in the light of the fact that the operation of these mechanisms has been significantly affected by the national political (i.e. continuingly hierarchical) and budgetary context in which they are operating. Conclusion: The organisational structures of a hierarchy are more appropriate for the delivery of healthcare in the English NHS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines the contributions of J.M. Clark to institutional economics. Clark is sometimes seen as standing between institutional and neoclassical economics, but I argue that this view is not accurate. Clark was intimately involved in the definition, promotion, and defense of institutional economics in sessions of the American Economic Association and in a variety of other forums. No other member of the institutionalist group was as much involved in the professional discussion of institutional economics as J.M. Clark. In addition, Clark made a number of key contributions to institutionalist theory in the areas of psychology and economics, the costs of decision-making, overhead costs and business-pricing behavior, the accelerator mechanism and business cycles, workable and effective competition and competition policy, and social control. These contributions, together with the graduate students he trained at the University of Chicago and Columbia University, serve to place him in the center of the institutionalist movement and not on its periphery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The neoclassical concept of the market is built on a number of assumptions that lead one to view it as a type of ether, devoid of any institutional content. In opposition to this point of view, this article proposes an alternative characterization of markets based on the fundamental principles of institutional and post- Keynesian economics. After reviewing the main features that characterize the behavior of economic agents, we analyze the set of interrelations between these agents within markets and the role of institutions in the regulation of these interrelations. Finally, we discuss some of the consequences generated by the institutional dimensions of markets with regard to their origins and evolution, the justification for their existence, or the evaluation of their results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1963, the North Dakota Legislature amended the North Dakota Century Code to ensure that all licensed community pharmacies in the State are majority owned by pharmacists registered in the State. During the 2008-2009 legislative session, a debate arose about whether this law should be repealed. Those in favor of repeal attacked the law using the neoclassical arguments of efficiency, competition and lower prices. Those opposed to the law's repeal argued that pharmacists must own pharmacies in order to protect the public's welfare. This paper explores the arguments made for and against this law and draws two major conclusions. First, the arguments made by both sides are flawed because neither side fully incorporates the historical, physical and cultural characteristics of North Dakota communities into their analyses. Second, North Dakota legislators voted overwhelmingly to retain the law. Moreover, prima fascia evidence indicates that the legislators based their decisions on Institutional considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neoclassical theoretical approaches dominate modern health economics. However, the peculiarities of healthcare provision are so unusual that neoclassical theory is especially unsuited to the area. Even mainstream health economists often abandon Paretian welfare considerations to focus on needs instead. Problems relating to uncertainty and externalities are also widely acknowledged. This article shows that there are additional important pecularities of healthcare that are relatively neglected in the literature. Some of these concern healthcare needs: while health itself is a universal need, needs for healthcare provision are largely involuntary, varied and idiosyncratic. These issues have important consequences for the planning of healthcare systems and the extent of transaction costs in any market-based system. These factors, combined with the inherent dynamism of modern healthcare needs and capabilities, make institutional and evolutionary approaches especially suitable for healthcare economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economists inside and outside of the Austrian-school tradition have formulated a subjectivist theory of mineral resources. While von Mises () presented a rudimentary theory, institutionalist Zimmermann (1933 and after) provided an in-depth mind-centered approach distinct from the objective, neoclassical theory for minerals developed by Jevons (, ), Gray (), and Hotelling (). A full-fledged Austrian theory identifies the fixity/depletionism view of minerals as incompatible with entrepreneurship. Mineral resourceship, praxeologically akin to manufacturing, or the making of capital goods, demotes the distinction between depletable and nondepletable resources for the sciences of human action. Instead of nonreproducibility, the interplay of geography and institutions becomes the locus of mineral-resource theory, given the nonuniform distribution of deposits. An Austrian-institutional theory is more robust for explaining changes in mineral-resource scarcity than neoclassical depletionism, and offers a wide research agenda for current debates over resource production, usage, and future availability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we argue that calls for widespread implementation of ethics measurement systems would be better informed by institutional economic analysis. Specifically, we assert that proponents of such systems must first recognize and understand the institutions that potentially impede such efforts. We identify two potential institutional impediments to measuring ethics and social responsibility. First, we suggest that neoclassical economics, supported by traditional business education and legal precedent, serves to reinforce the notion that shareholders are the primary corporate constituency group. Such an emphasis on the needs of shareholders severely hinders implementation of measurement systems that address the needs of multiple stakeholder groups. Second, we argue that the threat of litigation may constrain corporate managers from measuring and considering ethics and corporate social responsibility matters. In particular, managers may be reluctant to quantify various ethical concerns if the resulting measurements could be used as evidence against the corporation in a lawsuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares institutional economics with neoclassical economics. The four philosophical systems are formism, mechanism, organicism, and contextualism. Formism and mechanism, as used in physical sciences, are the philosophical foundations of neoclassical economics. The mechanistic foundations of classical economics are complemented by formism in neoclassical theory. The individual is an inadequate unit of analysis for institutional economics, since individuals are integral parts of a group and of a society. Organicism leads institutional economists to conceive society as an evolving organism made up of going concerns in which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. A theory is an organized or formalized explanation of the relations within a set of phenomena. The four types of organized explanations are deductive, probabilistic, functional or teleological, and genetic. In a deductive explanation, that which is to be explained is shown to be a logical consequence of stated premises. In a probabilistic explanation, that which is to be explained is made probable by stated premises even though it is not formally implied or implied with certainty by the premises. In a functional or teleological explanation, that which is to be explained is shown to be necessary to maintain or bring about either an inherent or a desired trait of a system. In a genetic explanation, that which is to be explained is shown to be a consequence of a sequence of events.

