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An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including financialisation, Global Crisis, and neoclassical economics.

Don Lamberton asked many questions about the nature and role of information, without expecting to be able to provide tidy or neat answers. The issues he raised have not gone away or been resolved. Some have re-appeared in modified or new form. This paper first focuses on the analysis of information at the macro-level, starting with the ill-fated ‘information sector’ studies and leading on to current attempts to use neoclassical economics to measure macro-level capital stocks in the context of the debate about sustainable development, also known as ‘wealth accounting’. Wealth accounting has no place for information-as-capital that goes beyond very primitive proxy measures for intangible capital other than human capital. Often, information-as-capital is neglected completely by denoting such capital stocks as ‘enabling assets’ that are assumed to be reflected in what turn out to be unmeasurable shadow prices. Next, an issue mostly neglected by Don Lamberton is discussed – the normative assessment of information and innovation. It is argued that neither mainstream economics nor evolutionary economics, information studies, innovation studies and so on currently has an appropriate normative theory of innovation. Increased output, innovation counts, productivity, competitiveness and consumption-related utility (what economists call ‘welfare’) are poor indicators of what really should be measured, which is the objective and subjective impacts of innovation on people’s well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis on the factors that caused the 2008 global financial crisis in the U.S. It discusses various explanations of the crisis and the solutions offered by economists from the four schools of thought which include Neoclassicals, Keynesians, Institutionalists and Marxists. It also provides useful insight and view from the different schools of thought regarding the government's response to address the problem and the economic imbalances of the nation. Furthermore, it explores the Marxists' concept on the systemic causes of the crisis and its suggestion on the need for the government to initiate investigations and interventions.

We present a neoclassical economic model of the human right to water using a nonrenewable resource model inclusive of a backstop technology. The right is interpreted as a minimum consumption requirement the government is obligated to fulfill in the event that any one household cannot do so independently. Differing by income levels, households maximize utility by purchasing a composite consumption good and water from two distinct, government-owned sources. Facing physical and financial constraints, the government uses fiscal policy to address potential human rights violations. Reducing the analysis to two periods, we develop a novel approach to compare total welfare levels from a joint human rights and neoclassical economics perspective. We define a human rights welfare standard and discuss cases in which traditional social welfare measures would exceed, violate, or meet this standard. We thus offer a unique way to merge economic analysis with human rights research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hodgson's review of our books argues against us that marginalism neither adopted methodological individualism nor excluded the social from economics. Thus, he finds a partial solution to sickonomics in abandoning the term methodological individualism and using both structures and individuals as analytical starting point(s), revisiting Marshallian marginalism dressed up in socio-institutional clothing. He also denies any relationship between the current malaise in economics and the marginal revolution, as we claim, focusing exclusively on institutional developments since the Second World War. We show Hodgson is either partial or wrong on all of these counts. Firstly, his alternative to methodological individualism is untenable. Secondly, institutions, although implicitly present in Marshallian and Walrasian economics, play no substantive analytical role and as such are superfluous. Finally, although institutional factors help explain the sickness of modern economics (in addition to socioeconomic, ideological, political, and intellectual factors), the intellectual roots of this decay lie in the conceptual framework established around the marginal revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their recent analysis of the alleged decay in modern economics, Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis claim to find its source and origin in the 'marginal revolution' of the 1870s. They argue that this development led to 'methodological individualism' and the detachment of economics from society and history. I contest their account of the marginal revolution and of the role of Alfred Marshall among others. They also fail to provide an adequate definition of methodological individualism. I suggest that neoclassical economics adopted a denuded concept of the social rather than removing these factors entirely. No such removal is possible in principle. It is also mistaken to depict neoclassical economics as the science of prices and the market. In truth, neoclassical economics fails to capture the true nature of markets. I consider some sketch an alternative explanation of the sickness of modern economics, which focuses on institutional developments since World War II. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By exploring the implications of the linkage between Knight and Pragmatism, some non-trivial implications can be argued to exist. Specifically, section 2 outlines the T.C.E. literature, and how it exists in an atmosphere mixed with Marshallian competition and Knightian uncertainty. Section 3 then considers the disparate philosophical positions behind the work of Knight and Marshall. Knight's critique of Marshall is seminal, not because of any trivial technical innovations that Knight may have inspired within economic theory, but because Knight grounds his work on a philosophical viewpoint that effectively devastated Hegelian philosophy: American Pragmatism. Section 4 then links together the previous two sections by considering how the T.C.E. literature exhibits a dependency on both Pragmatism and Hegelian philosophy. The non-trivial implications of understanding the T.C.E. literature as a branch of Marshallian economics, which recognises Knightian uncertainty, are developed in section 5. Possible conclusions and a summary of the argument are provided in section 6. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role of the relative efficiency of the free market and government intervention in handling economic woes. It mentions that the emergence of the financial and economic crisis has resulted to discussions over the virtues of the free market system and the role of the government in economic stabilization. Laissez-faire economics has turned into a neoclassical monetarism recommending policies such as the free market. It stresses that the government and market need to coexist and complement one another toward sustainability.

