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New and enhanced processes will not be the only drivers toward a sustainable chemical industry. Implementing climate policies will impact all components of the chemical supply chain over the following decades, making improvements in energy generation, material extraction, or transportation contribute to reducing the overall impacts of chemical technologies. Including this synergistic effect when comparing technologies offers a clearer vision of their future potential and may allow researchers to support their sustainability propositions more strongly. Ammonia and methanol production account for more than fifty percent of the CO2 emissions in this industry and are, therefore, excellent case studies. This work performs a prospective life cycle assessment until 2050 for fossil, blue, wind, and solar-based technologies under climate policies aiming to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5 °C, 2 °C, or 3.5 °C. The first finding is the inability of fossil-based routes to reduce their CO2 emissions beyond 10% by 2050 without tailored decarbonisation strategies, regardless of the chemical and climate policy considered. In contrast, green routes may produce chemicals with around 90% fewer emissions than today and even with net negative emissions (on a cradle-to-gate basis), as in the case of methanol (up to −1.4 kg CO2-eq per kg), mainly due to the contributions of technology development and increasing penetration of renewable energies. Overall, the combined production of these chemicals could be net-zero by 2050 despite their predicted two to fivefold increase in demand. Lastly, we propose a roadmap for progressive implementation by 2050 of green routes in 26 regions worldwide, applying the criterion of at least 80% reduction in climate change impacts when compared to their fossil alternatives. Furthermore, an exploratory prospective techno-economic assessment showed that by 2050, green routes could become more economically attractive. This work offers quantitative arguments to reinforce research, development, and policymaking efforts on green chemical routes reliant on renewable energies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The quest for attaining 'sustainable development goals (SDGs)', especially 'SDG‐13', which addresses the policy towards lessening the risk of climate change, is impossible without abating CO2 emissions, which are a major contributor to climate change globally. Thus, this study inspects the decisive role played by renewable energy use, green finance, and political stability in achieving SDG‐13 by abating CO2 emissions for 14 emerging economies from 1990 to 2021. We have used the cross‐sectional autoregressive distributed lag and method of moments quantile regression estimators to analyse the impact of explanatory variables on the dependent variable, considering the probable endogeneity issue in the model. The outcome of the study signifies that renewable energy consumption and green finance substantially reduce CO2 emissions, whereas political stability is observed to have a positive impact on CO2 emissions. Moreover, the moderation effect of political stability and green finance is found to substantially reducing carbon emissions. This study thus suggests that emerging economies need a stronger political system to promote green financing and renewable energy consumption to attain SDGs by addressing climate change policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decarbonization policies require public support to be implemented and to remain in legislation. Examinations of public support for climate policies tend to focus on a small number of policy instruments and/or use hypothetical instead of real policy proposals. Here, we address these criticisms by examining public support across four distinct policy instruments – command-and-control, market-based, information-based, and voluntary – using sixteen policy proposals by UK political parties and government institutions. In addition to assessing UK national policy support, we also explore regional differences. Using a representative sample of the UK population (N = 1,911), we find that, at a national level, individuals preferred instruments shown to be less effective in reaching net-zero: information-based and voluntary policies. Our results indicate that the extent to which individuals believe in the free market, their environmental worldviews and political party support as well as their age are all correlated with policy support. We find stark regional differences where, compared to individuals living in Greater London, those living in the remainder of the country were 32% and 30% less likely to support command-and-control and market-based policies, respectively (among other regional differences). Regional variations in free-market beliefs and population density partly explain differences in policy support. We propose policymakers focus on place-based initiatives to increase support for decarbonization policies that are more effective in reaching net-zero and on improving the perception of market-based and command-and-control policies through positive framing and policy bundles. The majority of the UK public supports all climate policy instruments (command-and-control, market-based, information-based, and voluntary) regardless of their stringency. More stringent decarbonization policies (command-and-control and market-based instruments) received less public support compared to more lenient policies (information-based and voluntary). Population density as a structural factor helps to explain regional variation and points to the crucial role of improving public infrastructure, particularly in more rural areas. Free-market beliefs are associated with regional and individual variations in support and stress the need for overcoming ideological barriers. Income was found to influence support for less stringent (e.g. information-based) instruments, but was not associated with support for regulatory and market-based instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The carbon neutrality goal has emerged as the most popular way for institutions to frame policy responses to climate change, largely because of its flexibility as a net-zero emissions target. We highlight two desirable features arising from this flexibility: the potential for reducing emissions at a lower cost and the potential for promoting distributive justice. To demonstrate the role of cost-effectiveness, we report estimates of average emissions abatement cost of solar electricity plants located (hypothetically) in each of the 48 states of the conterminous United States. We then explain how institutions may pursue distributive justice by targeting cobenefits of emissions-reducing projects to specific areas or groups. We also describe the two primary concerns with carbon neutrality goals: additionality and ethics. To allay these concerns, we suggest improvements to the basic integrity of carbon markets and ways in which institutions can commit to local decarbonization in tandem with carbon neutrality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article outlines how the systemic rivalry between the West and China is preventing effective collaboration in the fight against climate change. Three approaches are suggested that can help the West achieve tangible action in the sphere of climate policy. First, the West must build up pressure points such as CBAM or even tariffs to incentivise greater climate protection measures. Second, climate partnerships with more substantial financial resources will incentivise developing