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Early work on China's Two-Child Policy identified cost as a major disincentive to having a second child, but financial constraints may work in tandem with cultural factors to shape childbearing desire. In addition, most research has excluded men from the sample. This paper develops Yan's (2003) concepts of 'new' and 'traditional' fertility cultures to childbearing desire, a key component of fertility decision-making that is poorly understood (Hayford & Agadjanian, 2017). In particular, we focus on how differing conceptions of children's needs relate to perceptions of cost. This paper reports on semi-structured interviews with 29 men and women in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province. We found that interviewees who espoused views consistent with a traditional fertility framework were more interested in having a second child, and were less concerned about cost. In addition, men were more likely to espouse views consistent with a traditional fertility cultural framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the population aging, on May 31, 2021, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) proposed the policy that a couple can have three children and rolled out more supportive measures to further optimize fertility policies, which is another major initiative following the universal two-child policy introduced in November 2015. Currently, a series of population policy innovations have aroused great attractions among the public and triggered a hot debating on the Internet. People’s fertility attitude tendency under different related policies can reflect their current fertility intentions. Based on the fact, this paper firstly classifies the sentiment of online comment data on the three-child policy and analyzes people’s sentiment tendency toward the three-child policy from the spatio-temporal perspectives. Secondly, people’s points of view on the three-child policy are summarized by using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) thematic clustering. The reasons for the change in people’s fertility attitude tendency under different fertility policies are analyzed by comparing the change in people’s fertility attitude tendency with the change in people’s attentions. Finally, a multiple regression equation is constructed to analyze the key factors influencing people’s intention to have three children by using public opinion data and its extension data. The findings demonstrate: (1) people’s fertility attitudes toward the three-child policy are negative and similar among different regions; (2) compared to the two-child policy, the percentage of negative and neutral attitudes toward the three-child policy increases, while the percentage of positive attitudes decreases; (3) the increase in fertility costs, the deterioration of women’s employment environment, and the change in the concept of marriage and childbirth become important reasons for the negative change in people’s fertility attitudes toward different policies. Therefore, the government should take measures to reduce the burden of childbirth and guide the correct concept of marriage and childbirth to improve people’s fertility intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Postponement of first birth has implications for the health and well-being of women and is often associated with lower fertility levels, a demographic reality affecting most high-income countries. Country-level institutional differences are one factor behind the variation in fertility in these countries. This paper examines the relationship between housing and mean age at first birth across 39 low-fertility countries. Using newly compiled indicators of multiple dimensions of the housing context we explore housing from the perspective of renters and homebuyers and examine differences for former-communist and non-former-communist countries. We use six indicators of the housing context and combine them into three different indexes: renter support index, homebuyer support index, and a combined index of both dimensions. Analyses show that access to housing is associated with age at first birth, but that this relationship has changed over time and is different for former-communist and non-former-communist countries. Findings support theories that expectations regarding the importance of homeownership for family formation are changing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines social class differences in fertility, using longitudinal micro-level data for a regional sample in Sweden, 1922–2015. Using discrete-time event history models, we estimated the association between social class and parity-specific duration to next birth, adjusting for household income in separate models. Social class was associated with fertility quite independently from income and the association was both parity-dependent and sex-specific. For transitions to parenthood, higher class position was associated with higher fertility for men and lower fertility for women before 1970, but then converged into a positive association for both sexes after 1990. For continued childbearing, a weak U-shaped relationship before 1947 turned into a positive relationship for second births and a negative relationship for higher-order births in the period after 1990. These patterns likely reflect broader changes in work–family compatibility and are connected to profound shifts in labour markets and institutional arrangements in twentieth-century Sweden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]