Symbolic utility involves appreciation and esteem and expressed by symbolic products (gifts), while substantive utility entails ordinary welfare satisfied by substantive products. For neoclassical theory, both utilities are symmetrical or fungible and, hence, substitutable along the uni-dimensional utility function. If they are substitutable, though, why would agents be judged as "crass" if they intentionally remind the recipient of the cost of the substitution? For normative sociological theory, the judgment of "crassness" would arise if the agent mixes moral norms with non-moral substantive interests. The two are supposed to be non-fungible, stemming from multiple selves. If both utilities are non-fungible and stem from multiple selves, though, why do we call agents who spend on gifts beyond their means "fools," while those who spend very little "cheapskates"? It seems that there must be a supervising, single self that makes decisions on the proper division of the budget between substantive products and gifts. But this invites the single-self idea from the back window, reverting back to the neoclassical approach. We would be caught in a vicious cycle of anomalies. To get out of the cycle, this paper identifies the critical issues and suggests an alternative, complex-self view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tony Lawson has argued that the methodology of neoclassical economics is deductivist: in constructing their formal models, economists hope to be able to provide explanations based on laws, as described by the deductive-nomological model of explanation. This article argues in contrast that neoclassical economics cannot be understood as following just one methodology. It is argued that neoclassicism exhibits two methodologies, one "official" and one tacit. The former is empiricist, and corresponds to the practice that has been described by Lawson. The latter, which can be called "hypothetico-deductive rationalism", amounts to the position that knowledge of the world can be obtained without any empirical verification of one's assumptions, simply by exploring the implications of the assumptions one makes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tony Lawson has argued that the methodology of neoclassical economics is deductivist: in constructing their formal models, economists hope to be able to provide explanations based on laws, as described by the deductive-nomological model of explanation. This article argues in contrast that neoclassical economics cannot be understood as following just one methodology. It is argued that neoclassicism exhibits two methodologies, one "official" and one tacit. The former is empiricist, and corresponds to the practice that has been described by Lawson. The latter, which can be called "hypothetico-deductive rationalism", amounts to the position that knowledge of the world can be obtained without any empirical verification of one's assumptions, simply by exploring the implications of the assumptions one makes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on N. Georgescu-Roegen's bioeconomic paradigm, this paper reconsiders the neoclassical economic paradigm which endorses continuous global economic growth through stimulated trade. We suggest that, in view of sustainability, it is fundamental to acknowledge: (1) the importance of preserving the identity and integrity of economic systems in different regions of the world through enlarging as much as possible self-sufficiency and equity assessed at national and regional levels; and (2) the importance of including respect for biospheric equilibria as one criterion to be used to regulate world economic activity and trade. We examine differences and similarities of the past and present patterns of ecological degradation. We also present two types of efficiency to assess technological changes and the drive toward unsustainability. Then we discuss an entropy-based theory of North-South trade issues and three points for promotion of sustainability. Finally, we show that the true origin of current ecological crisis lies in a deep change in the perception of the relation between humans and nature that affects the mode of technological development of modern society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper represents an attempt to follow-up on Kenneth Arrow's long-neglected identification of a ‘logical gap’ in the perfectly competitive foundation of the neoclassical framework. Attention is initially focused on establishing the fact that this logical gap exists and that it leaves the orthodox paradigm without an endogenous account of the manner in prices are determined. The presence of this logical gap implies, in other words, that neoclassical economics fails to provide our discipline with a theory of value. Given this fact, the second, considerably longer part of this paper establishes the broad outlines of a framework in which this logical gap is not present and that is capable, therefore, of providing our discipline with a legitimate theory of value. While prior efforts to develop an explicit account of the manner in which prices are determined provide crucial guidance in this regard, these efforts are extended in terms that address certain shortcomings and traditional sources of resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the viability of the self-management system. One of the major drawbacks of the self-management firm, according to the neoclassical school, is a perverse response to changes in demand. In the discussion of the horizon problem, it has been indicated that the property rights school drew attention to an important aspect of decision making in self-managed firms. It is true that workers in a society with limited property rights cannot take a proportion of the funds they accumulated as a part of the enterprise's capital assets when they leave the job. Workers enjoy the benefits of investment in the form of larger personal incomes only as long as they remain with the firm. The claim of the neoclassical institutionalists that the self-management system is inherently inefficient due to a lack of incentives by workers to perform well and a lack of interest by management to supervise workers is strongly exaggerated. At the same time, the praise of the capitalist corporation for its hierarchical structure of control as the best form of industrial organization which has no alternative is far from convincing.