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This paper focuses on the recent political spars between Canada and Saudi Arabia as well as China and their impact on Canadian universities. It asks three questions: (1) What key issues did Canada's political strains with Saudi Arabia and China raise for Canadian universities' international education (IE) initiatives and what issues were absent? (2) What do these key issues suggest about Canada's approaches to IE in an era of new geopolitics? and (3) What implications can be drawn from these cases about Canadian university-government relations in the context of new geopolitics? Given the powerful role media plays in education policy, a systematic study was conducted across three main media sources to identify 74 articles and news releases between August 2018 and November 2019. Three dominant themes are identified and analyzed, each vividly illustrating the close ties between global politics, government foreign policy and IE within Canadian Universities. On the one hand, the narratives speak to concerns about IE as a risk to national security and, on the other, as a vehicle for Canada's economic prosperity. However, what the media has not achieved is a broader discussion on how Canada needs to revisit its IE objectives and approaches in light of broader geopolitical shifts. Using the theoretical framework of soft power, the paper speaks to the limitations and short-sightedness of Canada's approach to IE as soft power in this era of new geopolitics and concludes with three recommendations for Canada.

In this article, Richard Hill addresses the topic of China supposedly undermining Australia's national security and way of life, and causing ructions on university campuses. He writes that Chinese infiltration, or so it seems, is everywhere, from excessive housing investments and land buy-ups to dodgy dinner dates with ALP officials; and from Confucian Institutes (as fronts for espionage activities) to the take-over of student unions by Chinese students. Concern has even arisen over the spread of Chinese takeaways and the growing demand for Mandarin courses, both clearly promoting Chinese influence across the nation. Hill goes on to say that three journalists from the "Sydney Morning Herald/The Age" (Baker, Hunter & Bonyhady, 2019) took the brave step of striding into the murky world of Chinese students to expose the shadowy goings on. Hill opines that following some general observations on 'the Chinese issue', their report morphs into a more general discussion of how Australian universities deal with international students -- no trivial matter, given their contribution to university coffers. Apparently, to no surprise, not all of these student visitors are happy campers. Hill asserts that after all, Australian journalists inform the public, that these students have to fork out up to three times more for their education than domestic students, often live in dilapidated and over-crowded accommodation, and feel estranged, lonely and depressed. Many of them struggle with the most basic English, which makes reading turgid academic texts and assignment completion tough going. Worried by such questionable investigative reportage, Hill shares a slightly amended version of a letter he wrote directly to the journalists. He concludes that 'corruption risks' notwithstanding, it has become glaringly obvious that Australian universities are massively over-reliant on overseas students for their income and face an epic implosion when this revenue stream dries up, which it will once China and India build up their own sectors.

There are around 400,000 international students studying on Australian campuses in 2018, and the education of international students is Australia's third largest export, behind that of iron ore and coal, thereby playing a significant role in the country's economy and particularly the financial sustainability of Australian universities. Chinese international students, account for one-third in this cohort, are paradoxically both coveted as 'cash cows' and labelled as a 'security threat' to Australian society. The paper examines this particular 'Chinese Student Syndrome' through the lens of 'colonial modernity' and argues that along with the problems of Chinese firms in Australia, Chinese international students on Australian campuses, in many ways, take on the persona of China itself in Australia, and the implications associated with its global rise. At the core of this syndrome lies a deep-seated ontological framing of a historical teleology that centres the Anglo-European pathway to modernity as universal that grounds the epistemic certainty of higher education institutions in Australia and regards Chinese students as the outsider to this teleology.

The rate of unemployment in Nigeria is alarming and could promote social vices some of which are kidnapping, armed robbery, child trafficking, Cultism, Drug peddling and ritual killing. These social vices could in no small measure constitute a threat to national security as a matter of fact. Therefore, the development of a workable Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programme in the country is the needed panacea to creating Job opportunities for the teaming youths. This will definitely reduce to its barest minimum threat to national security. This paper gives insight into: Youth employment as a vehicle for enhancing national security, ways adopted by other countries in promoting the poor perception of TVET, lessons to be learnt from other countries as regards enhancing the perception of the TVET, existing youth employment programmes in Nigeria and the way forward to boosting employment creation in Nigeria.

