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Employing insights provided by the theory of monopolistic markets in economics and Great Power behaviour in the discipline of international relations, this paper aims to provide an alternative understanding of India's refusal to join the BRI beyond the immediate bilateral security, domestic politics, and economic considerations in Sino-Indian relations. We argue that BRI is an effort by China to position itself as the leading firm in the market for international development – a space for long dominated by Western development providers. The paper argues that India's efforts to contest the BRI can be seen as a natural outcome of other rising powers resisting China's efforts to monopolize the development market. In doing so, it provides a template of why rising powers compete with each other in providing developmental aid even when cooperation may create mutual benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decades, China has rapidly increased its influence throughout the South Asian region, using both its hard and soft power tactics. China has succeeded in eclipsing India's influence and emerged as an important player in the region. China is making inroads in South Asia by making huge investments and constructing roads, highways, railways, sea ports, bridges, power grids, dams, and public buildings. China is pursuing a foreign policy that aims to advance its strategic and economic interests while trying to imbalance India's predominant position and contain India within the boundaries of South Asia. This is to prevent the rise of a peer competitor that can challenge or hinder the rise of China as a sole Asian power. This paper argues that the geostrategic situation of South Asian countries is such that they pose threats to India's security by aligning with the extra-regional powers. Hence, China's expanding strategic and security ties with South Asian countries have wider implications for India's security due to the complex and sensitive nature of its relationship with China. The theoretical approach of Power Transition Theory has been utilized to analyze the Sino-India power rivalry and China's growing threat to India's security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite having differing foreign policy objectives against the core Indo‐Pacific fundamentals, Prime Minister Modi is constructing a robust, proactive, and influential role of India in the Indo‐Pacific region without formally aligning with the United States or gesturing for any confrontational behavior against China. To unfold India's Indo‐Pacific positioning, this paper asks how India behaves between the United States and China in the Indo‐Pacific. The authors argue that to address this, Modi's Indo‐Pacific strategy revolves around Pragmatic Balancing between the United States and China in the Indo‐Pacific. The paper highlights Modi's Indo‐Pacific ambitions to explore this pragmatic balancing, keeping in view the US Indo‐Pacific strategy. To deal with the United States on the geostrategic front, ensuring maximum strategic autonomy and building India's maritime security order in the Indian Ocean region are Modi's crucial policy outlooks. On the other hand, to deal with China on the geo‐economics front, maintaining the maritime economy's flow, thereby preventing any confrontational behavior with China on multilateralism, is the critical component of Modi's Indo‐Pacific strategy. The evaluation demonstrates Modi's pragmatism by redefining India's balancing behavior with the United States and China to achieve the desired foreign policy outcomes, before presenting the article's final conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to describe how China's rapid growth and increasing resource dependence have changed its relationship with India and their respective defense strategies. In particular, we consider China's Belt and Road Initiative, India's "Act East" policy and the strategic and economic value of the Indian Ocean and South China Sea regions. Design/methodology/approach: The authors find no econometric evidence of interactions between China and India's military spending using a Richardson-Baumol arms race model. Likewise, in a cross-county panel data study of military spending, they find that China's military spending has no independent effect on military spending in other countries. The authors also show that once wage costs and other sources of military inflation are accounted for, the pattern of real defense spending growth is much less intense than is suggested by nominal data. Nevertheless, they show that China has been undertaking intense military modernization with rapidly rising capital-labor ratios in its defense spending. Findings: The authors find little evidence of a traditional arms race, but also show that China, and to a lesser extent India, have been realigning their military capabilities to these new security risks while maintaining overall military burden on the economy. Research limitations/implications: Econometric analysis is limited by data availability and is necessarily historical, whereas the security situation is very fluid and may change in the short term. Practical implications: The paper identifies factors that are likely to influence China and India's attitudes to defense spending in the coming years. Social implications: The paper finds that there is not an arms race in the traditional sense but may be an arms race in terms of new technologies and military modernization. Originality/value: This is a very much underexplored topic in economics. The