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Policies that promote the common good may be politically infeasible if legislators representing 'losing' constituencies are punished for failing to promote their district's welfare. We investigate how varying the local and aggregate returns to a policy affects voter support for their incumbent. In our first study, we find that an incumbent who favours a welfare-enhancing policy enjoys a discontinuous jump in support when their district moves from losing to at least breaking even, while the additional incremental political returns for the district doing better than breaking even are modest. This feature of voter response, which we replicate, has significant implications for legislative politics generally and, in particular, how to construct politically feasible social welfare-enhancing policies. In a second study, we investigate the robustness of this finding in a competitive environment in which a challenger can call attention to a legislator's absolute and relative performance in delivering resources to their district. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does candidate ideology affect donors' contribution decisions in U.S. House elections? Studies of donor motivations have struggled with confounding of candidate, donor, and district characteristics in observational data and the difficulty of assessing trade-offs in surveys. We investigate how these factors affect contribution decisions using experimental vignettes administered to 7,000 verified midterm donors. While ideological congruence influences donors' likelihood of contributing to a candidate, district competitiveness and opponent extremity are equally important. Moreover, the response to ideology is asymmetric and heterogeneous: donors penalize more moderate candidates five times more heavily than more extreme candidates, with the most extreme donors exhibiting the greatest preference for candidates even more extreme than themselves. Republicans also exhibit a greater relative preference for extremism than Democrats, although partisan differences are smaller than differences by donor extremism. Our findings suggest that strategic considerations matter, and donors incentivize candidate extremism even more than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The accountability relationship between voters and elected members of Congress (MCs) hinges on the potential for citizens to learn about legislator behaviour. In an era of declining local newspapers, local television coverage of MCs potentially fulfils this important role. However, few studies have comprehensively examined the determinants of contemporary MC coverage by local television news broadcasts. In this paper, we leverage a vast database of local television news broadcast transcripts spanning two years to identify which factors explain MC coverage. We find that MCs receive little coverage outside the general election campaign season. Media market and campaign-specific factors are associated with more exposure when coverage occurs. Finally, we find that within competitive elections, incumbents receive only a marginal advantage in coverage. These findings provide a springboard to explore further questions regarding Congress, local media, and political accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decision-theoretic Downsian model and other related accounts predict that increasing perceptions of election closeness will increase turnout. Does this prediction hold? Past observational and experimental tests raise generalizability and credible inference issues. Prior field experiments either (1) compare messages emphasizing election closeness to non-closeness messages, potentially conflating changes in closeness perceptions with framing effects of the voter encouragement message, or (2) deliver information about a particular race's closeness, potentially altering beliefs about the features of that election apart from its closeness. We address the limitations of prior work in a large-scale field experiment conducted in seven states and find that a telephone message describing a class of contests as decided by fewer, as opposed to more, votes increases voter turnout. Furthermore, this effect exceeds that of a standard election reminder. The results imply expected electoral closeness affects turnout and that perceptions of closeness can be altered to increase participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partisan Americans like members of their own party more than members of the opposing party. Scholars often interpret this as evidence that party identity or loyalty influence interpersonal affect. First, we reassess previous studies and demonstrate that prior results are also consistent with what we would predict if people cared only about policy agreement. Next, we demonstrate the difficulty of manipulating perceptions of party identity without also manipulating beliefs about policy agreement and vice versa. Finally, we show that partisans care much more about policy agreement than they do about party loyalty when the two come into conflict. Our analyses suggest that partisan Americans care about policy agreement; we have little convincing evidence that they care about partisan identity or loyalty per se, and scholars will have to find new research designs if they want to convincingly estimate the effects of identity or loyalty independent of policy substance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic made salient the risks posed by an infectious disease at a polling place. To what degree did such health risks, as with other changes to voting costs, affect the willingness to vote in person? Could highlighting safety measures reduce the association between COVID fears and unwillingness to vote in person? Using both a representative survey of Connecticut voters and a survey experiment, we examine whether concerns about health diminish willingness to vote in person. We find correlational evidence that those who are more worried about COVID-19 are less likely to report