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In this study, we investigate the link between product market competition and the extent of a firm's analyst following. Our research is motivated by prior studies on analyst coverage, as well as the literature pertaining to the informational and monitoring role of product market competition. Using a sample of 520 French listed firms over 2000-2013, we find support to the hypothesis that the number of analysts following a firm decreases with the intensification of competition. This result suggests that the disciplinary power of product market competition makes investors more confident that firms are well monitored, which reduces their incentives to seek additional private information produced by financial analysts. In short, our findings corroborate previous evidence that there is a substitution effect between competition and other external corporate governance mechanisms, especially analyst following. Our results also shed more light on how the quality of firms' monitoring mechanisms and information environment is affected by the intensity of product market competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We extend research on the consequentiality of stated preference choices to a threshold provision mechanism for public goods. We develop a simple theoretical model of option price to analyze how option price varies with payment and provision uncertainty. We explore whether threshold provision contributions are similarly influenced by payment and provision uncertainty using an induced value contribution experiment. Results suggest that: (1) the probability of payment has a negative effect on contributions; (2) the probability of provision has a positive effect on contributions. We offer subjective beliefs regarding payment and provision as a plausible systematic explanation for hypothetical bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]