countries to accelerate decarbonisation and not just follow the Chinese model. Third, climate action in the US and EU must be well calibrated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores whether economic viability is the key to achieve deep decarbonization or net zero emissions. The hypothesis tested is that popular support for decarbonization policies is conditional upon most people's belief that their economic well-being will improve, or at least not suffer with these policies. While GDP growth is the typical metric for economic health, a more useful socio-economic indicator for gauging the political viability of climate policies may be job creation. Specifically, the paper reviews the existing evidence about whether climate policies are more successful in achieving deep decarbonization in the long run if policy-makers include job creation as well as emissions reductions when designing and implementing climate policies, because, to date, climate policy-makers have often focused on emissions reductions as the primary criterion for policy choice. While empirical evidence remains thin, we find that job creation in low-carbon industries appears to lead to greater political support for the climate policies that contribute to decarbonization, but employment factors are not always the most salient factor in a voter's decision. We also find empirical evidence that clean energy deployment policies, such as feed-in tariffs, have led to significant net gains in employment in the countries that have been studied. The review points to several policy implications, including the need to assess competitive advantage, develop plans, design and execute industrial policy, and develop a low-carbon workforce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For several decades, modal shift within the freight transport sector has been promoted by policy makers as an important basis for achieving lower transport emission targets. Even though the literature on mode choice is well established, there is less consensus about the volume of freight with the potential to shift and, more importantly, the actual contribution of freight modal shift to achieving less climate and air pollution impacts. The climate contribution of freight modal shift can be increasingly questioned, as decarbonization is taking place at increasing rates within road freight transport. In this paper, the role of modal shift policies in realizing climate objectives is scrutinized by focusing on the case of Sweden, which serves to illustrate some general insights. We highlight how modal shift is often analyzed and discussed in isolation, even though it forms an important part of a policy mix in which it may contribute to achieving climate objectives. Treating modal shift as an objective in its own right may render less effective and cost-efficient policy instruments. • The climate contribution of freight modal shift is increasingly questioned. • The role of modal shift policies in realizing climate objectives is scrutinized by focusing on the case of Sweden. • Modal shift is often analyzed and discussed in isolation. • Treating modal shift as an objective in its own right may render policy instruments less effective and cost-efficient, [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an in-depth analysis of the Marginal Abatement Cost Curve (MACC) for CO2 of China's industrial sector. Leveraging comprehensive firm-level panel data spanning the period 2011–2015, we employ a parameterized directional output distance function to estimate the shadow price of CO2. By doing so, we derive the marginal abatement cost for individual firms across different years, which provides crucial insights into two fundamental aspects: first, the variation in shadow prices as indicators of the economic efficiency of existing climate policies; and second, the carbon price levels necessary to achieve CO2 mitigation targets in the future. Furthermore, we conduct scenario simulations to assess the potential industrial output loss resulting from forthcoming carbon policies, such as the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Our findings underscore the necessity for a considerably higher tax rate to stimulate pollution reduction in order to meet the desired emission targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are the primary contributors to climate change. Addressing and mitigating climate change necessitates the effective management and utilization of renewable energy consumption, which poses a substantial challenge for the forthcoming decades. This study explores the dynamic effects of service value added (SVA) and renewable energy on environmental quality, particularly focusing on CO2 emissions. Unlike previous studies, we employ a non-parametric modeling approach to uncover the time-varying influence of service sector growth on CO2 emissions. Specifically, we apply the local linear dummy variable estimation (LLDVE) method to a panel of the 17 highest-emitting nations over the period 1980–2021. Our study uncovers a non-linear relationship between CO2 emissions and SVA. From 1980 to 2003, we observe a negative correlation. However, starting from 2005 to 2020, we witness a shift towards a positive correlation, indicating a rise in energy consumption within the service sector. The results indicate that significant emitter economies have yet to achieve sustainability, with the service sector continuing to contribute to pollution. Addressing this issue necessitates more robust climate change policies and increased investment in clean energy, specifically targeting the service sector, including buildings and transport. • The dynamic effects of service value added on CO2 emissions are investigated for the 17 highest-emitting nations. • A non-parametric approach known as local linear dummy variable estimation is applied. • The study verified the existence of the environmental Kuznets curve. • A nonlinear relationship between CO2 emissions and the service value added is revealed. • Robust climate policies are needed, emphasizing more clean energy investments in services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against this background, our contribution discusses the effects of this double regulation and provides a clear policy recommendation for the future of EU and German climate policy in the transport and buildings sectors. However, two other groundbreaking climate policy decision in the EU and Germany have passed with much less commotion: the implementation of the German heating and transport fuels emissions trading system (ETS) in 2021 and the 2022 decision of the EU to add a similar ETS to its climate policy instrument mix. In early 2023, far-reaching decisions on climate policy were made in both the EU and Germany. [Extracted from the article]