authors take an interdisciplinary approach showing how economics tools can be used to help understand this important issue in international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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India's balancing against China has both continental and maritime dimensions. India first approached China's challenge from the continental sphere by forgoing its military alliance with the former Soviet Union. This policy allowed New Delhi to exercise a degree of military dominance over South Asia. However, the sudden demise of the Soviet Union and the concurrent rise of China forced India to redefine its balancing strategy. The paper offers a realist explanation of India's foreign policy. It argues that India's strategic shift from the continental domain to the Indo-Pacific region was a departure from the classical realism of Kautilya to a neoclassical realism understanding of dealing with China's rise. The paper concluded that the two domains of India's foreign policy are interlinked. The developments in the Eurasia region have shaped New Delhi's military and strategic cooperation with the US and Quad-level cooperation with the US, Japan, and Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rising convergence between India and the United States, as well as their strategic interests, have been evident since the end of the Cold War. Over the last decade, the Indo-US strategic partnership has strengthened not only in the areas of defence, arms cooperation, counter-terrorism collaboration, ballistic missile defence, drones, nuclear technologies, space, and cyber technology, but India has also emerged as a prominent strategic partner of the United States in the areas of cyber and homeland security. India is becoming a pompous regional player who wants to be the regional hegemon as the Indo-US Strategic Partnership grows. As a result of the Indo-US strategic cooperation, the discrepancy in conventional and nuclear weapons between India and Pakistan could exacerbate the South Asian arms race and destabilise Pakistan's security environment. Pakistan must implement a proactive foreign policy in order to gain from the changing global and strategic environment. For Pakistan's economic and security, an alliance policy with regional and extra regional nations would be more prudent. Under the shadow of the US-India cooperation, this paper briefly emphasises the potential security threats to Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Afghanistan; the Heart of Asia, being located at the cross-roads of tri-regional junction offers a buffer as well as a test case for the Great Powers to showcase & prove their potential. India and China both aspiring for change in their global status positioning, practicing policy of non-interference are having high-stakes in Afghanistan. Although economically engaged both have high considerations for Afghanistan. International community is looking for new stakeholders to assume more responsible role in Afghanistan, how China and India deal with such pressure and foreign policy principles will determine their power status in international system. This paper seeks to locate Afghanistan in India and China's domestic and foreign policy. China's security reason and its commercial engagement with Afghanistan and India's bridge to access and Connect Central Asia policy pave the way towards such understanding. Management of their mutual relation is very crucial for peace in Afghanistan as well as for the entire region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper looks at the security challenges faced by the Modi administration in the Indo-Pacific region. There is a special focus on Indo-Pak relations and Sino-Indian relations. Whilst India has had problematic relations with both China and Pakistan in the recent past, relations between India and China are likely to improve because of the exponential growth in trade between the two countries. Good economic relations between the two rising Asiatic giants, particularly in the post-2000 phase, is likely to diffuse some tension over border issues. However, this is not the case with neighbouring Pakistan. In Pakistan, whilst civilian leaders may view India favourably, the more powerful Pakistani military and the ISI do not, and hence problematic relations with India are likely to continue. In the final analysis, whilst realism helps us to understand Indo-Pak relations, both realism and liberalism gives us an insight into Sino-Indian relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

India has adopted a pro-active Afghan policy since the fall of Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The country has extended her financial assistance covering economic, social, political and even cultural development of this war-torn nation. US-decision of ISAF-withdrawal has necessitated the resolve to strengthen Afghan security forces. India has extended her support to train and equip the ANSF to deal with Taliban resurgence and other security related aspects. However, there are some interpretations, especially constructed by Pakistan think tanks regarding the suspicious role of India in Afghanistan. These interpretations manifest India's presence in Afghanistan as a strategic design to encircle and destabilize Pakistan. Since the USNATO exit strategy, China too has become pro-active in relation to Afghan issue. Besides her economic considerations, the country has mainly the security concerns with increasing violence and instability of Afghanistan. There is also ambiguity regarding China's