This paper describes how Senator Molan sees Australia's future unfolding over the next century, including likely opportunities and challenges ahead. While Australia is now the world's 14th most economically powerful nation, it has only been able to focus on its economic development because, heretofore, it has not had to provide for its own defence. With United States' power diminishing and China's power increasing, Australia's historic grand strategy is becoming unsustainable both militarily and economically. To craft a way forward for the next century, Australia needs develop a national security strategy and should do so urgently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines ideologies of American study abroad in politically and culturally "non-Western" countries. Drawing from the theory of orientalism (Said, 1978), we analyze how American public discourse on study abroad for learners of Mandarin and Arabic manifests an orientalist thinking, and how such macro discourse both produces multilingual subjects (Kramsch, 2010) and considerable tensions with the micro discourses of these subjects. Our findings show that despite linguistic and cultural differences between China and the Arab world, the two contexts are imagined together as the political "East" in American public rhetoric. The two languages are also assumed to be crucial to the somewhat contradictory goals of "bridge-building" and "national defense." These imaginings provide students a mode of identity construction, but they are also contested in students' everyday experience. Using these findings, we argue that the discursive links between the two study abroad destinations result from a geopolitically situated American gaze, a view that obscures differences between the two destinations, the goals of individual language learners, and the locals they interact with when abroad.

The Asia-Pacific region has emerged as the central playing field of the US and China strategic competition. The US views China as the competitor undermining the US regional influence in the Asia-Pacific region. This paper explores the US-China strategic competition, layers of instability in the Asia-Pacific, and specifically the constraints for the US in its Indo-Pacific Strategy and security implications for the region. The US National Security Strategy - 2022 strategises to counterbalance China by constructing regional deterrence infrastructure by strengthening its long-standing alliances and building new partnerships such as the QUAD and AUKUS, and is also cementing ties with the ASEAN. In order to avert crisis escalation in the Asia-Pacific region, the US and China bilaterally and the regional states, as crucial stakeholders, would require to carefully manage their roles and strategies in the ongoing competition for world order determination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how China's presence in the East African seaports has created a threat to the Indian Ocean's security. In particular, the research empirically analyses whether China's growing activities in the Western Indian Ocean along the East African coast have dismantled the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. This paper aims to understand the responses of India and her allies in containing China's rise in the region. The paper has taken three East African ports, Dar es Salaam, Lamu, and Doraleh port of Djibouti, as a case study to examine how Chinese presence in these three ports could dismantle the security architecture of Indo-Pacific in the Western Indian Ocean region. The paper demonstrates that the present competition of power projection in the Indian Ocean is a power maximization strategy for the national security of each state. Using primary and secondary data available on China, India, and other states' policies and activities, the study finds that it is a policy failure of the Indo-Pacific, accelerating China's rise in the region. However, the Indo-Pacific partners are revamping their policies to check China's rise in the Indian Ocean region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the UK's future Indo-Pacific policy by looking into the newly published Integrated Review (IR) and comparing it with the French and German policy papers. The "Indo-Pacific tilt" is one of the most highlighted themes in the IR, but a reading of the review suggests that the UK remains Euro-Atlantic centered when it comes to defense and security policy. It is only after the internal and external security issues are addressed that the UK pursues its "global interest" through diplomacy and trade. Hence, while the geopolitical and economic importance of the Indo-Pacific is acknowledged, and the stance of the UK towards the region appears more ambitious and confident than that of France and Germany, it remains a question as to the degree to which the UK may commit to the Indo-Pacific. The UK defines China as a "systemic competitor" rather than a "threat," suggesting that while the challenges China poses may be comprehensive and profound, they are not taken as immediate and urgent. This designation is peculiar. On the one hand, it differs from the US policy, which sees China (and Russia) as threats to its national security. On the other hand, compared with the European counterparts, the UK is the only one that calls out China, expressing a stronger will to counter China when necessary. Therefore, it is suggested that the post-Brexit UK is likely to side with the US in the US-China-EU triangular relations. Being very much a middle power, however, the UK's space for maneuver is limited. It pledges to compete against China and seek the latter's cooperation simultaneously, but such a stance requires power and will that the country may be lacking. The deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacific, for instance, has been described as an expression