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Phenomenology questions the centrality that Kant attributes to the “I think.” It claims that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless as unity is given. I call this the “unity argument.” The paper explores the significance of this claim by focusing on the work of Edmund Husserl. What interests me is that although the unity argument claims that we can account for the unity of experience without appealing to the an “I think,” Husserl agrees with Kant that experience must be owned. Moreover, he endorses Kant's dictum that ‘the “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my presentations’. The aim of the paper is to explore how Husserl can consistently appeal to Kant's account of the “I think” and at the same time contend that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless. The thesis I wish to advance is that although the unity argument acknowledges that experience is necessarily mine, it reveals that it is a necessary feature of self‐reference that I have never taken absolute ownership over my experience. This may explain why our sense of self can often be out of tune with the way we live our lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Universals in the Platonic tradition were intended to play both metaphysical and epistemological roles. The contemporary debate around universals has focused overwhelmingly on the former, with even ‘platonists’ typically holding that our knowledge of universals is derived from our knowledge of particulars. In contrast, I wish to argue for the epistemological primacy of the universal: specifically, I defend the thesis that we perceive particulars as a result of knowing universals, and not the other way around. My argument draws from the work of Malebranche, who notoriously contended that we see ordinary objects through the immutable ‘ideas’. I conclude with the suggestion that the resulting account of the relationship between our knowledge of universals and our perception of particulars may be thought of as a kind of Platonic indirect realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his remarkable new book, Emotion and Virtue, Sreenivasan defends the view that, in the case of many virtues, in order for an exemplar of each of these virtues to be a reliable judge of what that virtue requires in specific circumstances, she must possess a particular, morally rectified, emotional trait. In this article, I raise two challenges to “the argument from salience” that Sreenivasan offers in favor of this view. First, I argue that, although Sreenivasan wishes to remain neutral about different philosophical theories of emotions, the success of his argument depends, in fact, on the outcome of the debate about the nature of emotions. Second, I challenge the central claim of Sreenivasan's argument from salience, namely, that the possession of a morally rectified emotional trait, cleverness, and supplementary moral knowledge is sufficient to explain an agent's ability to reliably judge what a given virtue requires in specific circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In terminally ill individuals who would otherwise end their own lives, active voluntary euthanasia (AVE) can be seen as life-extending rather than life-shortening. Accordingly, AVE supports key pro-euthanasia arguments (appeals to autonomy and beneficence) and meets certain sanctity of life objections. This paper examines the extent to which a terminally ill individual's wish to donate organs after death contributes to those life-extension arguments. It finds that, in a terminally ill individual who wishes to avoid experiencing life he considers to be not worth living, and who also wishes to donate organs after death, AVE maximizes the likelihood that such donations will occur. The paper finds that the wish to donate organs strengthens the appeals to autonomy and beneficence, and fortifies the meeting of certain sanctity of life objections, achieved by life-extension arguments, and also generates appeals to justice that form novel life-extension arguments in favour of AVE in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author wishes to defend a naturalistic version of phenomenology rooted in and expropriated from William James's radical empiricism against Max Scheler's non-naturalistic phenomenology. By drawing from Jack Reynolds's arguments for a minimal phenomenology, the author posits that radical empiricism is a middle way between the misguided self-sufficiency of transcendental phenomenology and the misguided self-sufficiency of ontological naturalism. The orthodox reading of Scheler as a dualist is found problematic, and in outlining four propositions characteristic of Scheler's positions, the author motivates resources from Jamesian thought to argue for the superiority of a naturalistic phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'religion/secular' frame should be retired as a way of characterizing contemporary northern European cultures. The concepts of 'secularity' and 'religion' are both falsifying and question begging. They invisibly and unhelpfully predetermine the conversation about who and where we are now. Further, they are terms which increasingly lack salience in these cultures. If we seek to locate and articulate, in order to reflectively engage, the horizons within which contemporary northern Europeans generally live, the goods that orient people's lives, the ideas and values that move and motivate them, we need to talk not about 'religion' and the lack of it, but about the idea of the human. Within the concept of the human is nested today the sense of orientation, meaning, goodness and importance that notions of 'religion' used to express. This is the conceptual territory on which arguments about 'what really matters' are now conducted. If one wishes to have salience in contemporary culture, one needs to speak to this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article deals with Heidegger's research into boredom. The phenomenon cannot be simply described as an emotion but as a fundamental attunement, which represented a pathway to being qua being for Heidegger. Many scholars have argued that the philosopher's treatment of the phenomenon led to sublimation or transgression in describing it beyond its phenomenological limits. While I agree with the general assessment, I also believe that there is a need to expand the argument further. I will argue that the cause of such transgression lies mainly in Heidegger's inability to separate the truth from the notion of meaning or sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his direct comments on The Brothers Karamazov, Fyodor Dostoevsky only refers to Book V (“Pro and Contra”) and VI (“The Russian Monk”) as the novel’s culminating points. These two Books, notoriously polemical, constitute a debate provoked by the representative of Contra values, Ivan Karamazov, who seeks responses from the “Pros.” This paper comes to support a more sophisticated reading of the Pros’ arguments, and argues that they do win the debate, since Ivan never intends to convince his counterparts, but on the contrary, wishes to be convinced of Zosima’s doctrines as the solution to his personal existential crisis. In this respect, Ivan, or more precisely his upbringing and early experiences that have been relatively neglected in Dostoevsky scholarship, becomes the key to our understanding of the novel’s ideological core. Such a viewpoint, it will be argued, fits perfectly with the theme of The Brothers Karamazov, namely “the young generation” and “contemporary Russian families,” according to the writer’s own testimony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]