Background: Sustained elevated concentration of GHGs is predicted to increase global mortality. With the Australian health sector responsible for 7% of the nation's GHG emissions, the benefits and costs of various decarbonisation trajectories are currently being investigated. To assist with this effort, we model the impact earlier decarbonisation has on temperature-related mortality. Design: We used DICE-EMR, an Integrated Assessment Model with an endogenous mortality response, to simulate Australian GHG trajectories and estimate the temperature-related mortality impact of early decarbonisation. We modelled a linear decline of the Australian health sector's and economy's GHG annual emissions to net-zero targets of 2040 and 2050. Main outcome measure: Deaths averted and monetary-equivalent welfare gain. Results: Decarbonisation of the Australian health sector by 2050 and 2040 is projected to avert an estimated 69,000 and 77,000 global temperature-related deaths respectively in a Baseline global emissions scenario. Australian economy decarbonisation by 2050 and 2040 is projected to avert an estimated 988,000 and 1,101,000 global deaths respectively. Assuming a low discount rate and high global emissions trajectory, we estimate a monetary equivalent welfare gain of $151 billion if the Australian health sector decarbonises by 2040, only accounting for the benefits in reducing temperature-related mortality. Conclusions: Earlier decarbonisation has a significant impact on temperature-related mortality. Many uncertainties exist and health impacts other than temperature-related mortality are not captured by this analysis. Nevertheless, such models can help communicate the health risk of climate change and improve climate policy decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2015, the 21st Conference of the Parties reaffirmed the target of keeping the global mean temperature rise below 2 °C or 1.5 °C by 2100 while finding no consensus on how to decarbonize the global economy. In this regard, the speed of decarbonization reflects the (in)flexibility of transforming the energy sector due to engineering, political, or societal constraints. Using economy–energy–climate-integrated assessment models (IAMs), the maximum absolute rate of change in carbon emission allowed from each time step to the next, so-called carbon emission inertia (CEI), governs the magnitude of emission change, affecting investment decisions and economic welfare. Employing the model of investment and endogenous technological development (MIND), we conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis and examine anthropogenic global carbon emission scenarios in line with decarbonizing the global economy while measuring the global mean temperature. We examine the role of CEI as a crucial assumption, where the CEI can vary in four scenarios from 3.7% to 12.6% p.a. We provide what-if studies on global carbon emissions, global mean temperature change, and investments in renewable energy production and show that decarbonizing the global economy might still be possible before 2100 only if the CEI is high enough. In addition, we show that climate policy scenarios with early decarbonization and without negative emissions may still comply with the 2 °C target. However, our results indicate that the 1.5 °C target is not likely to be reached without negative emission technologies. Hence, the window of opportunity is beginning to close. This work can also assist to better interpret existing publications on various climate targets when altering CEI could have played a significant role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People have always been interested in improving their quality of life. But how is this possible when the population is constantly growing, and the planet's resources are dwindling? The efficient use of resources is not only believed to increase the general quality of life but also to contribute to the creation of a cleaner environment. But what is the relation between resource efficiency and a cleaner environment? The European Commission and the United Nations have been dealing with this key issue for many years now and the EU has forced member countries to meet certain targets. This paper presents some of the UN and EU's policies with regard to climate change and resource efficiency and offers an independent evaluation of the achievements of Member States. We assumed that the implementation of the objectives of the EU climate and energy package improves the resource productivity and reduces its negative impact on the environment, relation analysed with the help of a linear regression model. Further, we have performed a critical study on the performance of EU-member states in meeting their GHG-emission targets correlated with the resource intensity of their economies, modelled using Microsoft Excel. Resource efficiency and the low-carbon economy have emerged as central themes in global discussions on the transition to a sustainable economy, and this paper sheds new light onto the connection between the two subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a leading industrialized block of Member States and a global trendsetter of climate policy and law, the EU has a particular responsibility to rapidly decarbonize. With energy forming 75% of current emissions and decarbonization being driven in part by mass electrification, transitioning the EU's power system from predominantly fossil fuel-based to being principally powered by renewable energy sources (RES) ('the Transition') is a key first step. Particularly on the necessary speed of fossil fuel phase-out, however, the Transition is falling short of 1.5°C compatibility. Here, we advocate for a justice-driven, holistic approach to the Transition, with appreciation for the interconnectivity of the four major pillars of environmental, social, economic, and governance justice. Promoting governance as an integrated justice dimension offers a more robust and comprehensive framework for decision-making across different legislative levels. To demonstrate how this framework could deliver a more effective and equitable Transition, we apply it across sixteen 'Rules', under these four pillars. Each is designed for EU-wide transposition and the implementation by Member States as a means of filling a gap in the EU's legislative framework, including the newly released 'Fit for 55' proposals package. We consider directly and comprehensively the interaction between new rules and existing and proposed EU legislation, the synergies across pillars, the compromises which might be necessitated, and the limitations of our high-level approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of command-and-control target policies for climate governance is crucial in achieving China's "dual carbon" goals. We investigate the impact of multi-target policy on county-level carbon emissions, using the generalized difference-in-differences model for the gradual implementation at different phases of multiple policies. We find that the Carbon Intensity Reduction Target (CIRT) and Total Energy Consumption Target (TECT) policies promote carbon reduction, while the Energy Intensity Reduction Target (EIRT) policy has less reliable outcomes. In the eastern and central regions, the initial phase of carbon reduction is primarily propelled by the EIRT policy, subsequently transitioning to the dominant influence of the CIRT policy. In the later phase, carbon reduction in the eastern region is predominantly attributed to the CIRT policy, whereas in the central region, it results from the combined effects of the EIRT, CIRT, and TECT policies. In the western region, early policies have an insignificant impact on carbon reduction, and the later-phase effects shift from being primarily influenced by the EIRT to being predominantly influenced by the CIRT. Additionally, neglecting the impact of other policies with similar targets during the same period may lead to overestimation of the effects of EIRT and TECT and underestimation of the effect of CIRT. • Command-and-control target policies are crucial for China's "dual carbon" goals. • The effectiveness of climate policies varies by timing and region. • Carbon intensity reduction targets consistently reduce emissions. • Combining multiple policies effectively cuts carbon emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scale of the decarbonisation challenge and the short timeframes over which action is required