of the UK's commitment to the rules-based international order. Yet Prime Minister Johnson's emphasis on not antagonizing anyone and the decision that the Carrier Strike Group will not sail through the Taiwan Strait indicates a concern about China and consequently difficulty implementing the "co-opetition" strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Athenaeum: Polskie Studia Politologiczne is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Security Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Political economy impacts and influences a state's military strategy. This article focuses on how the integration of the US political economy in the Indo-Pacific drives US Navy officers and the broader national security state to establish the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Investigating the strategic thought of senior Naval officers shows that they think far beyond military threats and engage with the United States and the Indo-Pacific political economy. Even as the US Navy competes with China's military, its FOIP strategy benefits corporate elites in both China and the US, whose cooperation creates a mutually supportive economic relationship. This argument leads to the finding that the US hegemony in the region is a strategy that avoids a bipolar 'New Cold War' of an entirely de-coupled US and China. The FOIP supported by the US Navy continues to integrate China into regional and global economies, even as it attempts to push back against China by gathering allies and partners. The emphasis on international political economy highlights how the region is a network of 'patchwork' relations, where states rely on one another for economic prosperity. Through investigating speeches and strategic papers from US Naval officials, this paper demonstrates how the US competes and cooperates with China in the context of relations in the region that are in constant flux. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper aims to review the latest management developments across the globe and pinpoint practical implications from cutting-edge research and case studies. Design/methodology/approach: This briefing is prepared by an independent writer who adds their own impartial comments and places the articles in context. Findings: The USA and its European partners face a potential problem in accessing critical minerals. Given its implications for national security, it is important to increase supply chain resilience through diversification of sources while also establishing a basis for closer cooperation with China. Originality/value: The briefing saves busy executives and researchers hours of reading time by selecting only the very best, most pertinent information and presenting it in a condensed and easy-to-digest format. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper approaches the "Security Dilemma" as the cornerstone of Realist school of thought strategic Theory. According to that, states are regularly trapped into competition escalations, due to the lack of a clear “opponent” strategy and operational decisions’ understanding. This situation, leads to political distrust, occurring economical rivalries and military conflicts. Subsequently, 21st century China’s commercial and military power rising, creates fear for the states in the East Asia region and the global naval powers, a situation that promotes a new world competition between USA and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020 and China has since been under public scrutiny for neglecting the first signs of this global health challenge and for its lockdown strategy. Although lockdowns have not lasted for long, China needs to confront the political, social, and economic implications for its national security. The paper aims to fill a gap in the knowledge and investigate aspects of China’s national security in light of the pandemic. The study is based on desk research using secondary data and statistical and comparative analysis. It also employs an inductive method to build general theorems. The Chinese government can be seen as successful in dealing with the pandemic because of a low death toll and minimal economic losses. By early February 2022, only 106,863 Chinese had been diagnosed, and 4,636 had died from the virus. China also achieved enviable economic success and, its output grew by 18.3% year on year in the first quarter of 2021, the fastest rate since the 1990s, and it was the first major economy to withdraw its pandemic stimulus. China consolidated its position in low-income countries and improved its image as a global leader in trade by supplying vaccines, masks and ventilators, and strengthened its geopolitical standing. It will face threats from other countries working on a joint approach to the challenges posed by Beijing and while the aftereffects of the crisis can be seen, it also fears that they might further affect China’s national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the ongoing global power riualry between states like the USA, China and Russia, lawfare' has become an important tactic to further national security objectives and influence the international order. Lawfare entails the manipulation of legal norms to achieve strategic objectiues without resorting to military means. This study analyses the emergence of lawfare and its various domains, with an emphasis on how utilization of lawfare is playing a role in global narratiues and diplomatic engagements. For Pakistan, a country with significant geopolitical and geo-economic importance, the use of lawfare by major powers has resulted in legal and diplomatic challenges. Historically, Pakistan's responses to these challenges have been reactiue and limited due to lack of understanding in policy circles. Thus, this paper offers an in - depth analysis of lawfare 's impacts on middle powers such as Pakistan and