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Why are Japan and Korea taking different paths of immigration policies despite they had shared the similar policies until 2004? I explain this variance focusing on distinct structure of state institutions and civil society as well as alliance pattern ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is facing the difficulties of declining population, and yet still seems unwilling to embrace immigration as a source of new citizens. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine the links between Confucian thought and the Liberal DemocraticParty of Japan (LDP). I then use the World Values Survey to test whethercitizens holding Confucian values have higher support for the LDP. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some 40,000 Chinese, along with 700,000 Koreans, performed forced labor for private corporations in Japan during the Asia Pacific War. The presenter, having closely observed Chinese and (to a lesser extent) Korean forced labor redress activities in the Fukuoka area since 2002, locates these distinct but overlapping political movements within leading models of the reparations process. A mismatch exists between the especially strong Chinese reparations claim and the Northeast Asian political context in which it is being contested. Pessimistic short-term prospects for compensation from Japan cast some doubt on the universality of redress norms and the progressive view that a new morality is driving the global trend toward repairing historical injustices. Yet due to an evolving calculus of more pragmatic concerns like economics, security and international reputation, Japan may eventually come to terms with the past in a manner partially satisfying to Chinese forced labor survivors and their government. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Applying Wilson's argument in The Declining Significance of Race (1978) to the Japanese context, this study shows that the legal/institutional and socioeconomic changes for the past few decades have made "class" more significant than "ethnicity" in explaining the life experience of the Korean minority in Japan. From a comparative perspective, this study also reveals that historical contingency such as the concentration of Koreans in the expanding industries and of blacks in the declining industries brings about different results in the overall socioeconomic status of these two minority groups, i.e., positive results in the case of the former but negative results in the case of the latter. This suggests that the peculiarity of the Korean minority case must be understood within the context of Japan's postwar political economy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the diplomatic normalization by the 1965 Basic Treaty with Japan, the Republic of Korea (hereafter, South Korea or ROK) still used Japan's past wrongs and/or South Korea's security contribution to Japan as a means of gaining bargaining leverage over Japan. For example, the Chun Doo-hwan regime (1980-87) in South Korea often invoked history and security to put pressure on Japan in unrelated issues, such as trade and government loan, equating Japanese concessions with evidence of its genuine repentance. After the late 1990s, however, South Korea appears to have discarded this strategy of associating history or security with economic issues in its foreign policy-making toward Japan. Why did South Korea abandon the previously oft-used strategy of utilizing history or security as a method of obtaining bargaining leverage over Japan?In addressing this question, I argue that although not a deterministic factor, a change in the self-perception of South Koreans from "dependent" upon to "competitors" with Japan provided the ROK policymakers with an environment in which with enhanced confidence they seek to separate economy from political issues. More specifically, the disintegration of South Korea's vertical economic structure with Japan since the early 1990s resulted in the alteration in the self-perception of South Koreans from "dependent" upon to "competitors" with Japan. This perceptual change contributed to the promotion of South Korean policymakers' confidence toward Japan, thereby placing psychological constraints on their keeping the strategy of using history or security as a tool to put pressure on Japan in economic issues. The ROK democratization, furthermore, led to the establishment of the institutionalized foreign policy making process, thus placing serious institutional constraints on South Korean policymakers' keeping their former strategy to connect history or security with economic issues in its foreign policies toward Japan. Under democracy, South Korean Presidents still contained the authority to make a final decision, yet they got placed under heavy institutional constraints emanating from other actors, such as diverse government organizations, the National Assembly, civic/academic organizations, and the mass media. Unlike past practices, the ROK Presidents under a democratic system became unable to push through their own policy ideas without taking other voices into account. Under this condition, therefore, it was quite difficult for South Korean policymakers - holding the changed self-perception from "dependent" upon to "competitors" with Japan - to keep using the former history- or security- related negotiation strategy toward Japan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan and Taiwan have been rapidly approaching each other since the 1990s. This process, which has elevated their relations to an "unofficial-in-name-only" status, is the result of three mutually reinforcing factors: the re-imagination of colonial ties, the sharing of a democratic identity, and the permeating of popular culture. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite potential gains of significant oil resources and the fact that China has compromised in the majority of its territorial disputes, China has been unwilling to compromise on its claimed sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, against Japan. The purpose of this article is to explain China's reluctance to drop its territorial claim and compromise with Japan about sovereignty of the disputed islands. I argue that there have been strong incentives for China to maintain its territorial claim against Japan because the Chinese government has been able to use the territorial dispute to make bargaining gains on exogenous issues disputed with Japan. By provoking Japan through confrontational actions, China has used the dispute to gain bargaining leverage by achieving concessions on other disputed issues with Japan, or compelling or deterring certain Japanese policies or actions. Data analysis from 1978-2001 supports the theory. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study challenges the conventional wisdom that investment on highways and bullet trains was the key to the electoral success of Japan's LDP. A formal model and empirical evidence corroborates the above claim. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has LDP dominance reduced Japanese judges' willingness to rule against the government in pollution cases? I find that judges' passivity results more from the limits of environmental law and social movements' resources than from careerist interests. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructing a formal model and drawing on data of factional affiliations in LDP cabinets between 1956 and 1991, I demonstrate that portfolio allocation is an instrument the prime minister uses to handle intra-party and inter-party pressures. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines Japanese foreign aid policy towards China as the product of Japanese political-bureaucratic relations and electoral politics. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using newly collected campaign finance data, I focus on the empirical linkages between candidate quality, money and votes for incumbents and new candidates in the Democratic Party of Japan. I show how the inability of the largest opposition party to ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cabinet appointments in Japan have usually been seen simply as division of spoils amongst LDP politicians. However following the 1994 electoral reform we find that ministerial selection also represents party interests in policy and vote-maximization. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is the global innovator in community currencies, a policy designed to create social capital. I collect new survey data to test whether government can increase trust. I find that community currency involvement increases generalized trust. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on antimilitarist norms in Japanese security policy has focused on whether they have prevented Japan from acquiring military capabilities. In fact, the norms have been counterproductive when their advocates overreached. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In seeking to explain how democracies attempt to win the peace, this study examines the policies designed for the occupations of Germany and Japan, specifically examining how democracies balanced carrots and sticks. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The deeper institutionalization of democratic values in South Korea has accelerated South Korea?s communication with Japan at governmental and nongovernmental levels, thereby contributing to their efforts at bilateral reconciliation with Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Garbage can processes in U.S. and Japanese education agenda formation have 1) facilitated the spread of trendy administrative reforms, 2) prevented rational planning and coordination, and 3) prevented pressing education problems from being addressed. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]