dual stand regarding terrorism and Taliban. It is in light of these issues that the paper focuses India's Afghan policy in changing circumstances. Besides analyzing Pak perspective and counter-responses regarding India's Afghan policy, an attempt has been made to underscore China as a factor for India in Afghanistan. The paper also highlights the common concerns of India and China in Afghanistan with the potential to push these nations for a joint workable strategy to deal post-ISAF situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes to outline various theoretical approaches used to conceptualize peacekeeping operations (PKO) in International Relations Theory, and compare these general approaches with Indian and Chinese participation and practices. The analysis follows two main trajectories: 1) How is peacekeeping understood in Chinese and Indian conceptions of international relations? 2) How are peacekeeping operations operationalized and carried out? The article carries out a literature analysis additionally informed by a hundred interviews carried out by the authors with policymakers, academics and military in China and India in 2012. There are several core findings of the comparative analysis: While China and India tend to differ at the level of their contributions, there is a commonality of the broad theoretical underpinnings of their participation. Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-interference remain at the core of engagement for both these actors. At the same time, as demonstrated by Indian support for the UNAMA missions and Chinese voting behavior on Libyan and Syrian missions at the UNSC, both countries have become more pragmatic in their foreign policy approach to peacekeeping as future "responsible powers." Chinese and Indian involvement in different types of missions which go beyond traditional peacekeeping thus point to a change in the international outlook and evolving foreign policy of both these countries, possibly in tandem with their rising global status and the need to utilize peacekeeping as a means of greater participation in the global governance system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India's foreign policy in South Asia has recently suffered revisions following increased Chinese presence in the region. Since 2007 the Maldives has also witnessed a tremendous change in its foreign policy from the 'India First' to the 'India Out' campaign. Islamic fundamentalism is on the rise in the Maldives and is impacting its foreign policy choices. China has shown great interest in the Maldives. While the Maldives has signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China and recorded enormous Chinese investments in various projects, the Indian ground in the island state has shrunk in the last decade. This article discusses how the Maldives has realised its geostrategic significance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and how India has succeeded in restoring its traditional clout in Malé after the return of President Ibrahim Solih in 2018. It also discusses the Indian role in the Maldives during the pandemic and the signing of several Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), maritime security understandings and partnerships with the United States in the Indo-Pacific in view of groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Also examined is how the sharing of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (FOIP) has brightened the scope of India's relations with the Maldives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that geopolitics is a major obstacle to an effective Indian policy on substantive maritime governance. It holds that India's involvement in maritime governance is predominantly shaped by geopolitics and driven by two geopolitical concerns, Delhi's drive to counter China's expanding influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and India's pursuit of leadership in that region. This emphasis on geopolitics is perfectly reasonable from India's perspective but comes at the cost of constraining Delhi's maritime governance policy and reducing India's ability to address substantive maritime governance issues. Hence, India's focus on geopolitics undermines substantive maritime governance. The focus on geopolitics negatively impacts substantive maritime governance because it: 1) leads India to oppose China's involvement in IOR's maritime governance; 2) creates bureaucratic obstacles to India's substantive maritime governance; 3) constrains Delhi's ability to concentrate its substantive maritime governance efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional Indian medicine is one of the oldest medical systems and remains popular worldwide. Traditional medicine systems in China and India have historical origins pertaining to mutual learning, reference, and development from medical theory to the drugs used. The exchange of traditional medicine between China and India began in the Qin and Han Dynasties (221 BC–220 AD), prospered in the Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD), and declined after the Song Dynasty (960–1279 AD). It was also directly related to the rise and fall of Buddhism. The traditional medicines of the two countries are highly complementary because of differences in geographical climate and the modernisation process of traditional medicine. This review aimed to understand the spread and development of traditional Indian medicine in China to further promote exchange and cooperation between China and India in the field of traditional medicine. We