evaluates its responses to these evolving challenges. By exploring these dynamics, the study aims to highlight the critical role of lawfare in contemporary international relations and its implications for Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pakistan occupies an elevated role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and hosts its so-called flagship project, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Existing literature has often interpreted this project from a geopolitical perspective, as a vehicle through which a rising China projects influence on a peripheral country and advances its own centrality in international affairs. While such motivations certainly played a major role in getting the project off the ground, they are not the sole determinant of its design, or the heated controversies it triggered within Pakistan. This paper seeks to capture both dimensions by analysing the development of CPEC, and the handling of the conflicts it sparked, through a lens of overlapping centre–periphery relations: one between China and Pakistan at the international level, and one between Islamabad and peripheral regions and groups within the country. I argue that this model best captures the pivotal position and resulting agency of national governments in shaping local BRI implementations. It also shows how the BRI is not a straight case of Chinese influence radiating outwards; rather, contestation by local actors in turn forces adaptations in Chinese foreign and security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to provide an answer to the question which has hitherto not been significantly explored in the relevant academic scholarship: Why did China block India's (and other countries) attempts to designate Masood Azhar – head of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM/Jaish) as terrorist under UN Security Council 1267 committee rules? According to the extant literature, China's actions are explained broadly by India-China rivalry and India-Pakistan rivalry resulting in a strategic and 'all weather partnership between China and Pakistan against their common enemy India. This study argues that China's actions are also explained by its New (Asian) Security Concept and the ensuing China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), domestic (in)stability in Pakistan and China's geo-strategic interests. China is deeply perturbed by the socio-economic-political instability in Pakistan. China was concerned that if Masood Azhar was designated as a terrorist under UNSC 1267 Committee rules, Jaish and other terrorist organizations would take up arms against the Pakistani state (as in the past) which will create further instability in Pakistan and undermine CPEC and China's geo-strategic interests. Thus, the paper provides a more comprehensive and nuanced grasp of China's reluctance to designate Masood Azhar as a terrorist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the four main military strategies of the People's Republic of China towards the security architecture of East and South China Sea under President Xi Jinping. These strategies cover a region that has been under the US alliance system's security umbrella since the Cold War. This paper demonstrates that the People's Republic of China, under the current leadership, seeks to reorder the regional security architecture to its favour by leveraging military modernisation, influence operations and diplomatic-economic power to remove the influence of the US and its allies over the East and South China Sea. The present study argues that the successful conclusion of the rising power's strategies over the East and South China Sea will translate the current geopolitical rivalry into a power transition to the detriment of the established power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Online Journal Mundo Asia Pacífico is the property of Universidad EAFIT and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

After being a neutral actor for decades in the complex South China Sea (SCS) territorial disputes, Indonesia has seen itself compelled by China's assertiveness to become firmer about protecting its territorial sovereignty around the Natuna Islands (NI). Jakarta is alarmed by China's claims that it has undeniable historical fishing rights in the NI territorial waters because they undermine Indonesia's territorial sovereignty. Our analysis loosely adopts the securitization conceptual framework proposed by the Copenhagen School to reveal that Jakarta swiftly securitized the NI issue between 2014 and 2016. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, this paper unpacks how the Indonesian printed mainstream media discussed the NI in recent years. By the end of 2016, the Indonesian media portrayed China's claims that it has historical fishing rights in the NI territorial waters as the most urgent national security threat to Indonesia, i.e. the NI issue was securitized. This analysis shows that the Indonesian people accepted Jakarta's security discourse, i.e. Jakarta had successfully securitized China's claims over the NI territorial waters. This paper makes a new contribution to the securitization literature by simultaneously analysing the Indonesian news and social media outlets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to find the dynamism in Afghanistan's relations with Central Asian states. It is explained that prosperity without security is not possible and ongoing imbroglio in Afghanistan is directly affecting Central Asian states. The Central Asian states are surrounded by China, Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. These states (with significant influence of India and Turkey) are the key regional players and their socioeconomic and political interests are converged on various issues. The political conditions in Afghanistan would directly