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The inefficiency observed in investment within state-owned enterprises presents a significant practical challenge that can affect the sustainable development of China's economy. To address this issue, this study comprehensively explores the intricate mechanisms underlying the governance implications of mixed ownership on the investment efficiency of listed companies. Drawing on unbalanced panel data encompassing Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-share listed companies in China spanning the period from 2008 to 2022, this study employs a fixed-effects model to unveil the nuanced ways in which mixed ownership influences investment efficiency through the lens of agency costs. This study transcends the boundaries of traditional agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. It delves deeper, illuminating the diverse effects of agency conflicts between significant controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The results revealed a noteworthy positive correlation between mixed ownership and investment efficiency, and verified the intermediary role of agency costs between mixed ownership and investment efficiency, which is an important result of our research. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the relationship between the two can be affected by external events, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic, investment efficiency is not the most concerned issue for enterprises. The findings have practical implications for practitioners and policymakers, as they offer avenues for optimizing investment strategies and fostering efficient and effective corporate governance practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the analysis of data from listed enterprises in China between 2011 and 2022, we investigate the influence of digital transformation on the governance efficiency for minority shareholders. The results show that the extent of digital transformation exert a negative effect on the agency costs incurred from related-party transactions. The mechanism examination elucidates that digital transformation augments the governance efficiency for minority shareholders by boosting attendance at shareholders' meetings and enhancing the exit threat for minority shareholders. Subsequent analysis reveals that non-state-owned enterprises, compared to state-owned enterprises, exhibit a more pronounced effect in diminishing the second type of agency costs through digital transformation. Furthermore, the impact of digital transformation in curtailing agency costs is more significant in the eastern regions than central and western regions. The better the equity checks and balances in listed enterprises, the more effective digital transformation is in reducing agency costs. This study offers valuable insights for bolstering the governance capacity of minority shareholders in the context of digital transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a crucial component of internal corporate governance, remuneration controls possess the potential to influence the cash holdings of firms. However, identifying the causal relationship between these controls and such holdings presents a considerable challenge. To address this research gap, this paper leverages the implementation of China's Guidance on Further Regulating the Remuneration Management of Heads of Central Enterprises as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the relationship between executive remuneration controls and firms' cash holdings, utilizing a double-difference approach. Based on an analysis of a sample of listed companies from 2007–2012, the results indicate that firms subject to regulated executive compensation exhibit lower cash holdings. To ensure the robustness of these findings, various statistical techniques such as parallel trend tests, variable replacement, propensity score matching, and placebo tests were employed. Additionally, a mechanism test was conducted, whereby the mediating effect of executive compensation controls on firms' cash holdings was examined, revealing a reduction in internal agency costs. Finally, the analysis of heterogeneity demonstrated that the impact of executive compensation controls on firms' cash holdings was more pronounced in companies with high-quality internal controls, stronger management oversight, and lower information asymmetry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]