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Summary: False data injection attacks can disrupt the steering control actions and make a real threat to both the security and safety of autonomous vehicles. In this paper, a secure event‐triggered lateral control approach of autonomous vehicles subject to actuator attacks is investigated. Firstly, an arbitrary unknown actuator attacks is considered in the secure lateral steering control of autonomous vehicles. Thus, to save communication resources for the limited bandwidth CAN bus, the periodic event‐triggered transmission scheme is utilized, transforming the established lateral steering control into a time‐delay system through the consideration of periodic event‐triggered sampling. Then, an adaptive control compensation scheme is developed to mitigate the malicious effects caused by actuator attacks. The proposed secure control approach is skilled in compensating the unknown attacked steering control actions in an adaptive way. The stabilization criteria under the adaptive secure control law is well derived by Lyapunov–Krasovskii method and some linear inequality matrices operations. At last, the effectiveness of the proposed secure control scheme is verified by some numerical experiments borrowed from a practical vehicle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a novel detection and rerouting mechanism for distributed adaptive platoon control of non‐linear autonomous connected vehicles under denial of service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks can cause delays or losses of data packets due to blocked communication channels, leading to reducing platoon performance or even collisions among vehicles. To tackle this issue, the proposed mechanism detects and reroutes communication topology depending on the real‐time topology and the number of link failures. Real‐time detection divides the scenario of DoS attacks into three parts. According to the different scenarios, rerouting mechanisms will be utilized. A controller adapted to real‐time variable communication topology is also designed in this scheme. The adjacency matrix of the real‐time communication topology generated by the rerouting mechanism is used to update the controller so that the platoon can remain in a stable state without being affected by DoS attacks. In addition, the sliding mode controller and the observer are designed by solving linear matrix inequalities, and the platoon stability and internal stability are proven. Numerical simulation studies demonstrate that the proposed mechanism and control design can reduce the vehicle state estimate error and platoon‐tracking error to ideal states under DoS attacks. The proposed method solves the problem that the existing methods have not considered the number of link failures and the inability to restore communication when the communication topology is paralyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]