demand urgent action. This paper is set within the surface transport sector, now the largest sector of emissions with the slowest pace of change in many advanced liberal economies. It focuses on the strategies and actions of local government which is recognised to be a central player in catalysing change. Our evidence is derived from the actions of two UK local areas which claim to be at the forefront of the decarbonisation challenge. The paper focuses on the role of funding and financial mechanisms in addressing the climate crisis. In the face of an established pattern of austerity and hollowing out of local government we explore how deep transformation is being envisaged. We find a recursive set of issues which derive from a dependence on funding from outwith. This dependence means that despite comprehensive overarching strategies and goals the funding available is the core of the strategy. This means that the nature of the funds, such as the requirement for experimentation, innovation or private sector leverage, defines direction. In turn, and to maintain success in attracting funds, there is an emphasis on presenting 'premium spaces of ambition' with little evidence of attention to broader systemic change. This duality is openly recognised. This paper advances a wider point that greater emphasis should be placed on the 'financialisation' of climate policy and the reality rather than the rhetoric of change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role that private actors play in accelerating or preventing progressive climate policy and true decarbonization is a core research interest of global environmental politics. Yet scholars have struggled to measure the political behavior of multinational firms due to lack of transparency about their activities and inconsistency in reporting requirements across jurisdictions. In this research note, we present a new data source—firms' earnings calls—that scholars might use to better understand the political behavior of major multinational polluters. To illustrate the value of earnings calls as a data source, we construct an original data set of all earnings calls made between 2005 and 2019 by major oil and gas firms. We then code these transcripts, demonstrating that although firms can be classified as more or less pro-climate, there is little evidence of the industry's public acceptance of decarbonization. These unique data could permit researchers to explore important questions about climate politics, the evolution of private governance, and the relationship between policy and firms' political behavior. Moreover, we suggest extensions of our approach, including other multinational industries that are amenable to this type of analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the world's largest fossil fuels exporter, Russia is one of the key countries for addressing global climate change. However, it has never demonstrated any significant ambitions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This paper applies ideational research methodology to identify the structural differences in economic, political, and social normative contexts between industrialized fossil fuel importing economies and Russia that lead to the fundamental gap in motivations driving decarbonization efforts. Russia is unlikely to replicate the approach to the green transition and climate policy instruments of energy-importing countries. In order to launch decarbonization in Russia, interested stakeholders need to frame climate policies in Russia differently. Specifically, the framing must address the priority of diversification as a means to adapting the national economy to a new green landscape, the combination of diverse channels for decarbonization, the promotion of energy-efficiency, closer attention to climate-related forest projects, and linkage of climate change with other environmental problems. Moreover, considering Russia's emissions as a part of the global economic system and shifting from a simplistic national focus on GHG emissions reduction would help coordinate policies through dialogue between exporters and importers of fossil fuel energy-intensive goods, which is essential for the global movement towards a net-zero future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Industrial policy has begun to move into the center of debates on climate policy. This represents a shift away from climate policy as we know it—as classic environmental policy. Industrial policy and environmental policy differ in their policy goals, policy instruments, and distributional effects, one primarily concerned with economic development, the other with cutting greenhouse gas emissions. This raises questions about policy interactions between industrial and environmental policy in broader climate policy mixes and how these affect global decarbonization. This article identifies complementary and conflictual dynamics between industrial policy and environmental policy in both domestic and international climate politics. It shows how green industrial policy can advance climate goals and cooperation but can also present challenges to deepening climate cooperation and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Developing an understanding of policy interactions is central to leveraging the potential of industrial policy to accelerate global decarbonization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India's centrality to global mitigation efforts makes it an important point of inquiry in studies of climate governance. However, we understand little of how climate change has been institutionalized in India's decision-making processes. We capture the emergence and decline of climate institutions over three decades, showing how political conditions have shaped institutional form. The politics of opportunism has animated institutional development. It resolves the tension between India's global leadership ambitions and a deeply entrenched, equity-focused narrative frame that rejects incurring large mitigation costs. Climate institutions have therefore been layered upon existing bodies and processes to create room for the organic, bottom-up growth of policies that meet development objectives while promoting mitigation. While this structure limits polarization around climate action, it also inhibits strategic intent, particularly because strong cross-governmental institutions have been unable to take root. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an analysis of the origins and effects of UK climate governance. It is centrally concerned with the relationships between politics and climate institutions, both in how political conditions have shaped the emergence of climate governance, and in how the resulting institutions subsequently structure climate politics. The analysis brings out three key themes. First, a focus on the CCA can overlook the enduring importance of the parallel climate governance architecture provided by the European Union. Second, it is important to see UK climate governance within a wider political and institutional context, as these results of this context, especially tensions between ambition and instability, have influenced its evolution. Third, this design, and other aspects of the evolution of UK climate governance framework, have in turn had implications for the strengths and weaknesses of the framework and how it has met key governance challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change poses an existential threat to our planet – but does it require wholesale reorganization of our political institutions? As diverse contributions to this special issue