they will vote in person, even when considering risk mitigation efforts. We then present causal evidence that mentioning the safety measures being taken does little to offset the negative effect of priming COVID-19 risk on willingness to vote in person. These results contribute to a growing literature that assesses how health risks affect in person voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experimental research on pay inequality attitudes often provides information about pay inequality with the expectation that greater awareness of pay differences will increase the belief that pay inequality is unfair, thereby strengthening support for policies addressing pay inequality. Less explored is whether providing information about why pay inequality might be justified may lower support for addressing pay inequality or counteract the effect of providing information about such inequality. This paper finds that providing static information about pay differences across the income distribution generally does not affect support for policies addressing pay inequality. However, providing information about pay inequality followed by a labor economics argument in support of pay differences (priming structural fairness) generally decreases support for such policies. One mechanism through which this effect may operate is by increasing the belief that differences in pay are justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The replication archive (available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/38UTBF) has been updated so that the code used to generate Figures 2-3 in Peyton, Coppock and Huber ([2]) now produces the correct versions shown here in Figures 1-2. In the course of running computational reproducibility checks for Peyton, Huber and Coppock ([3]), the Yale ISPS Data Archive identified mistakes concerning the number of statistically significant differences reported for comparisons made between pre-COVID experiments and our replications. In Figure 1, we present the original version of Figure 2 from Peyton, Huber and Coppock ([3]) in the top panel (1a) and the correction in the bottom panel (1b). [Extracted from the article]

Do small wording differences in message-based behavioral interventions have outsized effects on behavior? An influential initial study, examining this question in the domain of political behavior using two small-scale field experiments, argues that subtle linguistic cues in voter mobilization messages describing someone as a voter (noun) instead of one who votes (verb) dramatically increases turnout rates by activating a person's social identity as a voter. Two subsequent large-scale replication field experiments challenged this claim, finding no effect even in electorally competitive settings. However, these experiments may not have reproduced the psychological context needed to motivate behavioral change because they did not occur in highly competitive and highly salient electoral contexts. Addressing this major criticism, we conduct a large-scale, preregistered replication field experiment in the 2016 presidential election. We find no evidence that noun wording increases turnout compared to verb wording in this highly salient electoral context, even in competitive states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their reply to our article, "Irrelevant Events and Voting Behavior," Fowler and Montagnes reanalyze our replication study of college football's effect on election outcomes. Although we agree with Fowler and Montagnes that the evidence supporting the irrelevant events hypothesis is weaker than earlier research suggested, they overstate this case. Philosophically, we disagree with Fowler and Montagnes's preference for (1) running a plethora of tests rather than focusing on the most theoretically motivated tests and (2) privileging out-of-sample data over the full sample of available data. Empirically, we show that their claim that out-of-sample data weaken the original results depends on (1) an incorrect definition of out-of-sample years and (2) assigning two-thirds weight to the same hypothesis regarding heterogeneous effects. An amended version of Fowler and Montagnes's analysis affirms our initial assessment: although the original finding was overstated, adding out-of-sample data strengthens it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How well do voters hold politicians accountable? Although a long-standing research tradition claims that elections are effective tools for the sanctioning and selection of leaders, a more recent literature argues that voters often reward and punish incumbents for "irrelevant events." The empirical literature on this topic is characterized by conflicting findings. Drawing on ideas from the open science movement, and showing how they can advance the transparency of observational research, we replicated three prominent studies on irrelevant events and voting behavior: (1) Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels's 2016 study of droughts and floods; (2) Andrew Healy, Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo's 2010 study of college football; and (3) Andrew Healy and Neil Malhotra's 2010 study of tornadoes. Each study replicates well in some areas and poorly in others. Had we sought to debunk any of the three with ex post specification searches, we could have done so. However, our approach required us to see the full, complicated picture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic imposed new constraints on empirical research, and online data collection by social scientists increased. Generalizing from experiments conducted during this period of persistent crisis may be challenging due to changes in how participants respond to treatments or the composition of online samples. We investigate the generalizability of COVID era survey experiments with 33 replications of 12 pre-pandemic designs, fielded across 13 quota samples of Americans between March and July 2020. We find strong evidence that pre-pandemic experiments replicate in terms of sign