impact the interests of Central Asian states. Drug trafficking, illegal migration, religious extremism, a ramified corrupt network, porous border and terrorism are subverting peace in Afghanistan and its spillover effects are dangerous for Central Asian states. The military and security situation in Afghanistan has a direct impact on the production and transport of energy from Central Asia to the rest of the world. The response of the regional organizations, particularly the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), with certain commonalities, towards these issues often contrasts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This paper focuses on the efforts of major powers (Russia, China, and the US) along with neighbouring countries in the peacebuilding in Afghanistan to avoid its spillover effects over Central Asian states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rising convergence between India and the United States, as well as their strategic interests, have been evident since the end of the Cold War. Over the last decade, the Indo-US strategic partnership has strengthened not only in the areas of defence, arms cooperation, counter-terrorism collaboration, ballistic missile defence, drones, nuclear technologies, space, and cyber technology, but India has also emerged as a prominent strategic partner of the United States in the areas of cyber and homeland security. India is becoming a pompous regional player who wants to be the regional hegemon as the Indo-US Strategic Partnership grows. As a result of the Indo-US strategic cooperation, the discrepancy in conventional and nuclear weapons between India and Pakistan could exacerbate the South Asian arms race and destabilise Pakistan's security environment. Pakistan must implement a proactive foreign policy in order to gain from the changing global and strategic environment. For Pakistan's economic and security, an alliance policy with regional and extra regional nations would be more prudent. Under the shadow of the US-India cooperation, this paper briefly emphasises the potential security threats to Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Singapore's rude awakening to independence has led to the creation of one of the most important and strategic entrepôts in the Asia-Pacific. The country's limited territorial lands and natural resources, combined with huge per capita income, high population density and sensitive racial mix, make Singapore the quintessential pragmatic trading state of the twenty-first century. This paper examines how Singapore has embedded itself at the centre of regional and global trade systems by exploiting various forms of free trade activities including multilateral, regional and bilateral FTAs that underpin its security and survival. It argues that in order to maintain the city-state's geo-economic and geo-political viability, the Singaporean government has progressively linked its security interests with its multilevel free trade activities. Given the ‘vulnerability fetish’ and siege mentality that confront Singaporean leaders and policymakers, the pursuit of economic development via free trade has become the heart of its national security policy and strategy. The paper concludes by arguing that the enhancement and preservation of Singapore's survival as a sovereign nation-state demands a strategic utilization of FTAs with different trade partners, especially with regional and trans-regional powers such as the United States and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the application of the non-interference principle in the context of China’s security policy in Africa, to determine the extent to which we are witnessing an evolution in the application of this principle. Indeed, as seen with the recent opening of the military base in Djibouti or with China’s contribution to peace talks in South Sudan, it would appear that the non-intervention principle is undergoing a course reversal. This paper will argue that, in spite of these apparent shifts, there has been no fundamental change to the application of this principle. To make this point, this article applies Ren’s typology, which characterises three levels of nuance in the forms that the application of non-interference has taken in practice. This typology is then applied in a comparative manner across the four following components of China’s security policy in Africa: peacekeeping operations; military cooperation; naval power projection; and crisis management mediation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is abandoning its once unidirectional foreign security policy towards the USA, two notable examples of which are its increasingly comprehensive and substantial security relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. Putting these burgeoning Japanese security partnerships front and center, this paper asks the following questions: What are the characteristics of Japan's maturing security partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam? What factors have driven and enabled their recent emergence? What promotes and constrains their future development? What do these maturing Japanese non-US security partnerships reveal about Japan's direction as a security actor in and beyond East Asia? The paper finds that these two Japanese security bilaterals, which have six basic characteristics in common, are fundamentally driven by the contemporary shift in the balance of power and the strategic challenge that China's emerging maritime power and ambitions present Japan. It moreover argues that the substantiation of these security partnerships have been pursued under American auspices and further invited by Japanese nationalism and security legislative reforms. Notwithstanding these encouraging factors, however, domestic and geo-strategic constraints and counter incentives lead this paper