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This article focuses on the secularism debate currently taking place in France by examining how this issue impacts the integration of immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants. Secularism is one of the key values of French Republicanism, but one which has been challenged by the establishment of a settled population of Muslim immigrants in France. The issue has been particularly highlighted by the affaire des foulards (headscarf affair), an ongoing debate over the rights of Muslim girls to wear a headscarf to secular French schools. Discussions of the principle of secularism and of its application have been even more intense in recent months with the publication in December 2003 of a report by the Stasi Commission, a commission set up by President Chirac to investigate the application of the principle of secularism, and by the passage of legislation intended to outlaw the wearing of any “overt” religious insignia in French schools. This article examines these recent developments in the context of the long-running debate over Muslim women's right to wear a headscarf in French schools. It argues that the current focus on secularism provides evidence of the return of assimilation as a primary objective of public policy (Brubaker, 2001) and the decreasing strength of the movement in favour of the droit à la différence (right to difference). Finally, the paper argues that this has provided important obstacles to the integration of certain groups of immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The justification for the restrictions on religion inherent in secularism is the subject of lively debate in constitutional and political theory. As a rights-focused text, the ECHR struggles to accommodate constitutional principles such as secularism whose aims and justifications may go beyond the protection of the rights of others and include abstract goals such as upholding the religious neutrality of the state. Rights alone cannot provide an adequate account of the relationship between religion, state and law, and in Ebrahimian v France, the Strasbourg Court rightly reaffirmed that secularism and strict neutrality can be in harmony with the values of the Convention. However, the Court needs more clarity about the reasons for this stance and to be vigilant in its protection of private autonomy so that the use of abstract principles to restrict religious expression does not give excessive latitude to states to restrict individual autonomy and minority rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]