describe, countries have restructured government agencies or developed new institutions to oversee climate reforms. Yet, few such transformations have occurred in the United States, one of the world's most important cases. Instead, US climate institutions emerged when new mandates and policymaking routines were layered onto existing political institutions. This has had the cumulative effect of creating substantial US climate policymaking capacity in the absence of institutional innovation. When climate proponents have controlled the US presidency, they have mobilized this capacity to center climate change throughout the US executive branch. By contrast, opponents have quickly dismantled climate policy mandates and routines after gaining power. The result has been an unstable variety of climate governance in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While a large body of scholarship has analysed the nature and dysfunction of Australian climate policy over the past generation, there has been little examination of how the Australian state has reorganised itself institutionally to create and execute climate policy. Filling this gap, I explore the evolution of federal climate institutions since the early 1990s, describing how they have fared in the midst of Australia's highly polarized political debate around climate, as well as how they have facilitated and constrained Canberra's ability to develop effective climate strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Local perspectives can conflict with national and international climate targets. This study explores three stakeholder (community, provincial, and federal) perspectives on the Alberta oil sands as risks for a sustainability transition in Canada. In an ex-post analysis, we compared outputs from stakeholder consultations and energy-economy models. Our research shows that different local stakeholders groups disregarded some policy risks for the Alberta oil sands and Canadian energy transition. These stakeholders expected the sector to grow, despite increasing environmental penalties and external market pressures. The study revealed that blind-spots on risks, or "risk blindness", increased as stakeholders became less certain about policy climate goals. We argue that "risk blindness" could be amplified by dominant institutional narratives that contradict scientific research and international climate policy. Strategies that integrate local narratives, considered as marginalized, provide perspectives beyond emission reductions and are essential for meeting climate targets while supporting a just transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies are rapidly evolving from renderings in climate models towards an explicit and essential component of climate policy-making. This has raised concerns that the expectations of future large-scale availability of CDR technologies may deter mitigation, i.e., delay or substitute emission reduction efforts. Here, we develop a conceptual approach to systematically study such mitigation deterrence effects in climate policy-making processes. The approach integrates literature on sociotechnical imaginaries and the cultural political economy of mitigation deterrence with historical-materialist policy analysis. It follows within-case process tracing to uncover whether and how expectations of CDR technologies either weaken 'conventional' mitigation targets in policy formulation or encourage policy designs which treat 'conventional' mitigation and CDR as equivalent. Using critical instances of contestation in the policy process, this approach also allows us to identify nascent constellations of actors and interests as well as emerging fault lines related to CDR technologies. Empirically, the paper focusses on the EU Sustainable Carbon Cycles Strategy and the current negotiations over an EU Carbon Removal Certification Framework. We show that even though it is too early to pin-point clear-cut instances of mitigation deterrence related to CDR technologies in EU climate policy-making, critical opportunities to prevent such effects have already been missed in both climate target formulation and policy design. • Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies are currently being integrated into EU climate policy. • This poses the risks of mitigation deterrence, i.e., reduced emission reduction efforts. • We developed a conceptual approach to systematically trace mitigation deterrence in climate policy-making. • Opportunities to forestall mitigation deterrence have already been missed in critical EU climate policy initiatives. • Separating targets and specifying the use of carbon removal credits could contribute to prevent mitigation deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global south countries, including China, have faced a challenging dilemma of reducing carbon emissions while maintaining rapid economic growth. The low-carbon city pilots (LCCPs) policy in China is a demonstration of how state power intervenes and commands national low-carbon development through voluntary policy tools. Our study, based on panel data of 331 cities from 2005 to 2019, evaluates the policy effect of all three batches of LCCPs and presents an analysis of time-varying effects through batch decomposition and synthetic difference-in-difference models. The study found that implementing low-carbon policies can significantly reduce total carbon emissions and carbon emissions per capita. However, the reduction in carbon emissions per unit of GDP is insignificant, and the policy effect varies according to the batches and their characteristics. The reduction effects in the first and second batches, as well as the insignificance or even increasing effects of the third batch, may be due to carbon leakage between different batches of LCCPs. Overall, this research provides novel and quantitative evidence on low-carbon development in China, making theoretical and empirical contributions to the field, and expanding econometric assessment methods to evaluate the effectiveness of environmental and climate change policies. [Display omitted] • The overall and heterogeneous effect of three batches LCCPs in China was assessed. • LCCP could reduced carbon emissions by 6.5% and emissions per capita by 7.3%. • The reduction effect on carbon intensity is insignificant. • The third batch of LCCPs significantly increased emissions by 2.31 million tons. • The impact of LCCPs varies maybe due to industrial transition and carbon leakage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• On paper Zimbabwe has promising targets of reducing emissions targets by 2030. • Renewable energy policy for mandatory fuel blending, renewable energy and electric cars on course for decarbonization. • Lack of policy harmonisation results in policy conflicts and contradictions. • Establishment of national climate financing mechanisms enables reaching 2030 reduction targets. Zimbabwe intends to build resilience mechanisms against climate change while at the same time ensuring sustainable development in recognition of its climate change vulnerability and national circumstances, in line with the demands of the Paris Agreement of reducing emissions by 2030. The study examined the consistency of government policies in reducing emissions by 1278GgCO 2 by 2030. The study reviewed government policies and environmental projects intended at reducing carbon emissions. The results indicated that, on paper, the government has promising targets; but in reality, there are inconsistencies indicating the release of more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The inconsistencies include the