and significance, but at somewhat reduced magnitudes. Indirect evidence suggests an increased share of inattentive subjects on online platforms during this period, which may have contributed to smaller estimated treatment effects. Overall, we conclude that the pandemic does not pose a fundamental threat to the generalizability of online experiments to other time periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political campaigns frequently emphasize the material stakes at play in election outcomes to motivate participation. However, field-experimental academic work has given greater attention to other aspects of voters' decisions to participate despite theoretical models of turnout and substantial observational work signaling that a contest's perceived importance affects the propensity to vote. We identify two classes of treatments that may increase the material incentive to participate and test these messages in a large-scale placebo-controlled field experiment in which approximately 24,500 treatment letters were delivered during Connecticut's 2013 municipal elections. We find some evidence that these messages are effective in increasing participation, as well as that some of them may be more effective than typical nonpartisan get-out-the-vote appeals. While these results remain somewhat preliminary, our findings have important implications for our understanding of how voters decide whether to participate and how best to mobilize citizens who would otherwise sit out elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What types of public health messages are effective at changing people's beliefs and intentions to practice social distancing to slow the spread of COVID-19? We conducted two randomized experiments in summer 2020 that assigned respondents to read a public health message and then measured their beliefs and behavioral intentions across a wide variety of outcomes. Using both a convenience sample and a pre-registered replication with a nationally representative sample of Americans, we find that a message that reframes not social distancing as recklessness rather than bravery and a message that highlights the need for everyone to take action to protect one another are the most effective at increasing beliefs and intentions related to social distancing. These results provide an evidentiary basis for building effective public health campaigns to increase social distancing during flu pandemics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: This paper presents novel survey and experimental evidence that reveals the mass public's interpretation of movements to reform, defund, and abolish the police. We find strong support for police reform, but efforts to defund or abolish generate opposition both in terms of slogan and substance. While these differences cannot be explained by differing beliefs about each movement's association with violent protests, racial makeup, or specific programmatic changes, efforts to defund and abolish the police appear unpopular because they seek reduced involvement of police in traditional roles and cuts in police numbers. Policy Implications: Our findings suggest that public support for changes to American policing is contingent on the perceived implications for crime and public safety. Proposals like defunding and abolition are therefore unlikely to succeed at the national level. Viable police reform may instead require proposals that target changing how police departments and their officers operate rather than lowering police budgets or decreasing police involvement in responding to crime and calls for service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research has reported that Americans hold biased perceptions about the composition of US parties. Survey respondents vastly overestimate the frequency with which partisans belong to other social groups stereotypically associated with their party. We argue that when perceptions of Democrats, Republicans, and members of the American public are directly compared, evidence of relative misperceptions is limited. Drawing on novel survey experimental measures, we find that respondents underestimate many differences in the demographic composition of the Democratic and Republican parties. A few stereotypes thought to be associated with one party or the other may apply to partisans in general. Similar trends appear across parties and among strong partisans. These findings suggest limits on the extent to which inaccurate estimates of who affiliates with each party can be interpreted as evidence of party-specific stereotypes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research on economic voting generally finds that national economic performance affects incumbent support. However, the degree to which one's personal economic situation shapes vote choice remains less clear. In this study, we use novel survey data collected during the COVID-19 pandemic to provide more credible evidence about the effect of changes in personal economic experiences on intended vote choice. Our design uses an objective measure of change in personal economic situation by asking respondents their employment status prior to the pandemic and at the time of the survey. Given the widespread and abrupt way in which the pandemic induced unemployment, we argue that this design reduces concerns about confounders that explain both vote choice and job loss. Our analysis demonstrates that individuals whose personal economic conditions worsened during the pandemic were significantly less like to intend to vote for Trump in the 2020 election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the absence of widespread vaccination for COVID-19, governments and public health officials have advocated for the public to wear masks during the pandemic. The decision to wear a mask in public is likely affected by both beliefs about its efficacy and the prevalence of the behavior. Greater mask use in the community may encourage others to follow this norm, but it also creates an incentive for individuals to free ride on