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The success rate of information systems development projects is very low. Agency theory explains the low level of project success, emphasizing that agency problems and the opportunistic behaviour of designers are the main causes of the low level of project success. The main factors of agency problems are conflict of interest between the owner and the designer, avoiding the execution of tasks, collection of private information and not using tools and techniques for project management. The research was conducted as a case study. The data was collected based on questionnaires filled out by the designers and interviews with the designers and the owner of the company. In the questionnaire, based on a five-point Likert scale, the views of the designers were expressed. Only the designers and the owner of the company took part in the examination of the views on the conflict of interest. The draft research linked the agency problems and the success of the project and the company in a systematic way. The paper claims that the opportunistic behaviour of designers can be solved with an adequate employment contract. The scientific contribution of the work refers to the rejection of new scientific facts, cognitions. In addition, a detailed questionnaire was created to collect the designer's views on agency problems and a model was created for solving agency problems and improving the success of projects and the company. Researchers, designers, and company owners will benefit from the mentioned research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure delivery has rekindled the public versus private cost-of-capital debate. Early debate concluded that the social cost of public-sector capital is below that of private capital because risk can be spread across numerous taxpayers. Intervening research focused on the agency costs that arise due to increased separation between equity holders and managers and the various mechanisms to control those agency costs. We analyze differences in public versus private residual claims and their associated agency costs. We conclude that earlier discussions that omitted agency-cost analysis should be revisited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]