commissioned Hwange thermal power station and fossil fuel-powered locomotives. The study found that there is strategic coherence between policy objectives, aimed at building resilient and low-carbon human settlement, and objectives of international policies such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Paris Agreement and SENDAI Framework. The compulsory mixing of petrol and ethanol and the introduction of electric cars in the transportation sector demonstrated the limited but commendable efforts by the government in embracing renewable energy to reduce carbon emissions. The study established that poor policy implementation and lack of policy harmonisation have led to the failure of the Zimbabwean government to have policy consistency in terms of the decarbonisation roadmap resulting in policy conflicts and contradictions. An example of policy duplication is in, the Environmental Management Act and Forestry Act which can have sections dealing with climate change harmonised into the Climate Change Policy. The study recommends that the government establishes a National Climate Financing mechanism for cleaner technologies and practices to reduce emissions by 2030. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The credibility of climate policy has been identified as paramount factor for low-carbon investment and innovation and is thus key to achieving the decarbonization objectives set out in the Paris Agreement. Yet, despite its importance, we have only limited insights at present into how such policy credibility is formed. To address this gap, we explore whether and to what extent corporate perceptions of policy credibility depend on the current policy mix. We draw on the case of the German Energiewende and rely on data collected in 2014 in a survey of German manufacturers of renewable power generation technologies. We analyzed the answers of 390 companies using a linear regression model and found that corporate perceptions of policy credibility are mainly shaped by two characteristics of the policy mix: the coherence of policymaking and implementation, and the consistency of the policy mix. Changes in the design of the core demand-pull instrument (in Germany, the Renewable Energy Sources Act, EEG) and the nuclear phase-out policy are also important as are Germany’s targets for the expansion of renewable energies. These insights enable us to derive broader policy and research implications concerning climate policy credibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a CIB analysis and a CGE model to develop decarbonization scenarios for the European power market. Our CIB analysis reveals qualitative scenarios that differ in the level of political (stringency of climate policy) and physical collaboration (transmission grid expansion). The CGE model quantifies those scenarios for further usage in the power market model EUREGEN to analyze related distributional effects across heterogeneous countries as well as between consumers and producers. EUREGEN predicts that consumers experience considerably higher electricity prices in the future in all scenarios, whereas producers observe higher rents. Electricity prices are lowest in the least collaborative future. Producer rents in turn are highest in the most collaborative one. Patterns hugely differ by country, making 13 countries to profiteers of the least collaborative future and 12 countries to profiteers of the most collaborative one. Only 3 countries profit from medium collaboration. Countries that profit from the most collaborative future experience substantially higher producer rents. Countries that profit from the least collaborative one in turn experience lowest electricity prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transportation was Aotearoa/New Zealand’s fastest-growing sector in terms of carbon emissions over the last two decades. This article investigates mitigation policies for transportation emissions in the two most prosperous cities, Wellington and Auckland. Analysing local government policy documents, we dissect commitments and examine the gap between aspirations and outcomes. Neither city’s emissions are falling significantly despite trends towards housing intensification, which can cut emissions via shorter journeys. The mode share of motor vehicles in total commuting trips is only gradually diminishing, while the share of walking and cycling is only marginally increasing. We explore possible explanations for the slow progress in achieving aspirations. Our main findings are: first, there is a significant ambition gap between councils’ stated goals, on the one hand, and measures adopted by councils, on the other; and second, ‘business as usual’ policies of central government are dampening these cities’ will and ability to adopt more sustainable policies. We conclude that city mitigation performance will likely be modest until the central government’s stance changes, but there is nevertheless a strong case, and clear opportunities, for Auckland and Wellington to strengthen their emission reductions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Climate change poses economic, social, and environmental challenges to humanity. Through the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement (PA), World leaders are obliged to identify climate solutions. In 2015, within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Challenge (UNFCCC), 197 countries negotiated the PA on climate change mitigation and adaptation. This study examines Africa's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) pledges: 47 African countries provided such pledges in 2016, while 7 countries did not ratify the PA at the time. This study hereafter examines the PA treatment effect by designing a difference-in-differences technique between (2015) and (2018). The results reveal that 47 African countries that ratified the PA together have reduced carbon emissions intensity (CE) by about 80.76% of the pledge. The implication is that based on the NDCs' pledge to reduce emissions by 32% in 2030, African countries avoided emissions by approximately 26% by 2018. The study also analyses which policy measures assisted in CE reduction, showing renewable and clean energy. This suggests that African countries to the PA ratification have not over-ambitiously increased CE in their pursuit of economic growth and development. We further estimate carbon efficiency (CEE) as a total-factor analysis. It indicates that the 47 African countries' ratification of the PA has contributed to improving CEE. Thus, the economic productivity of the factor inputs relative to those which did not ratify at the time. The results suggest that the countries that ratified the PA have a carbon efficiency reduction potential of 23.47%, while those that declined have a wider gap of 77.77%. The inferred conclusions is that countries which declined the PA ratification or later withdrawal will increase emissions and hence leading to climate consequences. The authors propose insightful, targeted policies toward achieving efficient climate goals in Africa via integrated economic and environmental measures. • Africa is a committed actor in Paris Agreement toward emissions mitigation. • NDC pledges of African countries are presently consistent with emissions targets. • Quasi-experiment on climate change policy shows reduction in carbon emissions. • NDCs contribute to carbon emission reductions of African countries • NDCs provide opportunities for socioeconomic and environmental co-benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes four basic points about movement toward a low carbon economy in Canada: first, that it is important for political leaders, policy analysts, and researchers to approach the issue in terms of a transition to a carbon-emission–free society; second, that in Canada the development of regional pathways to a low-carbon economy is crucial; third, that we need ‘‘green development strategies’’ if we are to maximize the opportunities presented by this transition; and finally, that we should think about low-carbon politics as well as low-carbon economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ambitious 2050 decarbonization strategy of the European Union (EU) must implement and reconcile several economic, social, and technological targets, such as continuous prosperity, growth, and increases in energy production and reductions in fossil fuel (FOS) intensity. These dimensions are included in a modified Kaya identity that, consequently, becomes a considerably useful accounting identity to analyze convergence among the EU member states toward a carbon neutrality target. Surprisingly, no comprehensive analysis of the convergence of the growth of all Kaya components toward the decarbonization target among the EU countries and the rest of the world has been conducted thus far. This study fills this gap in the literature by providing the first comprehensive evidence for the simultaneous convergence process of FOS reduction for all the Kaya components from 1990 to 2018. A balanced panel data is used in the study. The results reveal that there is evidence of σ -absolute and conditional β -convergence process for several groups of EU countries. Furthermore, to provide policy recommendations, we simulate alternative scenarios to assess when the target levels of decarbonization can be reached, providing relevant policy implications for the credibility of the 2050 EU policy regarding climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to understand how the UK government's headline climate change targets are translated into action at the local level in the transport sector drawing on the findings of research in two English regions. In doing so, these headline targets are identified as a symbolic meta-policy that results in little action on the ground and which challenges established conceptions of policy implementation. Both the 'meta' and 'symbolic' aspects of the policy offer part of the explanation for the lack of substantive action on the ground. As a meta-policy, the headline targets across government require the elaboration of other policies at other levels such as targets for government departments and local authorities, but these are largely absent, leaving the meta-policy without teeth. Over time, these headline targets have developed into a symbolic policy, serving political goals but having little practical effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategies for dealing with climate change must incorporate and quantify all the relevant uncertainties, and be designed to manage the resulting risks. Here we employ the best available knowledge so far, summarized by the three working groups of the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR5; refs , , ), to quantify the uncertainty of mitigation costs, climate change dynamics, and economic damage for alternative carbon budgets. We rank climate policies according to different decision-making criteria concerning uncertainty, risk aversion and intertemporal preferences. Our findings show that preferences over uncertainties are as important as the choice of the widely discussed time discount factor. Climate policies consistent with limiting warming to 2 °C above preindustrial levels are compatible with a subset of decision-making criteria and some model parametrizations, but not with the commonly adopted expected utility framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responsibility for climate change lies at the heart of societal debate over actions to address it. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change established the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' among nations, suggesting that industrialized nations that had produced the greatest share of historic emissions bore particular responsibility for preventing dangerous interference with the climate system. But climate responsibilities can be attributed in other ways as well. Here, we explore the conceptual territory of responsibility. We consider the distinctive responsibilities of the major investor-owned producers of fossil fuels, assessing the actions these companies took and could have taken to act upon the scientific evidence of climate change. We conclude that major investor-owned fossil energy companies carry significant responsibility for climate change. It is still possible for these companies to effectively contribute to a solution. Significant progress in reducing emissions and limiting climate change could be achieved if companies 1) unequivocally communicate to the public, shareholders, and policymakers the climate risks resulting from continued use of their products, and therefore the need for restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the 2 °C global temperature target; 2) firmly reject contrary claims by industry trade associations and lobbying groups; and, 3) accelerate their transition to the production of low-carbon energy. Evidence from history strongly suggests that a heightened societal focus on their climate responsibilities will be needed to hasten such a transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Great interest has been in unilateral climate policies, given present difficulty of establishing stable global coordinated agreements. In this paper, we investigate underlining factors explaining large differences in performances, when the same carbon emission reductions are achieved in different abating countries. To this end, we develop a new multi-country general equilibrium model, incorporating six countries (or world regions), two goods, six production inputs, capital mobility, energy mobility and international trade. Meanwhile, we adopt two performance indicators, with carbon leakage representing environmental efficiency and carbon emission abatement costs revealing cost-effectiveness. Our findings are as follows. Firstly, there are large differences in performances among these unilateral climate policies, as evidenced by large differences in leakage rates and carbon emission abatement costs. Secondly, the new global climate treaties to replace the Kyoto Protocol should be able to induce more carbon emission reductions in countries with low carbon emission reduction costs, since such setting contributes to global cost savings. Finally, developed countries have high carbon emission abatement costs compared with large developing countries (China and India in this paper), implying that there should be trade-off mechanisms between efficiency and equity regarding how to allocate carbon emission reductions among countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accompanying the boom in the global economy, CO 2 emissions have soared over the past several decades, with the developing world exhibiting higher emission growth rates than the developed world. Emissions transfers between regions, which represent a significant fraction of total emissions, are assumed to be a primary factor contributing to this difference. It is important to understand these transfer figures and the resulting consumption-based emissions in order to evaluate the emissions drivers and establish climate policies. Existing studies, however, have merely estimated figures over a 20 years span (post-1990) using a traditional input–output