the protection afforded to them by others. We report the results of two vignette-based experiments conducted in the United States (n = 3,100) and Italy (n = 2,659) to examine the causal relationship between beliefs, social norms, and reported intentions to engage in mask promoting behavior. In both countries, survey respondents were quota sampled to be representative of the country's population on key demographics. We find that providing information about how masks protect others increases the likelihood that someone would wear a mask or encourage others to do so in the United States, but not in Italy. There is no effect of providing information about how masks protect the wearer in either country. Additionally, greater mask use increases intentions to wear a mask and encourage someone else to wear theirs properly in both the United States and Italy. Thus, community mask use may be self-reinforcing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political scientists regularly measure anti-Black prejudice in the survey context using racial resentment, an indirect measure that blends racial animus with traditional moral values. Explicit prejudice, a direct measure based in beliefs about the group-level inferiority of Blacks, is used less frequently. We investigate whether these attitudes predict anti-Black discrimination and evaluations of the fairness of intergroup inequality. Study 1 used the Ultimatum Game to obtain a behavioral measure of racial discrimination and found whites engaged in anti-Black discrimination. Explicit prejudice explained which whites discriminated, whereas resentment did not. In study 2, white third-party observers evaluated intergroup interactions in the Ultimatum Game, and explicit prejudice explained racially biased fairness evaluations, but resentment did not. This demonstrates that resentment and prejudice are distinct constructs and that explicit prejudice has clear behavioral implications. We also find that explicit prejudice is widespread among white Americans and significantly less partisan than resentment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Recent academic work on the coronavirus (COVID‐19) pandemic has established a persistent difference between Democrats and Republicans in social distancing behaviors. We uncover a potential explanation for this difference—social norms and beliefs. Methods: We use a series of ordinary least squares regression specifications on novel survey data collected in April through June of 2020. Results: We find that Democrats are more likely to report social distancing than are Republicans, even after controlling for a range of demographic variables that might otherwise account for differences in social distancing and that these differences are found in partisans' norms and beliefs around social distancing. Our main analysis shows that the partisan difference in social distancing disappears when we control for social norms and beliefs, suggesting their salience in changing social distancing behaviors. Conclusion: Our results contribute to current research focused on mitigating the spread of COVID‐19 by highlighting a mechanism, norms and beliefs, for interventions to target. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Widespread vaccination remains the best option for controlling the spread of COVID-19 and ending the pandemic. Despite the considerable disruption the virus has caused to people's lives, many people are still hesitant to receive a vaccine. Without high rates of uptake, however, the pandemic is likely to be prolonged. Here we use two survey experiments to study how persuasive messaging affects COVID-19 vaccine uptake intentions. In the first experiment, we test a large number of treatment messages. One subgroup of messages draws on the idea that mass vaccination is a collective action problem and highlighting the prosocial benefit of vaccination or the reputational costs that one might incur if one chooses not to vaccinate. Another subgroup of messages built on contemporary concerns about the pandemic, like issues of restricting personal freedom or economic security. We find that persuasive messaging that invokes prosocial vaccination and social image concerns is effective at increasing intended uptake and also the willingness to persuade others and judgments of non-vaccinators. We replicate this result on a nationally representative sample of Americans and observe that prosocial messaging is robust across subgroups, including those who are most hesitant about vaccines generally. The experiments demonstrate how persuasive messaging can induce individuals to be more likely to vaccinate and also create spillover effects to persuade others to do so as well. The first experiment in this study was registered at clinicaltrials.gov and can be found under the ID number NCT04460703. This study was registered at Open Science Framework (OSF) at: https://osf.io/qu8nb/?view_only=82f06ecad77f4e54b02e8581a65047d7. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent do individuals' perceptions of legitimacy affect their intrinsic motivations to comply with an authority? Answering this question has critical implications for law enforcement but is challenging because actions or institutions that affect intrinsic motivations typically also affect extrinsic, material ones. To disentangle these, we propose an experimental approach that separately identifies the effect of an authority's costly action to improve enforcement fairness on citizen behavior through both intrinsic and extrinsic channels. In experiment 1, the authority's simple attempt to institute fairer enforcement increases prosocial behavior by 10 to 12 percentage points via the intrinsic channel. A follow-up experiment demonstrates that this is not motivated by citizen attempts to "pay back" authorities. Our findings provide causally credible evidence that an authority's actions can directly shape citizens' behavior by enhancing her legitimacy and have important implications in policy domains where this conflicts with other incentives.