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Objectives: The paper offers an expanded framework for conducting empirical research on resilient aging. Methods: We review the conceptual frameworks for resilient aging and incorporate the role of economic factors as resources that contribute to resilience, in addition to social and psychological factors emphasized in the existing literature. Moreover, the idea of reinforcing cycles of resilience is incorporated in the framework. Existing empirical evidence that supports the conceptual arguments is presented. Results: Examples from Mexico and other low-middle-income countries are included, as well as from high-income countries. Data requirements for applying the conceptual framework in empirical analysis and the state of data availability are examined. We illustrate the measures that are available for this purpose using the Mexican Health and Aging Study. Discussion: We discuss and conclude that the state of the field is rich in data to conduct empirical work on resilience in old age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does organized crime affect foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries? Some research examines the effects of crime, such as homicide rates, on FDI. However, we know little about how organized crime in particular might affect such investment. This paper examines organized crime and FDI in Mexican states between 2000 and 2018. This case is important because Mexico is one of the top global recipients of FDI. At the same time, criminal violence has killed hundreds of thousands of people in Mexico in recent years, and scholars seek to understand the violence's wider effects. We explain how organized crime competition, as opposed to crime generally, should shape investors' decisions. Analyses using original data on criminal organization territory find that higher numbers of criminal groups are associated with lower levels of new FDI. Other measures of crime, such as homicide rates or crime rates, are not associated with foreign investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do foreign investors have subnational political preferences? The political economy of foreign direct investment (FDI) involves not only choosing among host countries, but also the subnational location of the assets. However, factors affecting investors' decisions about subnational location likely differ from the ones affecting international investment. This paper studies the effect of state-level partisanship on new FDI inflows to Mexican states. I argue that investors prefer states ruled by left-wing governors because they are more likely to invest in human capital. Statistical analyses using new data on subnational allocation of FDI in Mexican states between 1999 and 2017 support the main hypothesis. Given the persistence of authoritarian enclaves in Mexico, I also disentangle the effects of partisanship from subnational democratization. The partisan effect is independent from party turnover and political competition at the subnational level, and it is robust to different model specifications and estimation strategies. Additional evidence supports the plausibility of the argued mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While protests occurring in nationally democratic contexts rarely represent fundamental threats to the central state, they still need management when and where they occur. Thus, this paper suggests that, especially in federal countries, to explain the repression of protest, we must examine subnational politics. Subnational political elites, often tasked with protest management, can engage protesters and call for police restraint, but their capacity and authority affect their ability to carry out these tasks. The paper tests the theory using original event-level data on Mexican protests and responses and leverages within-country variations in democracy and state capacity. The paper shows that where subnational governments have bureaucratic capacity and where citizen linkages to the state cause them to see state agents as relevant, problem-solving authorities, protest events are less likely to be managed using a repressive response. In addition, the paper highlights a key difference between explanations of overall human rights violations and repressive responses to protest, namely, that electoral competition is not a significant factor reducing the likelihood of repressive responses to protest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countries in the Global South are particularly vulnerable to social and political violence. This paper suggests that such violence makes certain recalcitrant economic interests more open to taxes and spending on social welfare. Using results from a survey experiment of business owners and operators in Mexico, we show that relative to more innocuous institutional weaknesses, concerns over violence generally increase support for anti-poverty spending and decrease support for tax cuts. To build a theory, we explore heterogeneous effects and textual data. The findings suggest that business interests see anti-poverty spending as a tool for shoring up costs of violence in consumer markets, with some leaders even extending support to welfare-enhancing taxes. However, violence can create challenges in labor markets that increase operational costs, leading some business interests to resist tax policies that ask them to help fund social programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]