performed a systematic search of MEDLINE via PubMed, CNKI, Science Direct, Sci-Hub, and other databases using the terms 'traditional Indian medicine' or 'Indian medicine' or 'Ayurveda' or 'Yoga' or 'Unani', and limiting the search to articles published between 1958 and 2019. We analysed the sources, publication date, type, and topic of the retrieved articles/studies. Based on the results of research on traditional Indian medicine carried out by Chinese scholars, 518 academic papers and 60 classic works published in China and abroad were collected. The results showed the following. First, Chinese scholars have systematically investigated traditional Indian medicine including its composition, management, and education; the scale of medicinal and pharmaceutical plants; protective measures of intellectual property rights of traditional medicine; and international promotion of Yoga. Second, studies have examined the development status of traditional Indian medicine in China including the spread of Yoga in the country and the industrial scale of, education in, existing problems in, and clinical research on Yoga. In addition, Chinese scholars conducted research on and the translation of classic works and terms of Ayurveda, and studied the theory, treatment, and medicine thereof. Third, the historical exchange and trading status of traditional medicine between India and China have been discussed, including the exchange of traditional medicine between the two countries, effect of traditional Indian medicine on Chinese Buddhism, and minority medicine and trade in medicinal materials between the two countries. India attaches great importance to the management of, education in, and industry of traditional medicine, and has made various efforts to protect intellectual property rights. Indian Yoga is very popular in China, and Chinese scholars have conducted some clinical research thereon. However, regulatory systems and legislation for Yoga are lacking in China. At present, traditional Chinese medicine scholars have an enhanced understanding of the term Yoga and less knowledge of the terms Ayurveda, Siddha, Unani, and similar concepts. We suggest that Chinese scholars further study the classic works, basic theories, treatment of clinical diseases, medicinal materials, and prescriptions compounding traditional Indian medicine. The results of this study highlight directions for Chinese scholars to pursue in further studying traditional Indian medicine comprehensively, and will help promote exchange and cooperation between China and India in the field of traditional medicine. [Display omitted] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In global politics, the relations between India and China have long been branded by the countries' customary rivalry. Bitterness and resentment between the two came to the fore with the exile of Dalai Lama to India in 1959. Subsequent to this episode, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 further exacerbated their already strained ties. The continued border dispute, much importantly added fuel to fire. Altercations in their relations, thus are yet not extinguished. In the twenty-first century, when these Asian giants are putting forward their soft power together with military muscle through economic persuasion, the waters of the Indian Ocean are sponsoring economic and geo-strategic conflicts between the two. "India's participation in the new alliance formed in the maritime domain whereas could cause increasing insecurities to Beijing, Beijing's unregulated assertiveness through monetary aids along with modernized naval tactics is also viewed to have escalated India's security concerns". The global powers when examine such bilateral equation with probabilities of drawing complexities, cooperation between the two, in the form of an unprecedented "maritime dialogue", demonstrate their unabated commitment to ensure maritime security while pursuing their geo-strategic ambitions in the region. Developments of this kind can help promote regional peace as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's unprecedented economic rise and its growing military profile have transformed the threat matrix for India. China is challenging India's interests in its immediate neighbourhood in multiple ways. Managing strategic challenge from China, therefore, has become a topmost foreign policy priority for India. The article argues that given the structural constraints of New Delhi-Beijing rapprochement, there is an urgent need for India to step up quadrilateral security cooperation with the U.S., Japan and Australia. The revival of the Quad reflects this growing consensus. However, India's hedging approach – simultaneously balancing and engaging with China – may be politically expedient in the short run, but not without long-term adverse consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors do autocracies evaluate when responding to perceived threats and why might they fail to balance appropriately? I posit that autocratic leaders may choose greater exposure to an external threat if, by doing so, it preserves regime legitimacy. Specifically, the desire to promote a positive image to one's domestic public creates incentives to publicly downplay a rival's military progress, which then affects the state's ability to mobilize resources to respond to the growing threat. I test this theory in the case of China's response to India's military rise. This research contributes to balancing theory and empirical work on East Asian security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]