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In this work, we propose a geometric algebra‐based variation of a well‐known threshold secret‐sharing scheme introduced by Adi Shamir in 1979. Secret sharing is a cryptographic primitive which allows a secret input to be divided into multiple shares which are then sent to a collection of parties. The shares are generated so that only "authorized" sets of shares can reconstruct the secret. In Shamir's scheme, any sufficiently large set of shares can reconstruct the secret. The minimum number of shares which can obtain the secret is called the threshold, and any number of shares smaller than the threshold reveals nothing about the secret. The shares are generated such that each party can perform computations, generating a new set of shares that, when reconstructed, are equivalent to performing those exact computations directly on the secret input data. Our variant changes the domain from which secrets are taken: A finite field with prime order is replaced by a geometric algebra over a finite field of prime order. This change preserves the important security properties of Shamir's scheme, namely, idealness (secrets and shares are chosen from the same space) and perfectness ("unauthorized" sets of shares learn nothing about the secret). Our scheme allows secret sharing to be seamlessly added to the arsenal of GA‐based applications. Our extension of Shamir's secret scheme was first worked out for geometric algebras. It appears, however, that in fact it works for other algebras, a situation worthy to be explored in future work. For definiteness, in this paper, we restrict the analysis to the case of geometric algebras. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]