to expect further substantiation, but limited military significance in the future of these security partnerships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper begins with the simple questions of why and how South-North Korean rivalry or inter-Korean rivalry has persisted for decades. To answer these questions, I develop a theory of multilevel veto players and test the hypotheses drawn from the theory for the case of the hostile relations between South and North Korea from 1954 to 2007. Central to the theory is that maintenance of the rivalry is the result of rival leaders' efforts to maximize either the national interests of their country or their own personal interest—staying in power—subject both to the external constraint of great power intervention and to the internal constraint of challenges by hardline veto groups. By applying this theory to the case of the inter-Korean rivalry from 1954-2007, the paper finds that the leaders of South and North Korea have maintained their hostile relations over the past five decades because they believe that maintaining the relations will help them either maximize their nation's security interest or increase their chances of remaining in power, subject to the constraints. Specifically, the constraints have prevented the rival leaders from resolving the issues in dispute on the battlefield or at a negotiation table, making the inter-Korean rivalry persist across time. The findings offer a contribution to an enhanced understanding of the maintenance process in international rivalries, most notably the inter-Korean rivalry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following a changeover in the US corridors of power after the election of Donald Trump as President of the US, America's allies and partners are concerned about the US's willingness to sustain its leadership role and security commitments in the Asia Pacific region. China's rising military power and the Trump administration's decision to withdraw from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP); considering the economic leg of the 'rebalancing strategy.' This development has further contributed in increasing regional anxieties. Viewed through the lens of Neoclassical realism, the paper argues that the US emphasis on India's role within Asia Pacific is a consequence of consistencies in the US strategic priorities that value India as a regional counterweight to China's growing influence while also preserving the US dominance within the region. The paper analyses how the Indo-US relations have progressed from President Obama to President Trump despite the vastly different styles of leadership and asserts that the overarching pattern of the Indo-US strategic relations has not changed in any significant way. India will continue to play a central role in the US security strategy for Asia Pacific and the benefits accrued will in turn contribute towards the expansion of its own geo-political influence within the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the world is drawn increasingly into a web of shifting geopolitics, battle lines are being drawn and alliances are re-orienting themselves. Working from the premise that the competition between the United States (U.S.) and the People's Republic of China will define the dynamics of the international system for the foreseeable future, this paper takes a look at the U.S.'s evolving posture of Integrated Deterrence and the likely Chinese response, which would have implications for Asian security. It reviews the contours of 'Integrated Deterrence' as it is laid out in the U.S. National Security Strategy 2022 and how this may shape the policy decisions of the U.S. and its partners, especially Taiwan, as well as how major U.S. regional allies, including India are likely to play their role in support of the U.S. interests. The paper also analyses China's strategic thinking, national defence policy and national security objectives that are likely to influence its choices in the evolving great power competition. Taking Taiwan as the case study, the paper finds that in addition to pursuing more traditional approaches, both the U.S. and China will consider influencing domestic public opinion in China and Taiwan as a key focus of their respective policy considerations; it also finds convergences in the related responses of South Asia's two major players, India and Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent military standoff between India and China in Ladakh had received tremendous public attention, both domestic and international. Mounting uncertainty, chaos, and looming instability marked the crisis for the fact that it shattered the prolonged stability along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Particularly for India, it marked the heightening national security challenges from China. While the discussions that followed the crisis explored at length how the clash and the ensued crisis generated security threats, it seems to have inadequately captured the nuances of the insecurity generated. The article argues that the security concerns generated were not just physical but also 'ontological'. The paper seeks to demonstrate how the Ladakh crisis engendered a sense of ontological insecurity for India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the unceasing efforts of the international community to halt North Korea's nuclear ambitions, North Korea's nuclear development and missile technology have aggressively progressed over time. Why did the efforts fail and what would be the new direction to fix the problem, if necessary? To answer these central questions, this paper attempts to analyze the problems of sanctions on North Korea and assess North Korea's nuclear development and capability. This paper suggests that a recalibration of policy measures, including a dual-track strategy that, on