analysis (IOA) framework. To broaden the data coverage (to pre-1990) of these transfer figures and to further analyze their impacts on total emissions in the long term, a new model called the Long-term Consumption-based Accounting model (LCBA), which is directly based on statistics, is developed to span the period from 1948 to 2011. The results are consistent with the magnitudes and trends of existing studies over the validation (post-1990) period. We use Monte Carlo methods to calculate upper and lower bounds on the LCBA for each country and year, and find that 3 existing time series are almost fully included within these boundaries from 1990. Furthermore, the LCBA model is succinct enough to be easily expanded for future GHG estimations or to analyze other ecological footprints related to “the flow of materials”. It can be assumed that the soaring emissions transfers will seriously jeopardize the current climate policies such as Kyoto Protocol. The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) under which all parties are legally bound will require a consumption-based accounting method together with the territorial one in order to achieve an equitable agreement. However, more researches are still needed to facilitate the use of these figures to better support decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have only two of the eleven original members of the Western Climate Initiative implemented a cap-and-trade system? This article compares the implementation of cap-and-trade in California and Quebec versus in New Mexico and British Columbia. Ideas around the reality of anthropogenic global warming and the legitimacy of cap-and-trade created favorable context in three jurisdictions, although institutions condition the expression of these ideas in the policy-making process. Since parliamentary institutions concentrate power, elite consensus is more important in Canada, while in the United States public opinion plays a more significant role. However, ideational factors shaped by political institutions do not explain differences in cap-and-trade implementation. Growth in shale gas production, welcomed in British Columbia and New Mexico but resisted by Quebec and marginal in California, further explain different outcomes. Ideas, mediated by institutions, are the necessary prerequisites for action, while material factors influence policy instrument choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article theorizes about the implications for domestic climate politics of three distinct roles countries play in the global carbon supply chain: fossil fuel producer, manufacturer of carbon-intensive goods, and final consumer. Because international responsibility is assigned to territorial emissions, countries at either end of the global supply chain effectively evade environmental responsibility by shifting fossil fuel combustion to manufacturing countries. In so doing, they lessen the political challenges of reducing domestic emissions. Although exporters of carbon-intensive goods are reluctant to disadvantage local producers, importers can craft policies that both reduce territorial emissions and create local jobs. Ironically, fossil fuel exporters can emerge as leaders in reducing their own territorial emissions, a finding illustrated by case studies of British Columbia and Norway. The conclusion argues that shifting responsibility for carbon emissions to the point of either final consumption or fossil fuel extraction could facilitate an international climate agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to significantly reduce global carbon emissions, it is necessary also to control CO2 emissions in fast growing emerging economies such as India. The question is how the Indian economy would be affected by including the country in an international climate regime. In this analysis we soft-link a global and a single-country computable general equilibrium model in order to be able to capture distributional issues as well as international repercussions. We analyze different options of transferring revenues from domestic carbon taxes and international transfers to different household types and the effects of different assumptions on exchange rates on transfer payments. Our results show (i) that welfare effects can differ significantly for different household types, which is generally ignored in analyses with global models, and (ii) that these effects are significantly influenced by international price repercussions and by accounting for transfers from international permit sales which is generally ignored in single-country models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key dimension of the debate about policy innovation is the extent to which new policies achieve significant and lasting effects on the problems they purport to address. However, little is known about such effects. We break new ground by investigating how far current evaluation practices in a policy system with relatively ambitious climate policies – the European Union – identify the most effective (carbon-reducing) policies. We find that a small number of policy instruments are projected to deliver the lion’s share of emission reductions. Setting aside the special case of emissions trading, these instruments are not particularly innovative. If significant practical and political obstacles can be addressed, more (detailed) evaluations could enhance the evidence base and also the political prospects for delivering deeper emissions cuts through to 2050. An evaluation perspective could also offer a very different way to consider policy innovation dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Academics and practitioners have responded to the gridlock in the international climate-change regime by more actively exploring the ability of individuals and/or groups of states to fill in the associated ‘governance gaps’ by engaging in policy innovation at the level of the nation state, including its regional and local emanations. Here, we draw together the findings of a collection that, for the first time, explores policy innovation at this level from three key perspectives: the source of new policy elements (‘invention’), their wider entry into use (‘diffusion’), and their projected and/or real effects (‘evaluation’). After critically reviewing the findings of the contributions from these perspectives, we explore new directions for definitional, conceptual-theoretical, and empirical work in this field. Finally, we explore how a more systematic analysis of policy innovation dynamics can inform a much fuller understanding of climate policy and governance across different sites and scales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To determine whether innovations in policy concerning climate-change mitigation are symbolic or truly radical in the sense of ‘tipping’ existing policy portfolios towards a new instrumental logic, we study policy innovations in the context of pre-existing policy portfolios and analyse the associated dynamics over time. Our analysis is facilitated by a new measurement of policy output, the Index of Climate Policy Activity. This new approach sheds light on the relative importance of policy innovations in complex policy portfolios, and serves as a blueprint for further analyses of the politics of policy innovation. Empirically, we analyse policy innovations within the policy portfolios of energy production in Austria, Germany, and the UK between 1998 and 2010. We find high stability in the instrumental logic but substantial change in policy settings and calibrations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]