This paper anlayzes American economics during the period between the World Wars. During those years, two major groups of ecomomists - neoclassicists and insititutionalists - competed for control of the discilpline. I analyze this struggle with the conceptual tools of actor-network theory: black boxes, trials of strength, allies and translation. The neoclassical - institutionalist struggle is depicted as a trial of strength of two competing approaches to the scientific study of the economy. I argue that the parties in such struggles tend to recruit allies from other prestigious discipline, as well as from the field's own past leading practitioners, and to make arguments concerning the potential of their research programmes to solve important problems. The advocates speak in the name of these allies ('translation') and try to create unbreakable links with them. Rivals try to break these links, and the protagonists respond by mobilizing more allies and strengthening the network. Thus methodological controversies resemble controversies over facts and theories, although the materials of which contested networks are made are different. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the general features of institutional economics. Institutional economics, contrary to occasional references to its demise, is an active and productive school of economic thought. Although still eclipsed by both the neoclassical mainstream and Marxian (and related) heterodoxy, institutional economics remains a viable alternative approach to economics. It stresses power, technology and a holistic and evolutionary approach while critiquing the standard static partial equilibrium, narrowly formulated, maximizing, neoclassical approach. Whereas neoclassicism tends to explain and rationalize the market economy on its own terms, institutionalism does not, although institutionalists differ in their normative critique of the market. Whereas neoclassicism focuses on the allocation of resources through a relatively narrow market model, institutionalism, insofar as it too analyzes the allocation of resources, uses a much broader and deeper set of variables. But institutionalism is less concerned with the static allocation of resources through the price system per se than with the organization and control of the economy broadly conceived, something which neoclassicists either take as given or analyze analogically using a market model.

The article examines the meaning of monetarism. Monetarism, in popular usage, has come to cover a very wide range of subjects. In fact, monetarism deals only with policies which have to do with controlling inflation by restraining the growth in the quantity of money. It is perfectly possible for people to agree about scientific propositions and not to agree about policy. Monetarism has become a sort of code word, but, in fact, it is simply a new name for a very ancient doctrine, the "quantity" theory of money. The key proposition in monetarism is that the monetary authorities, in the United States, the Federal Reserve System, can control the nominal amount of money expressed in dollars but cannot control the real quantity of money. It is the public at large, the consumers, the holders of money, who decide what the real quantity of money will be. This is a very difficult concept for the non-economist to grasp. The reason it is so difficult is that what is true for the country as a whole is the opposite of what is true for each individual separately.

The principal theme of the essay is that, although we may wish to classify the new classicals as monetarists (for Tobin's or for Hahn's reasons) or we may not (for Laidler's reasons), Friedman, as one important monetarist, differs from the new classicals on a fundamental point of methodology: he is a Marshallian; they are Walrasians. Part II attempts to define the new classical economics and to clarify its relation to the rational expectations hypothesis. Part III explores the practical and theoretical relations between Friedman and the new classicals that give plausibility to Tobin's title, "monetarist mark II," and interest to the debate over its aptness. Part IV introduces the fundamental methodological distinction between Friedman and the new classicals. Part V shows how this distinction underlies and accounts for the differences between Friedman's and the new classical views on equilibrium and dynamics. Finally, Part VI summarizes the argument. There has been a lively debate over whether or not Lucas, Sargent, Wallace and their fellow adherents to the new classical doctrine are best thought of as monetarists. The central argument of this essay is simply that, whatever we may choose to call them, these new classicals must be distinguished from an older strand of monetarism represented by Friedman. We have seen that the strongest case for calling the new classicals "monetarists" is based on the similarity of their policy prescriptions to Friedman's. Nevertheless, their conclusions have a more radical tone than his. This is the result of a different theoretical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract--This paper attempts to reconcile the conflicting findings of a particular line of research designed to test Monetarism on reduced form equations. Using the encompassing approach of Mizon, the lag lengths in inflation and unemployment equations are statistically determined and then decomposed into lags due to "systematic" and "error" dynamics. Several Monetarist propositions are tested on the systematic component of each equation. The data fail to reject the restrictions imposed by Monetarism in all cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]