the one hand leads to internal change in the North, while on the other, results in strong external pressure, continues to be significant for the ultimate resolution of North Korea's nuclear quandaries. If left alone, the nuclear situation in North Korea may likely shift from the previously limited problem of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula to the broader global concern of nonproliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terrorism being the primary threat to China's national security therefore counter terrorism has turned out to be the main point of China's domestic and foreign policy. The major terrorist threat that China faces is posed by Uyghur separatist fighters of Xinjiang. They claim and fight for a separate independent state called "East Turkistan". The Xinjiang issue is the major anxiety and the focal point of China's war on terror. To stop extremism and terrorism in Xinjiang China has adopted a multi-dimensional approach i.e. Strike Hard Campaign, diplomatic actions to isolate terrorists and get the help of other countries, religious, economic and social antiterrorist policies to eradicate the roots of terrorism from society. China is also cooperating with the countries including US, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asian Republics, and many others in fighting against terrorism. From the platform of Shanghai Cooperation Organization China is also playing important role in counterterrorism. China major interest in war on terror is to stop the spread of extremism and terrorism within her borders particularly in Xinjiang province, as well as to make sure that neighbouring countries not become safe haven and base camp for the Uyghur militants. The main objective of this paper is to analyses the phenomena of terrorism in Xinjiang and China's role in war on terror. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China in recent decades has forged closer naval bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific region. Amongst these the Indo-Australian maritime ties have been a noteworthy development. Beijing's expanding maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region and growing influence in the South China Sea have become a core convergence in Indo-Australian cooperation. China's approach of asserting its rise as friendly while simultaneously becoming more aggressive in boundary claims has increased security concerns for Australia and India, thereby prompting maritime security convergences through the AUSINDEX exercises, increased trilateral engagements and establishing a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD). However, the maritime convergence is not only based on hedging, as there are common views of maintaining an inclusive security framework with China to address non-traditional maritime security threats affecting the region. In examining the China factor, this article also draws in other players such as USA, Japan and the ASEAN states with stakes involved in the region as also influencing Indo-Australian relations in their considerations of China. This article will explore China as a strong point of interest in India-Australia maritime cooperation; the roots of which can be traced from 1991 and have culminated into synergies of collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's growing focus on African peace and security has generated discussions on its longstanding foreign policy principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries and most of that growing body of research have argued that China is doing away with its foreign policy principle. Drawing its conclusions from a careful analysis of China's security engagement with African countries, this paper argues that, forced to deal with various African crises, China has been pragmatically adaptive. This adaptive pragmatism has allowed Beijing to get involved in Africa's peace and security landscape without overtly compromising its traditional posture on non-interference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses Japan's role in Korean security using the quasi-alliance model. Developed by Professor Victor Cha, the quasi-alliance model to analyze the security relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, two states that remain unallied despite sharing a common ally. Cha defined the quasi-alliance model as the triangular relationship between two states that are not allied, but share a third party as a common ally. A key assumption is that the third state serves as the great-power protector of the two states, and therefore exit opportunities for the two are limited. While historical issues affected relations between Tokyo and Seoul, American security policies were the primary determinant of cooperation between Japan and Korea. American policy changes produced distinct abandonment or entrapment responses within the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK security alliances: shared perceptions yielded cooperation, while differing views produced friction. This paper analyzes America's East Asia policies during the Bush and Obama administrations to assess Japanese and Korean reactions. Analyzed through the quasi-alliance model, American policies produced asymmetric responses in Japan and Korea, inhibiting security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. Diverging views of China exacerbated inherent friction between Korea and Japan. Thus, Japan will play a limited role in Korean security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the evolution of Sino-Japanese rivalry in the security sphere concentrating on the Chinese perspective, and placing it within the wider context of complex interstate rivalry between China, Japan and the United States. From a theoretical viewpoint, this research contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry from multiparty