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This paper suggests that it is not Japan's crude unwillingness but its traumatic memory of the War and post-war identity that makes it difficult to address its Asian neighbours' criticisms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Japan has begun the arduous task of transforming its vast economic leverage in the international community into political leverage, the nature of Japanese foreign policy in Southeast and East Asia has undergone significant changes. We will examine three areas within which evidence suggests Japan is searching for the means by which it will achieve a leadership position in Asia and perhaps, eventually, in the international community. Japan has been a driving force behind the development of multilateral organizations which have sought, if not always successfully, to crystallize regionalization in Southeast and East Asia. In addition, Japan has sought to compliment multilateral diplomatic efforts through a series of bilateral arrangements with nations in Southeast and East Asia. The aim of these bilateral arrangements is to provide for its security through regional stability and cooperation. We shall see that these bilateral agreements have established a ?safety net? within which the nations of the region of Southeast and East Asia have come to deal with one and other. Throughout the ongoing development of these trends, the role Japan?s military capability has been constantly changing to keep pace with new policy interests in the region. Japan, while not always successfully, has increased its position with which to lead the developing regions of Southeast and East Asia. Furthermore, it has been doing this in a way that is marginally independent of the aims of the US. While Japan may not be the world leader or the rival superpower to US hegemony that some may purport, it is well on the path to becoming a regional leader in Southeast and East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will analyze japanese nationalism by using the opinion polls that have been poorly utilized. It will indicate the nature of the nationalism. Then it will comperhend how such a nationalism will affect japanese alliance with the US ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The chief concern of this paper is to provide an analysis as to how the mutually-reinforcing phenomena of conflicting identities and conflicting interests have caused and are serving to exacerbate the current tensions between China and Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Why did Japan respond with diplomacy and money in the first Gulf War and diplomacy and troops in the second?" I argue that the demise of an ideological opposition party was structurally significant for making changed policies possible. This political realignment widened the parameters of viable policy options. Utilizing the concept of schema, I argue that how decision-makers thought about international events also mattered. In 1990, five categories of schemata existed amongst decision-makers that prioritized a variety of, sometimes mutually exclusive, policy options. Due to the lessons learned from the traumatic experience of the Gulf War, best captured in the phrase "too little, too late," schemata converged around the idea that monetary contributions are not enough and that Japanese policies need to address issues as a responsible member of the global community. Changes in both the political structure and decision-makers account for the differences in Japan's security-related foreign policies. My findings are based on over 100 interviews with Japanese decision-makers during the Kaifu and Koizumi Administrations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the diplomatic normalization by the 1965 Basic Treaty with Japan, the Republic of Korea (hereafter, South Korea or ROK) still used Japan's past wrongs and/or South Korea's security contribution to Japan as a means of gaining bargaining leverage over Japan. For example, the Chun Doo-hwan regime (1980-87) in South Korea often invoked history and security to put pressure on Japan in unrelated issues, such as trade and government loan, equating Japanese concessions with evidence of its genuine repentance. After the late 1990s, however, South Korea appears to have discarded this strategy of associating history or security with economic issues in its foreign policy-making toward Japan. Why did South Korea abandon the previously oft-used strategy of utilizing history or security as a method of obtaining bargaining leverage over Japan?In addressing this question, I argue that although not a deterministic factor, a change in the self-perception of South Koreans from "dependent" upon to "competitors" with Japan provided the ROK policymakers with an environment in which with enhanced confidence they seek to separate economy from political issues. More specifically, the disintegration of South Korea's vertical economic structure with Japan since the early 1990s resulted in the alteration in the self-perception of South Koreans from "dependent" upon to "competitors" with Japan. This perceptual change contributed to the promotion of South Korean policymakers' confidence toward Japan, thereby placing psychological constraints on their keeping the strategy of using history or security as a tool to put pressure on Japan in economic issues. The ROK democratization, furthermore, led to the establishment of the institutionalized foreign policy making process, thus placing serious institutional constraints on South Korean policymakers' keeping their former strategy to connect history or security with economic issues in its foreign policies toward Japan. Under democracy, South Korean Presidents still contained the authority to make a final decision, yet they got placed under heavy institutional constraints emanating from other actors, such as diverse government organizations, the National Assembly, civic/academic organizations, and the mass media. Unlike past practices, the ROK Presidents under a democratic system became unable to push through their own policy ideas without taking other voices into account. Under this condition, therefore, it was quite difficult for South Korean policymakers - holding the changed self-perception from "dependent" upon to "competitors" with Japan - to keep using the former history- or security- related negotiation strategy toward Japan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan and Taiwan have been rapidly approaching each other since the 1990s. This process, which has elevated their relations to an "unofficial-in-name-only" status, is the result of three mutually reinforcing factors: the re-imagination of colonial ties, the sharing of a democratic identity, and the permeating of popular culture. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]