perspective, which has been overlooked in existing research. China–Japan–US complex interstate rivalry includes elements of positional, spatial and ideological rivalry simultaneously. When rivalries mix two or more rivalry types, they become more difficult to resolve. The two broad trends of China's military build-up and deepening US–Japan alliance evolve in tandem intensifying rivalry dynamics and increasing positional elements of rivalry. There are many indications on various levels that for China, controlling Japan's international ambitions has become less important and more attention is paid to ways in which Japan helps the United States in reaching its objectives in Asia through their alliance agreement. The cases analysed to display complex interstate rivalry include the Taiwan question, territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, and the North Korean nuclear issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has North Korea been unable to implement serious economic reforms like those of China? By tracing the process of economic reform in China, this paper argues that the improvement of national security, especially as a result of diplomatic normalization with the United States, was an essential precondition for successful economic reform and growth. It reduced the fear of an open‐door policy and eased domestic control as well as reallocation of resources from the military to economic development. Furthermore, diplomatic normalization with the United States lifted economic sanctions, and allowed access to global markets, foreign direct investments, and membership in major international economic organizations. However, North Korea has technically been at war with the United States for the last 66 years. Therefore, it maintains very tight control of its population and spends a substantial portion of its GDP on the military. It has also been under severe economic sanctions and does not have access to the global economy. The possibility of any meaningful economic reforms in North Korea will depend on its success in improving national security by resolving the nuclear issue and normalizing diplomatic relations with the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The centrality of conceptual analysis has been underlined and acknowledged by scientists worldwide. This research discusses a new concept of security, identifying the relationship between state security and threats, labelled state security relation. The main emphasis is on a novel notion in the security paradigm, dependent state security, which is grounded by the case study of Chinese state security relationship with the Pakistani terrorism threat. The paper also highlights some of the practices that led to the development of the concept and the threat response strategies implied in the case of dependent state security relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how geopolitical visions from an earlier century are being reanimated in certain quarters of the political, intellectual, and military elite in the United States in order to frame recent shifts in China's status in the international system. However, these deterministic geopolitical lenses – like the historical antecedents they draw on – are misconceived and counter-productive, missing the sophistication and fluidity of world politics. It is suggested here that such reductionist geopolitical categories instead work to narrow the space for mutual understanding and deny the multiple versions of power and sovereignty in the world today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea and Japan have experienced their worst deterioration of bilateral relations since 2012. What are the long-term prospects for this relationship? Will it continue on this negative trajectory or recover positively in the long term? Challenging the conventional view that supports the former conclusion, this paper argues for a positive outlook for the relationship in the long term. This is defended from a structural perspective relying on two long-term strategic trends for Northeast/ East Asia--the elevated uncertainty in the regional environment (due to North Korea and China's strategic rise); and the rising strain on the U.S. military presence in both countries. In response to these structural pressures, South Korea and Japan will adapt and adopt strategies to defend their national security within a reformed U.S. alliance structure and strengthen strategic cooperation through bilateral and trilateral (with the United States) means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD, hereinafter referred to as Quad), which had come into existence in 2007, ceased following the resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the withdrawal of Australia during Kevin Rudd's tenure as Prime Minister. However, on the side lines of the 2017 ASEAN Summit, the subject of a structure that would facilitate peace, stability and development in the Indo-Pacific region which, is supposedly under threat due to China's assertive behaviour, came up for discussions once again between leaders of US, Japan, Australia and India. The revival of the Quad (colloquially termed as "Quad 2.0"), after a hiatus of nearly a decade was viewed with concern by the Chinese media, which termed the grouping as a possible first step towards the formation of an "Asian NATO". The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, however was more dismissive, comparing the idea of reviving the Quad to "foam in the ocean, destined to dissipate soon". Against the backdrop of a globalised and intertwined economy, where economic interdependence appears to be the norm in deciding national interests, this paper examines the likely future trajectory of this grouping and attempts to determine which of the two assessments is more plausible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]